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ABSTRACT
It is the purpose of this study to examine the social nature 
of legal aid. The thesis takes as its point of departure the delates 
about the problems identified in the administration of the legal aid 
scheme and the suggestions to improve this scheme. It seeks firstly 
to provide the reader with an account of the historical changes in 
legal aid in order to acquaint him with the knowledge about legal aid 
on which the debates and suggestions are based. Following this the 
major protagonists are considered and categorised according to their 
approach towards the problems of legal aid. It is suggested that 
these varieties of approach, however, all suffer from fundamental 
limitations in that they fail to question or examine the social and 
historical basis of legal aid and the legal system. It is argued 
that only by examining this basis can the nature of legal aid be 
understood and suggestions for amelioration or change assessed.
The second half of the thesis is a detailed study of the social 
basis of legal aid in the period of the 1920’s, 1930’s and early 
1940?s, a period chosen because of its importance for the growth 
of welfare services generally. The major groups involved in the 
creation of legal aid are identified and their interests examined; 
then the role of these groups in producing and changing legal aid 
is analysed. This is followed by a conclusion which draws together 
the main themes discussed in the production of legal aid in this 
period,- stressing in particular the importance of the response of the 
lower classes to the scheme, and’ re-emphasises the need to understand 
the social basis of the phenomenon in order to assess policy recom­
mendations. It is the development of this argument and its demonstration
in the analysis of the production of legal aid that is the major 
contribution of this thesis to sociology and socio-legal studies*
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PREFACE
It is the purpose of this study to elucidate the social nature 
of legal aid. Although partly motivated by a desire to understand 
and explain the ideological debates about what should be done to 
improve legal aid or to solve the problem of providing legal services 
to the poor, the study does not attempt to contribute to this debate 
by recommending a new or more radical approach, or by suggesting 
that a solution to the problem may easily be found. Indeed, in a 
reappraisal of this the legal aid problem, it can be seen that the 
problem only exists for a legal ideology which wishes to legitimate 
its concentration upon the upholding and administering of a legal 
system dealing primarily with commercial and property interests, 
by claiming that the services provided are equally available to, 
and useful for the majority of the lower classes. Thus, rather than 
seeking a solution to the problem of legal aid, this study seeks to 
explore its availability by discussing for whom legal aid is a 
problem and how the concerns and practices of those involved with it 
determine the form which the aid takes, and, of course, at the same 
time prescribe the limitations to any suggested changes in it.
In order to make such a reappraisal of legal aid it is necessary 
to adopt a perspective outside of the legal ideology within which 
the problem is conceptualised. In fact, it is necessary to take up 
the theoretical concern of explaining the existence of this ideological 
problem itself as a function of the economic, political and ideological 
practices of those concerned with it. Therefore this study is an 
attempt to describe the limitations of existing writing and research 
on the availability of legal aid and to begin a partial explanation
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of the social nature of legal aid within a particular historical 
period* As will be argued later, a full explanation of legal aid 
would require a detailed appraisal of the social formation of the 
particular period, and of the major economic, political and ideological 
practices within it, which would be too great a task for this study.
Four chapters are used for the discussion of this approach.
The first is an overvie?? of the changes in the availability and 
organisation of legal aid, intended to provide a background or what 
could be called fcommon knowledge1 of the changes in the provisions 
for legal aid in this country, with comparative examples being drawn 
from Scotland and the United States. Although presented in a chronolog­
ical form, it is not intended that this overview should give the 
impression that changes in the provision of legal aid have followed 
any sort of gradual development; this impression would involve the 
imputation of order to specific historical events, which, as argued 
in the later chapters, are products of particular social configurations 
at specific historical conjunctures* The first chapter is not a 
*history1 of legal aid, since the notion of historical knowledge 
implies some measure of understanding which is not provided here; 
it is primarily a vehicle for acquainting the reader with knowledge 
??hich he will need to read and comprehend later material.
The second chapter is a reappraisal of the legal aid problem.
It is a critique of prior attempts to solve this problem, and an 
attempt to situate these efforts within the ideological practices 
of those involved in the creation of legal aid; it will be argued 
that the problem only exists for these practices because of their 
desire to legitimate their involvement in the existing legal system.
This chapter suggests that in order to avoid the limitations imposed
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by such an ideological perspective, a theoretical position must be 
adopted which can explain the social nature of legal aid as the 
product of the practices of those groups involved in its creation 
during a specific historical period.
Chapters three and four use this theoretical framework to 
begin to explain the creation of legal aid. Chapter three is concerned 
primarily to identify the interests of the groups involved in the 
creation of legal aid, the economic, political and ideological 
positions of these groups, and the nature of their concern with the 
legal aid problem. The fourth chapter looks at the way in which 
these interests determine the nature of legal aid, and the way in 
which the changing nature of legal aid, in turn, demands that these 
interests be altered and adapted. It is finally argued that the 
major dynamic element in forcing changes in the nature of legal aid 
is the antagonism between the unarticulated demands of the lower 
classes, especially the poorer working class; and the attempts at 
the legitimation of their position, by those groups within the ruling 
class concerned with the administration of the legal system, through 
the creation and adaptation of legal aid.
In spite of the increasing amount of literature purporting to 
deal with legal aid, there is often little conformity between writers 
over what activities are encompassed by the term. Therefore, the 
meaning adopted for the purposes of this study should be spelt out: 
legal aid is free or subsidized work by lawyers for persons considered, 
by any relevant body, to be unable to pay court costs or lawyers* 
fees; or the provision of such help by other institutions for what 
the organisers of these institutions term as 'legal problems*.
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The historical focus for this study is the period of the 1920*s? 
1930’s and early 1940’s; and, in exploring the creation of legal aid 
during this period, much original material has been gleaned from a 
reading of the unpublished records of the Lord Chancellor's Office 
for this period, which can be found, mainly in the form of bundles 
of letters and memoranda, in the Public Records Office, Chancery Lane*. 
Reference will not be made to the specific source of information 
taken from these records as it would be time-consuming and of little 
benefit to the reader, but particular references can be supplied on 
request by the author. Where published material is referred to the 
reference procedure adopted will be to note, in parentheses in the 
text, the author, date of publication, and, where relevant, the 
page number of the reference, so that the full title and publisher 
of the text, as listed in the alphabetical bibliography, can be 
referred to. .
^ o r  anyone wishing to follow up this research by looking through 
these files, the reference numbers of those which do contain 
information relevant to the creation of legal aid are:
L.C.O. 2/557, 558, 564, 573, 644, 853,979 , 980, 981, 982, 983,984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 1032, 1033, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1059, 1066, 
1193, 1681, 1809, 1836, 1837, 1838, 1856, 1859, 1891, 2843, 284), 
and 2845o
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CHAPTER ONE
"AN OVERVIEW OP CHANGES 
IN THE AVAILABILITY AND ORGANISATION OE LEGAL AID”
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a 
"background picture of the changes which have occurred in the provision 
of legal aid in England and Wales, in order to assist in situating 
the issues and events referred to in other material* However, the 
chapter will also deal with changes in the provision of legal aid 
in Scotland and the United States, in the expectation that comparative 
study will help to illuminate the background to the situation here* 
Events in Scotland are of obvious comparative relevance* Scotland 
is geographically proximate and controlled by the same Parliament, 
although it has a different legal system; and it is referred to 
many times by English writers and politicians as a model to be either 
emulated or avoided. The United States is important because it has 
a very similar legal system and legal profession to those found 
in this country, but has developed separately and produced different 
legal aid schemes, which again have been frequently referred to by 
English Y/riters, particularly in the last ten years or so, when the 
schemes operating in the United States have been quoted by many 
as the blueprints for the solving of the legal aid problem in this 
country#
In order to avoid confusion, the comparative changes in Scotland 
and the United States over different periods have been dealt with 
separately, after discussion of the situation in this country. The 
social organisations of the different countries are obviously very 
different, and although reference is made by some to the situation
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in other countries, it is necessary to be wary of seeing developments 
in one country as parallelling or following those of another, or 
indeed of seeing the situation in one country as the cause or result 
of changes in another. Furthermore, as will be stressed later, it 
is necessary to avoid seeing changes in any one country as gradual 
or conscious developments towards a specific social form, whether 
this is the existing legal aid scheme or any projected future solution 
to the legal aid problem. Imposing such an order onto p’ast changes 
is teleological and only conceals the specificity of particular 
historical events behind a spurious ideology of ’development*.
England and Wales before 1914:
In the light of this last point it can be seen that it is more 
than unlikely that the clause in the Magna Carta, which states that 
"to no man will we sell or deny justice", constituted the binding 
contract between State and people which G-urney Champion (1926; P.1b3) 
claimed that it did. However, this clause in the Magna Carta does 
demonstrate that even in a centralised legal system as little developed 
as that oif Medieval England, there was some recognition of a need 
to ensure, on paper at least, that the law was not available only 
to a privileged class in society. Maguire (1923) has unearthed 
evidence of poor suitors being excused certain legal fees during 
this period; but the first recorded recognition that poor persons 
could use the courts without payment came in 1495 the statute 11 
Henry VII,c. 12. Quoted at length in Maguire (1923; P«373), this 
Act permitted a judge to appoint* attorneys to carry through poor 
persons* cases free of charge, providing that the applicants had 
a "yearly lyving" of under 40s. and a capital worth of less than £5*
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This ’in forma pauperis* procedure v/as seemingly not in constant 
use, and by the time of Elizabeth I contained a clause which required 
that, "If the matter shall fall out against the Plaintiff, he shall 
be punished with whipping and pillory•*’
It is extremely doubtful that this sanction was ever consistently 
invoked, but its existence on paper did at least indicate a lack of 
any real commitment to extending the full use of the legal system 
to the lower classes of the time. The ’in forma pauperis’ procedure 
remained little used and little changed for centuries, despite the 
increasing centralisation and expansion of the legal system as a 
whole. In 184-6 the County Courts Act introduced a new court system 
with lower court fees and purportedly no need for legal representation, 
whose courts would hear many cases involving lower class litigants; 
but it soon became clear that the majority of cases in these courts 
were commercial debt-collecting actions; the quicker, cheaper 
procedure of the courts making them attractive to businessmen, so that 
the lower classes were involved only as defendants in actions for 
debts. However, fears about the repercussions of having a legal 
system Y/hich effectively excluded the majority of the population 
had not disappeared by the nineteenth century and towards the end of 
the century there were the first major changes in the official legal 
aid scheme.
In 1883 the Act of Henry VII was repealed, and provision for 
actions to be brought ’in forma pauperis* brought under rules, made 
by the Rules Committee of the Supreme Court. In the twenty-five 
years from 1858 to 1882 the number of ’in forma pauperis* applications 
had only averaged five a year, and, anyway, under the 1495 Act, 
this procedure had only been available to plaintiffs, who further
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had to produce the signed approval of counsel of the merit of their 
case. The rules of 1883 raised the capital limit which would determine 
eligibility for the procedure from £5 to £25 and made the scheme 
available to defendants as well as plaintiffs. However, it was 
still necessary to procure counsel’s opinion and an affidavit from 
a solicitor in order to proceed 'in forma pauperis1 after 1883; and 
applications only increased to an average of thirty-two a year.
The decision in Carson v. Pickersgill did not help to extend the 
usage of the procedure since it confirmed that the lawyers representing 
a poor litigant could not recover their full costs, but merely their 
out-of-pocket expenses.
In the late nineteenth century there were also the beginnings 
of unofficial schemes to provide free legal assistance for poor 
persons. The University Settlements in East London, which provided 
the opportunity for young gentlemen from Oxford and Cambridge to 
broaden their experience of life, as well as co-ordinating charitable 
aid to the poor, began to hold regular weekly meetings at which
lawyers would give free legal advice to anyone who came along,
!
providing that they were ’poor’* The first of these advice centre 
meetings began at Mansion House in 1890, followed by others at
ISouthwark in 1897 and Toynbee Hall in 1898. These legal advice 
centres were usually dependant upon the charity of individual lawyers, 
who turned up after a full day's work, and the services provided 
were effective^ restricted to the giving of advice, which was often 
"ad hoc and superficial" (G-urney Champion, 1926; P. 17), or the 
occasional drafting of a letter in pursuance of a claim.
154 L.J.Q.B. 484. (1885)
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There were some ’legal aid societies* in Britain at this time,
who would pursue poor persons cases in the courts in return for a
share in any money recovered in the action by way of compensation#
The solicitors behind these societies managed to make a sufficient
living out of conducting these cases, but were officially despised
by the main body of the legal profession, who dubbed them with the
2name ‘ambulance chasers’ , constantly remarked that their activities 
were ’unethical*, and demanded that the ’speculative solicitors’ 
behind these 'legal aid societies' be driven out of business by 
the strict enforcement of professional codes of conduct* There is 
evidence to suggest that, even by the 1960's, however, they had failed 
to achieve this^*
In this country provision of legal help for the lower classes 
in criminal cases had always been approached separately from that 
in civil cs,ses* In the nineteenth century the only way in which 
a defendant, who could not afford court or counsel fees, could secure 
legal representation was by means of the 'Dock Brief'* Under this 
procedure the defendant would apply to the judge, who, if he allowed 
the 'Dock Brief*, would permit the defendant to choose any frockea 
barrister present in court to represent him at a cost of £1 :3s:6d*
The only representation available under this system, however, was
2This stems from the practice of some firms to send letters, and 
sometimes employees (’runners'), around the casualty Y/ards of hospitals requesting accident victims to avail themselves of the facilities 
of the society to claim compensation* The majority of 'legal aid 
society* work was accident litigation, since it produced compensation out of which the firm could be paid.
^In 15^4 'The G-uardian', quoted in Abel Smith and Stevens (19^7;P.345), carried a note of two firms of solicitors offering to take 
accident cases for 10% of any compensation recovered*
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that by a barrister, briefed in court, immediately before the case; 
and at the turn of the century this was felt to be inadequate, even 
for criminals * In 1903 the Poor Prisoners Defence Act was passed, 
providing for solicitors and barristers to be allocated to poor 
prisoners by the committing magistrate or the trial judge, if it 
was "desirable in the interests of justice" that the defendant be 
represented. This representation was, however, only available in 
the High Court and could only be given if the defendant first disclosed 
his defence to the committing magistrate; and, although there was 
provision for payment of the lawyers involved out of local funds, 
the fees did not amount to very much, particularly when compared 
with the amount paid to prosecuting lawyers.
Thus it can be seen that, although there had been a legal aid 
scheme officially in existence since 1495 in this country, it had 
been virtually ineffectual and had changed little until the beginning 
of the twentieth century.
Scotland before 1914i
In Scotland statutory provision for legal aid dated from 1424, 
when poor persons were first allowed to have lawyers appointed to 
conduct their cases free of charge*1*. There were, however, requirements 
for a ’probabi'lis causa litigandi*. a statement that the case was 
worth bringing, and a certificate of poverty, often given by the 
local minister or Parish elders; these requirements were as strict 
as those under the English scheme. Unlike the English scheme, which
S?hese lawyers would be drawn from a list of nominations confirmed by the local sheriff. Lawyers remained on the list, the ’Poor Persons’ Roll’, for one year.
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was only available for cases being heard in the High Court, legal 
aid in Scotland was available in the Sheriff Court and the Court 
of Session, although effectively not in the police and justice of 
peace courts, which heard more cases than any other courts (Young, 
19.69, P.201).
Despite Scottish claims that their official legal aid scheme 
was the most comprehensive in the ?/orld at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Young (19^9) adduces no evidence that it had 
been more widely used than the English scheme, and, of course, it 
was limited to free representation in court actions. The need for 
any other form of legal services for the poor was ignored, and, as 
in this countiy, unofficial voluntary attempts to provide other 
services were being introduced at the end of the nineteenth century. 
In fact, perhaps the largest voluntary legal advice centre in Britain 
began operating in Edinburgh in 1900* The Edinburgh Legal Dispensary 
advised 37>645 people in its first twenty-five years of operation; 
the average of 3*48 clients per night in its first year increasing 
to 45*94 in its twenty-fifth.
United States before 1917:
The situation in Great Britain contrasts starkly with early 
provisions for legal help in the United States. After the United 
States achieved independance from Britain, the ’in forma pauperis1 
procedure was retained only in some states; and, follov/ing the 
example of New York, where the first office was opened in 1876, 
legal advice centres, or 'Legal Aid Offices' as these were called, 
became the primary form of free legal help for the lower classes.
The offices were financed largely by regular contributions from
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the local ’community chest', a charitable fund set up in many large 
cities and controlled largely by prominent local businessmen. These 
contributions were normally sufficient to employ one or two lawyers, 
full-time, in giving legal advice to local people who fell below 
a strict poverty test and so were assumed to be unable to afford 
to hire a lawyer in 'private practice'. However, if the lawyer 
felt that a poor client had a worthwhile case, he could in addition 
to giving advice, represent that person in court free of charge.
Therefore, by the beginning of the twentieth century, there 
was a full-time legal service for the poor provided by these 'Legal 
Aid Offices' in the United States, the like of which were not found 
in Britain. Heber Smith (1917) praised the achievements of charity 
in providing such a scheme and cited the American offices as an 
example to be followed throughout the world. Even in the United 
States, however, 'Legal Aid Offices* could only be found in the 
largest cities; they gave mostly legal advice only since they could 
not afford many court cases and did not want to compete with 'private 
practice'; and they attracted the least competent and least successful 
lawyers, who had failed to establish their own private firm.
England and Yfales 1914-1951 '
By the time of the publication of Heber Smith's book in the 
United States in 1917* there had been important changes in the 
legal aid scheme in England and Wales, which were to provide the 
basis of a new scheme which operated, with modifications, for the 
next thirty years.
In spite of the widening of the eligibility criteria for the
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'in forma pauperis* procedure under the new rules in 1883, there
were still only about 15 to 20 applicants a year throughout the
1900's. In 1913 a High Court Rules Committee considered the desirability
of reforms in the procedure, and eventually, after numerous redrafts,
a new set of rules was introduced in 1914* These rules changed
the name of the system to the 'Poor Persons’ Procedure'; extended
the maximum amount of capital determining eligibility to <£50? with
discretion to raise this to £100 in exceptional circumstances;
provided for applications to be considered by a panel of 'reporting'
solicitors and for volunteer 'conducting' solicitors to be assigned
to successful applicants by a permanent body of state-paid administrators,
called 'prescribed officers'; and allowed for these solicitors
(but not any barristers who may also be assigned under the scheme)
to be paid out-of-pocket expenses, hopefully from a fund set up
by voluntary subscriptions with contributions from the Treasury.
The 'Poor Persons' Procedure’ was still only available in
] 5the High Court, since as early as 1849 the case of Chinn v. Bullen
had indicated that there was no county court rule allowing poor
persons to conduct their own cases free of cost in those courts.
Effectively the 'Poor Persons’ Procedure* was only used in the
High Court by applicants for petitions of divorce. During the
first world war there was an increase in the demand for divorce,
and an increase in the number of applications for representation
under the 'Poor Persons' Procedure*, for which the legal profession
and the 'prescribed officers’ were not prepared. As well as this
there were complaints that the 'out-of-pocket' expenses paid to
519 L.J.C.P. 42.
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some solicitors under the 1914 rules were allowing these solicitors 
to make a living out of conducting poor persons cases (one solicitor 
was reputed to be conducting over 400 poor persons cases a year) 
and yet the Treasury fund to provide for these expenses had never 
materialised*
In 1919 a committee was set up under the chairmanship of Lord 
Lawrence, High Court judge, to look into the operation of the rules*
The Lawrence Committee recommended that the rules be tightened up 
to prevent the procedure becoming overloaded and to stop exploitation 
by 'unethical' solicitors* Rules incorporating the recommendations 
of the committee were approved by the High Court Rules Committee 
in 1920, adding an income limit of £2 a week, extendable in exceptional 
circumstances to £4* to the capital eligibility limit; requiring 
the payment of a deposit of £5 (£15 in nullity cases) by the applicant 
before a certificate would be granted for matrimonial proceedings: 
and restricting the payments to be made to conducting solicitors 
to expenses actually incurred, without the previous additional payment 
to cover office costs. These 1920 rules also formally abolished the 
'in forma pauperis* procedure, a loophole which had been left by the 
1914 rules, and which enabled unscrupulous solicitors to take a 
poor persons' case under the 'in forma pauperis' procedure and 
so claim these full expenses*
Although less than of applications were granted certificates 
for representation, (over 90^ of these being for divorce proceedings) 
by 1922 there was a shortage of solicitors volunteering to conduct 
poor persons' cases* Several circular letters were sent out to 
members of the Law Society requesting them to volunteer to conduct 
poor persons cases; and in 1923 a second committee under Lord Lawrence
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was set up to consider ways of solving the problems in the 'Poor 
Persons* Procedure*«. In their report in 1924> the Second Lawrence 
Committee recommended that divorce proceedings and interlocutory 
proceedings for divorce be decentralised, and that the Law Society 
take over the administration of the *Poor Persons' Procedure', The 
latter was eventually completed in 1926, although the actual administra­
tive work continued to be done by the old 'prescribed officers', 
now under the auspices of the Law Society, who were given an annual 
Treasury grant, initially of £3000, to cover the cost of running 
the scheme.
Even before the Second Lawrence Committee had presented its 
report, another committee had been promised to investigate the 
possibility of aid before the Magistrates Courts, This committee, 
under the chairmanship of Lord Finlay eventually sat for two periods 
and produced two reports. The first report, in 1926, said that the 
absence of provision for free legal help in the Magistrates Courts 
had not led to any appreciable miscarriage of justice; but that, 
to cover those fev/ cases where legal help might be necessary, 
magistrates should be able to grant certificates for free legal 
representation in "exceptional circumstances", where this was 
"desirable in the interests of justice". They also recommended 
that the requirement that the defendant disclose his defence in 
applying for a certificate be dropped, and. that the fees paid to 
lawyers representing poor defendants be increased.
At first nothing was done about these recommendations of the 
Finlay Committee. However, in 1930 a Private Member's Bill was 
introduced into Parliament to establish an office of 'Public Defender' 
to conduct defences for poor defendants. In some States in the
15
United States there were already ’Public Defenders’, attornies
employed full-time to conduct the defences of eligible, poor
defendants and paid a salary out of state funds; the Bill envisaged
the existence of at least one similar office in England* As a
Private Member’s Bill, without the support of the Law Society,
this attempt was doomed to failure; however, it was followed in
the same year by a Bill to implement the recommendations contained
in the first report of the Finlay Committee, which became the Poor
Prisoners Defence Act of 1930* ‘The Act abolished the requirement
cto disclose a defence and allowed magistrates to grant certificates 
for free legal assistance in their courts in; "exceptional circumstances"*
The second session of the Finlay Committee was concerned with 
the more general problem of legal advice and assistance in civil 
cases outside the High Court* A final report on this aspect of 
the investigation was published in 1928, stating that, generally, 
the current situation was satisfactory and that,
’’There are many cases where, though there may be 
some violation of a legal right, it is neither prudent nor advisable to litigate, and we believe that any scheme which might tend to make people 
more litigious should be deprecated*"
(Finlay Committee, 1928; Para* 13) 
Although they did not recommend any substantial changes in the 
official provision for free help, the Finlay Committee did express 
praise for the efforts of unofficial bodies in providing legal 
advice and assistance for the poor and wished to encourage particularly 
the work of the voluntary ’Poor Man’s Lawyer* centres.
^Although as the Rushcliffe Committee later pointed out (194-5;Para.135)» in some cases the accused was still required to disclose a defence before a judge would accept that representation was "desirable in the interests of justice".
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Following the example of the settlement advice centres of the 
late nineteenth century, local law societies, charitable bodies, 
and even individual solicitors had begun evening advice sessions 
in church halls and similar places in large cities throughout the 
country, during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Like 
the settlement advice centres, the ’Poor Man’s Lawyers’ tended to 
be very limited in scope, usually just giving superficial advice 
to clients, and they relied very heavily upon the charitable spirit 
of the one or two solicitors who set them up* The ’Poor Man’s 
Lawyers’ in London were under the none too comprehensive supervision 
of the Bentham Committee, itself a charitable body; but, outside 
London, only t?/elve tovms had ’Poor Man’s Lawyers’, and in the 
late 1930*s the secretary of a 'Poor Persons* Procedure* committee 
gave an indication of the impact they had had in some circles:
"I do not quite know what is meant by the Poor Man’s Lawyer Association."
(quoted in Allen Jones, 1938; P.298)
!
However, after the Finlay Committee, the ’Poor Man’s Lawyers* 
remained the only organisations giving legal advice and assistance 
to poor persons generally; and the only concrete results of the 
Committee’s final report were another circular letter from the 
Law Society to its members asking them to volunteer to conduct 
cases under the ’Poor Persons’ Procedure’ (in 1930 only 5^7 out 
of 5000 London solicitors were prepared to conduct cases) and an 
amendment to the rules allowing free representation under the ’Poor 
Persons’ Procedure’ to be retained when cases were remitted to the
17
7Comity Courts from the High Court *
Thus in the 1930's the major provision for free legal help 
continued to be the ’Poor Persons' Procedure’, governed by the 
1914 rules as amended* The procedure was used almost entirely 
for divorce proceedings, and there was continual pressure from the 
Law Society to extend further the decentralisation of these pro­
ceedings* This was opposed by the Bar and by the higher officers 
of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, who said that local 
High Court registrars were treating applications for divorce too 
lightly and sent a circular letter, demanding a tightening up of 
proceedings, to District Registries in 1929* Minimal further de­
centralisation occurred in 1930 as a result of the recommendations 
of a committee set up the previous year to investigate poor persons’ 
divorce cases; but this did not significantly change the working 
of the procedure, nor did it do much to alleviate the problems of
the almost continual shortage of solicitors to conduct poor persons 
8cases *
Apart from High Court divorce under the 'Poor Persons* Procedure’, 
free legal advice and assistance continued to be provided primarily
The case of Cook v* Imperial Tobacco Co* Ltd*, (1922) 2K.B.158., had confirmed the suggestion in Chinn v* Bullen, 19L.J.C.P* 42 (1849), that remission of court fees or free representation were not available in the County Courts; as a general principle of practice, and the Finlay Committee recommended no change in this situation.
gThe committee, appointed in 1929, consisted of 5 representatives, from the Lord Chancellor's Office, the legal profession and the High Court* They ss/t for a few months only and recommended that divorce 
jurisdiction be extended to Assizes with extreme caution because of 
the difficulties involved with the procedure, much of which was 
unwritten. They listed 15 new District Registries and 8 new Assize towns to be given jurisdiction much less than the Law Society had 
asked for.
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by the 'Poor Man's Lawyers' in the 1930*a, although increasing
numbers of articles, books and reports argued that this type of
voluntary effort was inadequate and that more should be done, at
9least in the way of organisation, by the state © The fear of
10'ambulance chasers' remained , as presumably did their practices;
but it seems that the 'Poor Persons' Procedure* itself only continued
to function at all because the rules were not adhered to and solicitors
genei’ally were paid more than merely their out-of-pocket expenses.
Payment for bsnristers was less important as the Bar had for some
time used free legal representation as an opportunity for younger
practitioners to gain unsupervised experience, a state of affairs
which was commented on by the Trades Union Congress, who in 1932
suggested that the 'Poor Persons' Procedure* was little more than
an opportunity for less experienced members of the legal profession
11to practice on the poor, ©
By the late 1930's almost of all divorces were conducted 
under the 'Poor Persons' Procedure', yet over ?Oyc of applications 
to bring divorce proceedings using the 'Poor Persons' Procedure' 
were refused, and many more dropped because of lack of funds to pay 
the required deposit. Divorce jurisdiction was periodically extended 
to a few more Assize towns, for example to Plymouth, Bournemouth, 
Wakefield and Stockport in 1938; but the widening of the grounds 
for divorce by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937 resulted in a
9See, for example, the change in emphasis exemplified in the difference 
between two articles in the "Law Times", the first by Wentworth 
Pritchard in 1935 and the second by Allen Jones in 1938.
A QSee Wentworth Pritchard (1935> P.237)*
^Quoted in the "Solicitor's Journal" Vol. 76, 18 June 1932.
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massive increase in the number of applications under the 'poor 
Persons* Procedure %  and even the La?/ Society were forced to admit 
that the system was not functioning satisfactorily* The Law Society’s 
annual report on the running of the scheme in 1938 noted that many 
areas of the country had backlogs of cases for which certificates 
had been granted, but for which conducting solicitors could not 
be found.
A year after the introduction of the new grounds for divorce 
a 'strong* committee was appointed to consider the ’Poor Persons* 
Procedure', with a view to recommending any necessary or desirable 
changes in the provisions for free legal aid to the poor* The 
committee was under the chairmanship of Lord Hodson; and, immediately 
after the announcement of its terms of reference, it received numerous 
offers of evidence about the problems of the current procedure and 
suggestions about what should be done. Apart from a few preliminary 
sessions, ho?/ever, the Hodson Committee never really got off the 
ground, after the outbreak of war in 1939; and it ?/as abandoned 
about a year later.
As during the first war, there was a massive increase in the 
number of applications for divorce under the ’Poor Persons' Procedure', 
and the shortage of volunteer lawyers, difficult enough before the 
war, now became acute. Wholesale reform of the system was planned, 
but could not be carried out during the war; however, it seemed 
to be generally agreed that something had to be done. The largest 
backlog of cases without lawyers to conduct them were applications 
for representation in divorce from the rapidly increasing number of 
servicemen and women, and in 1941 the Law Society suggested the 
possibility of appointing a solicitor full-time in London to conduct
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divorce proceedings ror people m  tne services* The basis or the 
scheme was that the money paid by the applicant as a deposit to cover 
out-of-pocket expenses, usually £3»3s, should be paid to the solicitor 
as a small fee for conducting the case* As mentioned above, in 
spite of the amendment to the 'Poor Persons' Procedure' rules in 
1920, solicitors conducting poor persons' cases had for some time 
been paid more than their mere out-of-pocket expenses from these 
deposits, as an incentive to continue accepting unremunerated work, 
therefore, it was argued, this further breach of the rules would 
not be unprecedented*
It was not accepted that an official scheme should operate 
in breach of rules of the Supreme Court, and so the rules were 
amended to allow the scheme to start in January 1942* A solicitor 
was appointed by the Lav/ Society together with an administrative 
staff, and all were paid entirely out of the £3*3s deposits paid 
by applicants* This office soon began to clear away the backlog 
of service cases in London, proving what many solicitors had. known 
for some time; that divorce cases could be conducted quickly and 
cheaply, and be paid for by all classes of society, if necessary* 
However, local 'Poor Persons* Procedure' committees began sending 
all their cases to London and using the existence of the 'Service 
Divorce Department' as an excuse to refuse applications from civilians.
Beginning with the army, all the services started running 
more or less extensive legal advice services for their lower ranks, 
using legally qualified commissioned officers in weekly or daily 
advice sessions* Prom these advice sessions servicemen and women 
could be referred to larger service, 'legal aid* branches, and 
eventually allowed to apply to the 'Service Divorce Department'*
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The criteria for eligibility for free legal representation by the 
Divorce Department were changed from those of capital and income 
to simply those of rank on the grounds that it made the operation 
of the scheme easier. The scheme had to operate fairly efficiently 
because it was felt that lack of a legal remedy, especially for 
marital problems, could lead to a feeling of injustice, which would 
be bad for morale and, therefore, weaken the country*s fighting 
strength.
However, the *Service Divorce Department* did not help to relieve 
the backlog of civilian cases where certificates had been granted 
for free legal representation for divorce proceedings, but for 
which there were no 'conducting* solicitors or barristers. Eventually, 
although stipulating that it should last only for the duration of 
the war, the Law Society agreed to the establishment of a 'Civilian 
Divorce Department', operating, initially only in London, along 
the same lines as the Service Department to conduct those divorce 
cases for which the local 'Poor Persons’ Procedure' committees could 
not find volunteer lawyers.
The 'Civilian Divorce Department' did help to reduce the backlog 
of divorce cases, and grew in size throughout the war; in order to 
finance it the amount of the deposit paid by applicants for legal 
help was increased several times during the period. However, the 
Department was always a substitute for the normal 'Poor Persons' 
Procedure', and even at the end of the war only employed eight full- 
time solicitors and an administrative staff. Also the Department 
was restricted to handling divorce cases, and, although these had 
always constituted the majority of poor persons cases, there were 
others which continued to come under the 'Poor Persons' Procedure',
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or, as was probably the case with personal injury cases, were still 
taken on by * ambulance chasers* for a share of the compensation 
money, or by trade union solicitors for union members in the case 
of injuries sustained at work*
However, there was no suggestion of returning to the ’Poor 
Persons’ Procedure’ after the war, since it was agreed that it had 
already broken down before* There was general agreement that a 
new system for providing free legal help for the poor would have 
to be introduced; a system that did not depend on the charitable
instincts of the legal profession* The Law Society and the Haldane
12 ‘Society had both set up working parties to consider possible new
schemes, and, after the end of the war, the Government appointed
a committee under Lord Rushcliffe to recommend a comprehensive
scheme for the provision of legal aid and advice for poor persons*
The Rushcliffe Committee reported in 1945 recommending that 
a scheme more or less the same as that proposed by the Lav/ Society 
should be adopted* The scheme would alloy/ lawyers to volunteer to 
take poor persons’ cases, as under the old system; but representation 
in any courts named in the rules made under the scheme would be 
part of the aid given; and, instead of out-of-pocket expenses, 
both the solicitor and the barrister would receive a fee paid out 
of a fund administered by the Law Society* This fund would be made 
up of an annual grant from the Government plus money paid as 
contributions by some of the users of the scheme according to their 
position on a sliding scale of ability to pay for legal representation.
12An organisation comprising lawyers who wished to see certaxn reforms in the legal system to help ensure greater equality.
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This contribution calculated by the National Assistance Board from 
applicants* information about income and capital, subject to a 
maximum, beyond which aid would not be available, and a minimum, 
below which it would be free. The committee also recommended that 
some provision bo made for legal advice for the poor at an official 
level, possibly by the setting up of centres with full-time salaried 
solicitors in large cities; and they recommended that representation 
in criminal cases, although it should not come under a new system, 
should be organised and remunerated in the same way as in civil 
cases.
All in all, the recommendations of the Rushcliffe Committee 
involved a major change in the mode of provision of free legal 
help for those who could not afford to pay court fees or employ 
lawyers. Although published at a time when a post-war Labour Government 
were attempting to rebuild the *7/elfare State1, the recommendations 
of the Rushcliffe Committee were effectively those agreed upon 
by the legal profession; and, as Heber Smith (1949; P«455) pointed 
out to the American Bar, the scheme was not "socialistic”. In fact, 
according to the 'Law Society's Gazette* (1949; Vol.XLVl), such 
a system would be the
"...profession’s protection against any question of nationalisation."
However, for four years nothing was done about the recommendations;
and when they were introduced, as a Bill into Parliament in 1949,
there ?/ere protracted arguments between the Labour back-benchers,
who wanted wider provisions and control by an administrative body,
and the representatives of the legal profession, who pointed out
that lawyers would not co-operate in the scheme unless it complied
with their requirements.
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Eventually the Legal Aid and Advice Act was passed in 1949, 
enacting almost al3. the Rushcliffe Committee recommendations, as 
first put forward by the Law Society* However, no part of the 
Act was to come into force until introduced in regulations made 
by the Lord Chancellor; and it was not until the following year 
that the first part was introduced, covering litigation in the 
High Court*
However, even though it did not immediately come into force, 
the 1949 Act did represent a different approach towards the provision 
of legal help for the poor, establishing it as a state financed 
rather than as a charitable activity; and, in expectation of this 
change, most of the old voluntary organisations closed down. The 
’Poor Persons* Procedure1 committees were replaced by the new machinery 
set up under the Act; but also the ’Poor Man’s LaYyers’ virtually 
all closed down in anticipation of the setting up of advice centres 
under the Act, and the Divorce Departments, only intended anyway 
to last for the duration of war, were gradually dismantled, although 
the last survived in Newcastle until 19^0. Thus for the early 1950fs 
at least there was less provision for legal help for the poor than 
there had been before the second war.
Scotland 1914-1933:
The 1949 Act also applied to Scotland, replacing the previous
provisions of the ’Poor Persons’ Roll* under the Statute of 1424*
13which, although amended by various acts of sederunt , had remained 
the official legal aid scheme throughout the inter-wa.r period.
13Acts of sederunt were rules made by the Court of Session, empowered by a Statute of 1532.
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It had not been any more widely used than the English scheme, however, 
130 cases being brought under it in 1923, for instance, of which 
117 were divorce proceedings. In 1937 the Morton Committee on 
legal aid in Scotland had recommended that a statutory scheme controlled 
by solicitors be established, a similar recommendation to that 
eventually made in England by the Rushcliffe Committee.
Legal aid in criminal cases in Scotland had not been affected 
by the Poor Prisoners Defence Acts of 1903 and 1930 and had continued 
to be provided gratuitously by the legal profession through the 
'Poor Persons' Roll’. The 1949 Act did envisage the establishment 
of a state financed criminal aid scheme, but the only change which 
actually took place was an agreement in 1933 to give a Treasury 
grant of £8,000 a year to be used as a source of funds for solicitors 
conducting criminal cases for poor persons; and thus, effectively, 
this service continued to be provided gratuitously until 19^4*
In Scotland, as well as in England, charitable organisations 
closed down in anticipation of the new scheme, and here too the 
introduction of the Act seemed to result in the profession and the 
voluntary organisations regarding the provision of legal help for 
the poor as a problem simply of organisation and assuming, for a 
while at least, that, provided the organisation was functioning 
properly, the situation would be satisfactory. This assumption 
was not really questioned until the mid-1960's.
United States 1917-1931 :
The changes in the legal aid schemes in Great Britain during 
the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's can be interesting compared with the 
situation in the United States where, during the same period, the
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number of ’Legal Aid Offices’ had increased little faster than the 
rise in population® As was the case with the English and Scottish 
legal aid schemes these offices operated strict indigency standards 
to determine eligibility, in order to avoid taking potentially 
profitable work from the private lawyer, and they dealt mainly 
with matrimonial cases* Since, like the ’Poor Man's Lawyers’ in 
this country, the ’Legal Aid Offices' saw clients before they reached 
the stage of litigation, a large part of their work consisted of 
the giving of advice only and, as a result, only 5% of clients received 
further casework* Even this, however, varied from office to office, 
and a "test" for successful operation of offices (sic), which calculated 
success as handling the number of clients dealt with by the hardest 
working offices, suggested that most offices throughout the country 
were meeting on average about a third of the ’need'*
In many American cities there was no ’Legal Aid Office1, and 
even in Rochester, where there was, a survey by Koos (1949) suggested 
that at least 6Of0 of 'middle and lower income’ respondents did not 
know of the existence of the office. Similarly for aid in criminal 
cases, although there were full-time ’public defenders’ employed 
to represent poor defendants, by 1947 there were only 28 such posts 
in the whole of the United States* However, merely by securing more 
charitable or state funds from a seemingly inexhaustable supply, 
these provisions could be extended, and after the war expansion 
along these lines was u r g e d w i t h  note being taken of the changes 
being made in Britain as an attempt to catch up to some extent to
^^For example, Brownell (1951) urged that ’Legal Aid Offices' be opened in all towns 7/ith a population of over 100,000.
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1 5the superior position in the United States ", in the 1950’s the 
work of the 'Legal Aid Offices* was, for the first time, co-ordinated 
by a central body, the ’National Legal Aid Association*, later renamed 
the *National Legal Aid and Defender Association* (NLADA), when 
it widened its concern to cover criminal as well as civil aid* The 
potentially wide ranging changes in Britain, therefore, were not 
accompanied by similar reorganisations in the provision of legal 
help for those considered unable to pay for legal remedies across 
the Atlantic, and so the ’revolution* in legal aid in Britain remained 
very much a national phenomenon.
England and Wales 1951-197k:
In Britain itself the changes made by the 1949 Act hardly had
revolutionary effects. In 1951, in its first year of operation, the
new scheme provided substantially the same legal help as the old
’Poor Persons' Procedure* had done; that is, representation in High
Court cases. The only difference was that now lawyers taking the
16cases were paid a fee for each one ; and, out of the 24,14° 
applications for aid which reached the certifying committees in 
the first six months of operation of the scheme only 3,749 were 
refused certificates, as opposed to the 50yo who were normally refused 
under the ’Poor Persons* Procedure’, although over 80^ of the case3 
were still matrimonial. Also by the time the scheme had come into 
operation inflation had ensured that the eligibility limits were
15'See, for example, the articles on the English legal aid scheme 
by Heber Smith (1949) and Abrahams (1-950) in "the American Bar Association Journal.
16In these High Court cases lawyers did still contribute to the cost of the scheme to some extent since the rules under the scheme 
allowed them to recover only 85% of ordinary profit costs.
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much lower than those intended by the Rushcliffe Committee, and 
more'like those operating under the old ’Poor Persons’ Procedure’, 
with the result that during the first year over half of the cost 
of the scheme came from contributions paid by applicants not e3.igible 
for free legal help and at the end of the year there was a credit 
of £80,388 in the fund®
For all the broad changes which the Act proposed, it remained, 
as Sachs (1951; P.145) noted, primarily a statement of principle 
to be filled in by the arrangements drawn up by the Law Society 
and the regulations introduced by the Lord Chancellor® The only 
laymen involved in the scheme were those on the Lord Chancellor’s 
Advisory Committee, who throughout the 1950’s pressed for the intro- 
duction of advice centres, as mentioned in the Act, to no avail*
The Lav/ Society effectively had double control over the scheme, 
through their overall control of the administration and financing 
of the scheme, and through their control of the granting of certificates 
via the local secretaries and certifying committees*
For the first few years after the Act became lav/ in 1990 aii 
remained limited to representation in the High Court, at a standard 
of eligibility set by the Rushc3.iffe Committee in 1945* The Law 
Society v/ere wary of extending the availability of the scheme to 
allow aid to people who were never intended to benefit and who 
might produce ’speculative litigation’; and some of the High Court 
judges were even more hesitant about recognising the value of sub­
sidised legal remedies; Lord Chief Justice Goddard (Abel Smith 
and Stevens, 19^7; P«331) felt that many applicants were ungrateful 
and could better be left to defend themselves. The Bar also was 
concerned to see that the scheme remained limited and especially
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that it be kept out of the County Court, where they did not enjoy 
a monopoly over advocacy*
Eventually, however, in 1955 those sections of the Act allowing
legal aid to be granted for proceedings in the County Court and
17other similar courts were introduced by Statutory Instrument «
In 1959, after many recommendations by the Advisory Committee, 
facilities for providing legal advice were introduced; but not, 
as suggested by the Rushcliffe Committee, by the setting up of 
advice centres* Rather, as the Lav/ Society requested, advice was 
to be given in solicitors* private offices at a cost of 2s.6d. an 
hour, providing that the applicant satisfied an eligibility test 
somewhat stricter than that for ordinary legal aid. At the same time 
the Law Society began a ’voluntary scheme1, under which some solicitors 
would provide advice at a cost of £1 for half an hour to all clients. 
Both schemes together, however, were much less comprehensive than 
the legal advice centres envisaged by the Rushcliffe Committee, 
and possibly did not even come under the empowering S*7(2) of the 
1949 Act, which referred to " solicitors employed whole-time or part- 
time for the purpose”.
The legal advice scheme under the 1959 arrangements was never 
very popular, and at its most successful it provided advice for 
around 60,000 people a year; an average of three legal advice 
clients for each solicitor* The Prices and Incomes Board (P.I.B. 
Report, 1968) estimated that solicitors actually gave over five times
17The Act, although passed by Parliament in 1949, did not come into force immediately; the Lord Chancellor was empowered to bring sections of the Act into force as and when necessary, by Statutory 
Instrument under S.17(2) of the Act.
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this amount of free advice normally, without claiming remuneration 
under the scheme; however, this advice would not necessarily be 
going to those too poor to afford to visit a solicitor in the first 
place, for whom the statutory advice scheme was intended* More 
importantly, advice meant advice, as anything more than oral con­
firmation of a clients legal position required a certificate for 
full legal aid or a certificate to pursue a claim, and these required 
a fresh application to the local certifying committee*
Legal aid for Claims* cases, i.e. help, under 5*5 of the Act, 
in pursuing a legal claim as far as, but not including, court pro­
ceedings was not made available until 19&0* It had a stricter 
financial eligibility test than ordinary legal aid, and was never 
much used, certifying committees preferring to grant limited legal 
aid certificates requiring the applicant to seek counsel^ opinion 
on the desirability of litigation* It was also not until i960 that 
legal aid for representation in proceedings before the House of 
Lords became available*
In fact, 1960 saw quite substantial changes in the somewhat 
limited aid which had been available under the Act during the 1950*s* 
The financial eligibility limits in the Act of 1949 were those 
recommended by the Rushcliffe Committee in 1945; but these stable 
eligibility limits, however, did not take into account the effects 
of rapid post-Y/ar inflation. By 19&0 the limits were extremely 
low and an Act was passed to raise them, and to allow the Lord 
Chancellor to raise these limits -by regulation when again necessary*
Also in 1960, Part II of the 1949 Act, allowing for "fair 
remuneration" to be paid to lawyers representing defendants in
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criminal cases, out of state fundslu, was brought into effect in 
England and Wales. Thus for the first time all lawyers representing 
the lower classes in court were to be paid in full for their work.
In addition to these changes in 19^0, as from the beginning
of 19^1 legal aid became available for those Summary Jurisdiction
and Quarter Sessions cases specified in the 1949 Act, mainly matrimonial
cases in the Magistrates Courts. This meant that, for the first
time, and over ten years after it was introduced, the legal aid
scheme recommended by the Rushcliffe Committee was more or less fully
operational. The Law Society reported that in the year 1961-2 there
were 105,224 applications for aid, of which 75>6l6 were issued with
certificates; this was an increase of 159*6^ over two years, which
v/as largely due to the changes made in 19&0, although there were
continuing increases in applications every year after this. About
£15 million was received from the Treasury for the running of the
scheme in 1961-62 although its total cost was over £31 million;
70.5% of the cases were successful and £27 million recovered for
clients in the form of damages, although over 80fc of the cases were 
19still matrimonial • In appeal cases the success rate was much lower, 
around 60^; and, the following year, the Advisory Committee, worried 
about the increasing cost of the scheme, emphasised the importance 
of avoiding giving certificates for 1unmeritorious1 cases on appeal, 
which might resemble too closely litigation at the state’s expense.
^Under the Poor Prisoners Defence Acts of 1903 and 1930, the limited remuneration paid to lawyers representing poor defendants came out of local funds.
19Most of the other 20^ were personal injury cases, as had alv/ays been the case under the previous legal aid schemes.
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In the 1950’s there had been some criticism of the legal aid 
scheme, for example, Benenson (1956) argued that, as a public service, 
the scheme ought to be at least partially controlled by the public, 
i.e., by laymen rather than solely by lawyers; but, as the scheme 
was not fully in force, criticism was regarded as premature*
In 19&4 a third Legal Aid Act removed the major anomaly rec­
ognised in the scheme * Under the 1949 Act, since, by definition, a 
litigant granted legal aid could not afford to pay court fees and 
lawyer’s costs, it was not usually possible for costs to be awarded 
against such a litigant if his case was unsuccessful. This meant 
that an ’ordinary* litigant winning a case against a legally aided 
litigant would still lose money, because he would have to pay his 
own costs. There had been no arrangements made for such costs to 
be paid out of the legal aid fund, but litigation at the expense of 
’ordinary’ court users suffered much criticism, and the 19&4 Act. 
was introduced to allow costs to be paid to successful ’ordinary* 
litigants out of the legal aid fund. However, in an effort to reduce 
the cost of this to the legal aid fund, the right to costs was 
restricted: the unassisted party first had to use S.2(2)(e) of
the 1949 Act, under v/hich costs could be awarded in exceptional 
circumstances against the legally aided party, and if this failed 
v<rould only then be awarded costs out of the fund only if it could 
be shown that severe financial hardship would otherwise be suffered 
and that, in all the circumstances, it was 11 just and equitable” 
to make provision for costs out of the fund. Thus the only major 
reform to the scheme during the 1960’s removed, only partially, an 
anomaly which did not affect the poor litigant.
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Major changes in the provisions for legal aid in the United 
States during the 1960's, however, did provoke a reaction from many 
British writers and reformers* In 1968 lawyers from both major 
Parliamentary parties recommended changes in the organisation of 
legal aid to make legal help for the poor more Community orientated* 
the 'Society of Labour Lawyers’ even suggesting the establishment 
of 'Neighbourhood Law Offices' along the lines of those in the 
United States (Fabian Research Series 273> 1968)* Paterson in a 
report representing the views of the Cobden Trust, entitled "Legal 
Aid as a Social Service" (Paterson, 1968) argued that the provision 
of legal aid to the poor was a 'social service', and therefore ought 
to be made efficient as such through the provision by the state 
of legal centres giving advice and assistance to the poor, and which 
were not entirely under the control of lawyers.
However, unofficial criticisms of the legal aid scheme and 
recommendations that neighbourhood advice centres be set up remained 
unofficial. In 1966 the 'Advisory Committee’ said that new advice 
centres Y/ere unnecessary, because more money could be put into the 
existing 'Citizens Advice Bureaux'; in a memorandum in 1968 the 
Law Society said that they were opposed to the establishment of 
centres, which they claimed would be a radical departure from the 
concept of legal aid as thus far developed; and two years later one 
of the Law Society's spokesmen on legal aid published a reply to the 
Cobden Trust Report (Pollock, 1970)> in v/hich he argued that the 
'social service' argument was spurious and that the running of the 
legal aid scheme was a task which could only be done by lawyers.
As early as 1966, however, the Advisory Committee had encouraged 
the use of private funds to support research into the question of
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how to provide legal aid for the poor®
During the 1960*3 there were also some changes in the provision 
of legal aid in criminal cases* Although "fair remuneration" for 
lawyers doing criminal aid work had been introduced, in 1960, into 
England, under the 1949 Act legal aid in criminal cases here was 
still governed by an assortment of different statutes and regulations, 
of which the most important was the Poor Prisoners Defence Act of 
1930, which permitted trial judges to grant certificates for free 
legal aid when this was "desirable in the interests justice"; in 
the Magistrates Courts, however, the certificates could be granted 
only in "exceptional circumstances"* This meant that the cases for 
which aid would be granted varied enormously from one court to the 
next* In England in 1963“4 it v/as calculated that only 11+% of def­
endants tried on indictment were granted legal aid and only £>% of 
those on summary trial* In the same year, 1964* a committee was 
set up under the chairmanship of Lord Widgery to investigate and 
report on legal aid in criminal cases*
The Widgery Committee did not publish its report until 1966, 
yet, by and large, the report was complimentary to the practices 
of the courts. It rejected any view that the state owed a duty 
to provide representation for accused criminals, said that it was 
impressed with the way the courts exercised their discretion and 
satisfied that the proportion of refusals of applications for aid1was not unreasonably high* However, the committee did recommend 
that there ought to be a statutory statement of the principles upon 
which discretion should be exercised and that, in cases tried on 
indictment, aid ought to be granted in all but exceptional cases*
The Widgery Committee felt that criminal aid ought to be contributory,
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as legal aid. in civil cases was, but that the procedure used to 
assess the contribution in civil cases was unsatisfactory for criminal 
proceedings* Eventually, they did recommend that the scheme should 
become contributory, so that judges, when granting a certificate 
for aid, to persons who might be able to afford a contribution, 
would offer the certificate subject to a contribution to be assessed 
at the end of the case, in certain cases asking for the payment of 
a sum on account*
At first nothing was done about the Widgery Committee proposals, 
in spite of exhortations from writers such as Zander (1966), who 
wanted to implement even v/ider reforms* However, Part IV of the 
Criminal Justice Act of 1967 contained provisions for the reform 
of legal aid in criminal cases along the lines recommended by the 
Widgery Committee, to come into force the following year when reg­
ulations covering the administration of the scheme had been drawn 
up* As recommended by the Widgery Committee the Act did not take 
the decision to grant a certificate for legal aid away from the 
court in criminal cases, and the discretion to grant a certificate 
only where it was "desirable in the interests of justice" v/as retained 
in all courts, except in cases of murder and where the applicant 
was the respondent in an appeal to the Court of Appeal or House of 
Lords* In spite of criticism (see: Zander, 1966) the Act made legal 
aid in criminal cases subject to a contribution, if the judge considered 
that the applicant could afford to pay towards the cost of his defence, 
with the requirement of a payment on account if the judge ordered it*
Thus the 1967 Criminal Justice Act reformed and consolidated 
the provisions for granting legal aid in criminal cases in this 
country, retaining the discretion of the judge and. ignoring any
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suggestion of direct provision of aid by the establishment of ’public
defenders’ or other state officials# This reform of criminal aid
was the only major change in the official provision for legal aid
in the 1960's. However, unoffical criticism of the scheme was coupled
with important changes in unofficial approaches towards the provision
of 'legal services’ to the poor. Many of the writers, both lawyers
and laymen, 7/ho were critical of what they saw as short comings in
the English lega,l aid scheme, argued that the example set by the
United States in establishing ’Neighborhood Law Centres* v/as one
20which should be followed in this country . Their criticism was 
supported by the relative failure of the statutory advice scheme 
begun in which, operating only in solicitors’ offices, had
never averaged much more than three clients a year for each solicitor 
in the country. This failure was made more reprehensible by the 
fact that the 1949 Act had envisaged a scheme to provide local legal 
advice centres, v/hich was abandoned in 1959 with the introduction 
of the scheme using solicitors' offices. As had happened at the 
turn of the century, and, to some extent, again following the example 
of the United States, lawyers dissatisfied with the state provision 
for legal advice began to set up voluntary advice sessions in large 
cities, sometimes linked to the ’Citizens' Advice Bureaux', an 
organisation of state financed information centres v/hich had first 
been established during the second war. Towards the end of the 
1960's these centres started to proliferate, especially in London 
where the old 'Poor Man's Lawyer' meetings at such places as Southwark 
and Toynbee Hall were revitalised, and in July 1970 a full-time
20See, for example, The Society of Labour Lawyers (19^8), Paterson(19&8), Brooke (1966) and Zander (1968).
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centre offering a wide range of legal assistance and employing 
full-time lawyers paid out of charitable funds, along the lines of 
the American ‘Neighborhood La?/ Centres1, was opened in North Kensington*
Such was the general interest in legal aid and advice that 
charitable bodies, such as the Nuffield Foundation, who gave a 
grant of £21,950 to Birmingham University, were prepared to finance 
research into the problem of the ’unmet need* for lav/yers’ services*
In 1971 a voluntary national organisation, the ’Legal Action Group*, 
v/as formed to stimulate interest in the problem of ‘legal services 
and the poor’ and to provide some form of co-ordinating framev/ork 
for the voluntary efforts* In 1972 they estimated that there were 
61 legal advice centres in existence, of which 39 were in London 
(L.A.G-* 1972)* Also in 1972 a Private Member’s Bill, designed to 
provide fifty local legal advice centres at a cost to the state of 
about £1 million, was introduced into Parliament*
Without the support of the Law Society or the Bar, the Private 
Member’s Bill was unsuccessful; but by now there v/as some official 
recognition of the fact that the legal aid scheme might be capable 
of improvement. The Advisory Committee openly encouraged research 
to pinpoint shortcomings in the scheme and suggest improvements, 
and began to propose ways in which the scheme might be improved 
(Advisory Committee, 19&9) - & contrast v/ith their earlier concern 
to ensure that Treasury funds were not wasted* Local law societies 
had, in several areas, supported the establishment of voluntary 
advice sessions, and in 1971 the Law Society produced a Bill designed 
to replace the 1959 advice scheme, which envisaged, in Part II, 
the establishment of some legal advice centres under the control 
of the Law Society*
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In 1972 the Legal Advice and Assistance Act v/as passed by
Parliament, to come into force when introduced by regulations made
by the Lord Chancellor® The Act abolished the old advice scheme
and the 1 claims' procedure under sections 5 and 7 of the 1949 Act,
and replaced them, in Part I, with a scheme under which solicitors
could provide up to £25 worth of assistance, excluding representation
before a court or a tribunal, without prior approval and then claim
back the cost of the work from the fund, providing that, if the
21client earned between £11 and £20 a week , he would have to pay 
a contribution towards the cost which would be collected by the 
solicitor himself* Part II of the Act, which provided for the 
establishment of legal advice centres under the control of the 
Law Society, was not intended to be introduced until the success 
of the £25 scheme could be assessed*
The introduction of the nev/ advice and assistance scheme, 
however, did not result in any decrease in the growth of voluntary 
and charitable advice centres. In its first eighteen months of 
operation the ’North Kensington Neighbourhood Law Centre' dealt 
with 2000 clients, and had severely to restrict the geographical 
area from which it would accept clients in order to avoid being 
swamped. After 1972 many more legal advice and. information centres 
opened in cities throughout the country, and in London several 
more full-time law centres, along the lines of that in North Ken­
sington, began operating, some even receiving government money in 
the form of grants under the 'urban aid' scheme. The informal 
reaction of some solicitors has suggested that the £25 scheme is
21These limits have been raised annually since then to keep pace 
with inflation.
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not particularly useful, since the amount of work that can be done 
for £25 is not worth the administrative effort involved in recovering
it, a third of the solicitors replying to an L.A.G-. survey said that
22they never sent in the claim form . The result is that some of this 
advice work may be carried by solicitors for those clients from whom 
later legally aided work will allow the difference to be made up*
Y/ith ever increasing inflation, the income and capital eligibility 
limits for the legal aid scheme have been raised almost every twelve 
months in the 1970’s, although by no means could they be called 
generous* In 1972-3 the legal aid scheme, including criminal cases, 
cost £25,621,038, although only £13,765,801 of this was paid by the 
state; and in their annual reports both the Law Society and the 
Advisory Committee suggested that there may be areas in which the 
scheme could be improved, for instance by providing for representation 
in hearings before certain tribunals, an extension to the scheme 
which was envisaged in the 1949 Act and seems likely to be implemented 
in the near future. In February 1974 a Legal Aid Act came into 
force consolidating all the previous legislation governing the legal 
aid scheme into one single statute.
Thus the British legal aid scheme is now well established 
and the provision of legal assistance through the existing professional 
organisation is rarely questioned. The scheme provides for legal 
advice and legal representation to be given free of charge by lawyers 
in private practice to clients who come be3.ow the limits of a
22,,L.A.G-. Bulletin” October 1974, P.235.
23financial eligibility test and for the lawyers to clairn back 
the taxed costs of the work done from a fund administrated by the 
Law Society; this fund is composed of an annual grant from the 
state plus the contributions paid by applicants falling between 
the upper and lov/er eligibility limits. Free legal advice, however,
piis limited to £25 worth + in normal circumstances; and legal
representation can only be remunerated under the legal aid scheme
if the applicant is assessed to be financially eligible by the
Supplementary Benefits Commission, which replaced the National
Assistance Board in 1966, and is considered to have a ’prima facie1
claim and a reasonable cause for litigating by a legally qualified,
full-time local secretary or, in doubtful cases, a local committee
25of solicitors called by the local secretary • Would be litigants 
can apply directly to the local secretary for a certificate entitling 
them to free representation, but such applications are rare and less 
popular with the secretaries; the majority are prepared by the 
applicant’s solicitor after an initial advice session, a practice 
which largely accounts for the high success rate of applications 
(about 80/o) • The legal aid scheme now operates in all courts in
23Those who come between the upper end lower limits, however, are required to pay a graduated contribution towards the cost of their aid into the legal aid fund.
pi£25 is not a great deal when it is taken into account that the rates for legal aid work are £8-10 an hour at the least.
25Applications for certificates for representation before appeal courts must be made to the appropriate one of fifteen Area Committees who use the same criteria in considering applications - and, if they think these have not been satisfied, may refuse to grant a certificate even if the court has given leave to appeal, as was the case in:R. v. Legal Aid Committee No. 1 (London) Legal Aid Area, ex. p .
Rondel, (1967) 2 Q.B.~4fi2.
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England and Wales and, as mentioned above, it is anticipated that 
it will operate in at least some tribunals in the not too distant 
future; in 1972-3 263,579 applications for assistance were received 
and 204,368 certificates granted in England and Wales,
Scotland 1953-1974:
After the introduction of the 1949 Legal Aid and Advice Act 
into Scotland replacing the Statute of 1492, the provisions for legal 
aid in civil cases became the same as those operating in this country 
and have subsequently been changed in the same ways. As mentioned 
earlier, however, the situation in criminal cases had not been affected 
by the Poor Prisoners Defence Acts of 1903 and 1930, and legal 
aid for defendants was still largely a charitable service provided 
under the auspices of the ’Poor Persons1 Roll1. Yfith the introduction 
of "fair remuneration” for lawyers representing poor defendants in 
England and Wales in 19&0, however, some sort of conformity was 
demanded; and in that year the Guthrie Committee recommended the 
introduction of remuneration for lawyers representing poor accused 
persons in Scotland.
The situation was eventually changed by the introduction of the 
fLegal Aid (Criminal Proceedings) Scheme’ in 19&4* -^e scheme
allowed for lawyers to be provided and remunerated, in the same way 
as in civil cases under the 1949 Act, in criminal cases tried on 
indictment when the defendant was unable to pay the expenses of 
the case without undue financial hardship, and inihose tried summarily 
when representation was also in the interests of justice in the 
circumstances of that case. Thus after 19&4 "the provision of legal 
aid in criminal cases in Scotland v/as less restricted than in England;
42
but in summary cases, at least, it was still only granted at the 
discretion of the trial judge* However, after the introduction 
of Part IV of the Criminal Justice Act 1%7y the situation in England 
and Wales became very similar to that in Scotland, and so it has 
remained since, with aid being granted in nearly all cases tried 
on indictment.
United States 1951-1974-♦
After the formation of the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association, 'Legal Aid Offices' in the United States continued to 
increase in numbers and size throughout the and, with the
full backing of the American Bar Association were now established 
as the 'official' legal aid scheme. They remained, however, tied 
to the charitable funds of the local 'community chest' and thus 
largely under the control of local business interests. By 19&1 
there were 209 'Legal Aid Offices* in the United States, employing 
300 full-time lawyers and an increasing number of 'Public Defender* 
posts; hov/ever, in 19^4 only $4 million was spent on legal aid,
less than 0.2 per cent of the general expenditure in the United States
1 1  - 2 6  on legal services .
In the early 1960's, hov/ever, dissatisfaction with the paucity 
of provision for legal aid and its domination by the American Bar 
Association and the 'community chest', v/as felt by some groups 
outside of legal administration, who, perhaps influenced by the
26Money and hard v/ork were not put into legal aid without any hope of reward, however. By now initiative and hard work in the legal aid area could be recognised by the awarding of the 'Harrison Tweed Award' or the 'Heber Smith Award' (Brownell, 1951; supplement '\96'),
p.19).
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'Civil Rights' movement of the 1950's, wanted to achieve certain 
social and legal changes on behalf of sections of the lower classes 
and who found the existing legal aid scheme incapable of assisting 
in this* Thus scorning the established 'Legal Aid Offices', some 
groups in the larger American cities set up their own legal help 
agencies for their clients, attempting to secure more radical solutions 
to problems by using non-legal help and challenging legal decisions 
both inside and outside the courts: for example, a community office
was set up in New York by the 'Mobilisation for Youth', in the early 
19^0'So One of the aims of these new offices was to avoid the control 
by the local bar and local business interests which were felt to be 
a limitation on the work done by the 'Legal Aid Offices'; but 
initially such a break was difficult as these interests exercised 
at least partial control over most sources of charitable funding, 
through their control of the 'community chests*..
The limitations imposed by this situation were, however, radically
altered in 1964* w^en ihe Federal Government and the then President,
John F. Kennedy, began what they called the 'War on Poverty' controlled
by the newly formed 'Office of Economic Opportunity' (OEO). The
declared aim of the war v/as to use new forms of organisation, involving
"maximum feasible participation" of the local indigenous population,
to provide local solutions to the common problems of 'the poor* and
27to overcome the apathy and largely psychological base of poverty 
It was readily recognised that use of the law might provide a means 
of solving many of the problems of poverty, and early on there was
27The assumption that poverty was largely a psychological state was 
referred to by Lowenstein and Waggoner (19&7; P*811) in an article on the "new wave" of legal services in the United S
a call from Wald (1964; P*110) for lawyers to join in the war*
The 0E0 was given the power to provide up to of the funds
28required for projects which satisfied the aims of the war , an offer
which attracted many community organisations wanting to provide
’legal services’ for groups in various localities* Many centres
similar to that run in New York by ’Mobilisation for Youth’ were
soon opened under the auspices of the 'War on Poverty’. These centres,
which became known as ’Neighborhood Law Centres' employed community
workers and even members of the local indigenous population, as
well as young lawyers to provide wider help than just legal advice
and representation, including challenging welfare decisions and
bringing 'test cases’ to try to change the law in favour of the lower
29class inhabitants of the area • With most of their money coming 
directly from the Federal Government, and seemingly with no strings 
attached to it other than that it be used under the auspices of the 
'War on Poverty', the 'Neighborhood Law Centres' were not limited 
to the somewhat restricted advice and occasional litigation services 
which the 'Legal Aid Offices', under the shadow of local business 
interests, had traditionally provided. In fact, as the 'neighborhood 
principle' expanded, more radical measures were recommended for 
adoption by the law offices; for example, Cahn and Cahn (1964,
P.1321 et seq.) argued that all offices should serve a 'representative
28In 1967 the proportion of funds which the 0E0 could provide was reduced to 80%•
29The tactic of bringing controversial cases to try to secure changes in the law in favour of minority groups was one which had already 
proved successful in the 'Civil Rights' movement of the 1950's.
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function* as well as a ‘service function1'^, and two years later 
(1966, P.957 et seq.) suggested that the poor be given their own 
'Justice Industry'• In 19&7 'Neighborhood Law Centres' received 
022 million from the 0E0; a sharp contrast to the 0!± million spent 
on legal aid in 1964 •
However, although the organised bar was at first reluctant to 
recognise the work done in the 'Neighborhood Law Centres', they 
later decided to lend their support to the scheme and succeeded 
in taking over some offices and securing 0E0 funds for some of the 
existing 'Legal Aid Offices' by adapting their organisations to 
meet 0E0 requirements. Through their control of the conduct of 
neighborhood lawyers under the Canons of Professional Ethics, as 
well as through their direct control of some offices, the bar was 
able to obtain a measure of involvement in a large number of the 
'Neighborhood Law Centres', for instance, Karpel (19&9; P»32) describes 
the control exercised by the New York bar over centres there. 
Consequently eligibility standards were still used to limit the 
numbers v/ho could demand help from the new offices; and, although 
the numbers of 'Public Defenders' were increasing, the 0E0 would 
not generally fund projects to provide help in criminal cases. In 
practice most 'Neighborhood Law Centres' were mainly involved in the 
giving of advice and the provision of other 'service functions'.
Although they were not as successful in relieving poverty as 
their protagonists would have hoped, the 'Neighborhood Law Centres'
30The 'representative function' v/as the bringing of 'test cases' 
and lobbying for legislative changes which characterised the 'Civil Rights' movement of the 1950’s, as opposed to the 'service function' of simply giving legal advice and assistance in individual cases.
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did represent a significant change in the organisation and financing 
of legal services for those considered unahle to afford them in the 
United States. The idea of "taking law to the people" by establishing 
legal offices in poor neighbourhoods specialising in the type of 
problems experienced in such neighbourhoods, with which lawyers in 
private practice would not normally come into contact, was one which 
attracted the support of lawyers in Britain: Zander (1968) and the
Society of Labour Lawyers (Fabian Research Series 273? 1968) recommending 
the establishment of 'Neighbourhood Law Centres'-in this country; 
and the law centre, opened at North Kensington in 1970? modelling 
itself in many respects upon the American centres.
In the United States, however, the early 1970's saw the beginnings 
of set-backs to the 'neighborhood principle' of legal aid. Many 
of the centres run by local bar associations had become very similar 
to the old 'Legal Aid Offices', and the aim of "maximum feasible
31participation" of indigenous populations had rarely been very successful • 
In spite of pleas for a broader approach, such as Cahn and Cahn's 
(1966; P.937 et seq.) suggestion that the poor be given their own 
'Justice Industry', after 1970 the 0E0 began to withdraw funds from 
many of the neighborhood law projects and refused to renew many of 
the grants, which had originally been given only on a yearly basis.
0E0 cut-backs did not just affect the neighborhood law centre 
scheme, as other parts of the 'War on Poverty' ’were also "slowed 
down". However, projects funded by the 0E0 had become the major
31For example, Cahn and Cahn (19&8) note the case of the Child Development G-roup of Mississippi, which had strong local support 
from the black community, but had OEC funding withdrawn as a result of pressure from local business and professional interests.
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providers of free legal services in the United States, replacing
32the charitably funded 'Legs,! Aid Offices’ in many states , and, 
where the cut-backs did not result in centres closing altogether, 
they did mean a return to dependence on money from local charities 
and thus also the risk of control by the local interests behind 
these funds* Many community groups continued to run legal aid 
services in the large cities, and, unlike the English legal profession, 
American lawyers will take on cases on a contingent fee basis for 
clients who cannot afford to pay; but the "slowing down" of the 
’War on Poverty* has meant that, instead of there being an increase 
in the areas for which legal services are provided for those felt 
to be unable to pay in the United States, there has probably been a 
decrease in the availability of legal aid in most states in the 
early 1970’s.
In spite of the cutbacks affecting the ’Neighbourhood Law 
Centres’ in the United States, however, it is certainly the case that, 
in both G-reat Britain and the United States, some form of free or 
subsidised legal assistance for persons considered to be unable to 
pay court fees and lawyer’s costs is available to, and used by more 
people now than at any time prior to the second war, or before®
Although there has also been an increase in the number of legal rules 
affecting the lives of lower income earners in most countries - 
especially in Britain with its complicated social security provisions -
32In a few states there were ’Judicare' schemes providing for subsidised litigation using private lawyers, similar to the British legal aid 
scheme; but these had never been adopted on a wide scale in the United States.
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the legal aid provisions are still used primarily to obtain remedies 
for matrimonial problems, which have always constituted at least 
80$> of the legally aided cases in Britain* There can be no suggestion 
that increased provision for legal aid has followed the increase 
in the number and scope of laws affecting the lower classes, nor even 
that greater provision could be seen as a gradual opening up of the 
legal system to the previously deprived. Nor can the increased provision 
be seen as the development of a comprehensive policy towards legal 
aid; the changes in the availability of legal aid both in this 
country and elsewhere have been too erratic and piecemeal to permit 
of - any claim of gradual development; in fact, as pointed out at 
the beginning of the chapter, it is only by imputing to past changes 
a notion of progress towards the current situation that these changes 
in the availability of legal aid can be seen as a process*
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CHAPTER TWO
"A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LEGAL AID PROBLEM”
As suggested in the Preface the purpose of the first chapter 
was to provide a historical summary of what could be called the 
‘common knowledge* on legal aide In so.far as this ‘common knowledge* 
treats legal aid as an independent phenomenon, however, and suggests 
that it is describing the historical development of this phenomenon, 
it is masking the social base of legal aid and preventing an under­
standing of aid which could appreciate it as a social product. This 
chapter will look at the limitations of this ‘common knowledge’ on 
legal aid through a reading of the more important legal aid critics 
and reformers, and suggest that any approach to lega.l aid which seeks 
to understand and appreciate its position and possibiD-ities must 
question such knowledge and look behind it to elucidate the social
A,
nature of legal aid and indeed of lav; itself.
In a discussion of the major writings on legal aid it is possible 
to point to variations in the approach of writers in terms of their 
perceptions of the nature of legal aid and their recommendations 
for amelioration and improvement of its operation; although much 
of the ;vork is characterised by a similarity of concern over the 
inability or unwillingness of all sections of society to participate 
in the use of legal machinery, which will be examined later. Within 
the similarity of concern differences of degree and emphasis of 
various aspects of the problem are important particularly in view 
of their relationship to the different interests and practices of 
the writers involved, and can be used roughly to categorise the
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approaches: not as different theoretical schools, since most of
the writing is within the same ideological framework, but simply 
to demonstrate the different implications of the variations and the 
fundamenta]. limitations of the overall approach.-
Both in this country and in the United States the position 
adopted by official and semi-official organs of the legal profession 
towards legal aid has been one of a traditional conservatism: 
concerned to maintain the status of established institutions through 
the incorporation of limited changes. Particularly^ the profession 
has been concerned to maintain what it has felt to be its ‘independent 
position* and control over the administration of lav/. This was 
evidenced in 1932, at a time when legal aid was provided by professional 
lawyers as a form of * charitable duty*, by the President of the 
Law Society (quoted in the "Law Society’s Gazette" of February 1932) 
who pleaded for support from solicitors to ensure the continued 
working of the ’Poor Persons’ Procedure’, to make the position of the 
profession assured; and became apparent again forty years later, 
after the scheme had. become a nationally financed part of some lawyers’ 
work, when Pollock (1973^ P.179) demanded that:
"... what is done (must) neither damage the unity of the profession nor produce abuses that would weaken its function within the community".
The importance of the control of the legal profession over the 
administration of law is reflected not merely in the attitude of 
professional writers on legal aid, the powerful position of the
Brovmell (1951, Pc235) writing about legal aid in the United States puts this quite bluntly:
"The effectiveness of the service is directly related to the degree of professional independence".
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profession can be seen as a major influence on changes in the provisions
for legal aid. In a memorandum of 1968 the Law Society opposed the
establishment of local law centres arguing that they were a radical
departure from the concept of legal aid as so far developed; however,
when provision was made for centres to be set up in the 1972 Legal
Advice and Assistance Act it had been ensured that, were any to be
set up, they would be controlled by the Law Society. And this is
the case not only with the British Law Society: in the United States
the American Bar Association, although initially opposed to the
introduction of ‘Neighbourhood Law Centres* financed by the 0E0,
later endorsed the programme, and, partly through control of necessary
local financial resources and partly through control over the activities
of the lawyers involved, was able to dominate some centres and ensure
?representation in others . The comment of the President of the Law 
Society in England on the apparently substantial changes in legal 
aid recommended by the Rushcliffe Committee in 1945 is perhaps 
characteristic of the position and attitude of the legal profession. 
Quoted in the “Lav; Society’s Gazette" in 1945* he said:
"The Rushcliffe Committee have adopted entirely the basic principles which we set out in our evidence"•
The apparent influence of the legal profession over the scope 
of changes made in the legal aid schemes is something which will be 
re-emphasised later. It is important here to note that the attitude 
which informs this influence has always been closely linked to a 
concern to protect what are perceived to be the profession’s financial 
interests* It is never economically prudent for a profession geared
2For instance, local bar control over neighbourhood lav/ offices in New York is described by Karpel (1969- P.32).
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to administering the law in ways which it has developed over centuries,
to question the principles upon which that law is administered. This
is not to say that extensions in the provisions for legal aid have
not been advantageous to the profession: even when the work was
Charitable*, out-of-pocket expenses were paid and valuable experience
was provided for young barristers and solicitors; and it is increasingly
possible now for legal aid work in this country to provide a valuable
source of income for a firm of solicitors or a young barrister.
However, this value seems to be jealously guarded: for example,
the introduction of the £25 advice scheme, by the Legal Advice and
Assistance Act 1972, prompted Pollock (1973? P®176) to ask,
"Row will the new scheme work for the ordinary practitioner?"
Although claims for professional control and professional 'independence*
are often couched in terms of their importance for the 'public
interest', at best this is only the 'public interest' as defined
by the legal profession; and there is no guarantee that either this
definition or the financial interests of the profession will coincide
3with the problems of different classes in society «
Criticisms of the legal profession's prudent conservatism have 
been voiced by academic lawyers and by some groups of professional 
lawyers more concerned to see the scope of the law extended^"® Although 
sometimes critical of the profession's self-interest, the major
3Por instance, matrimonial cases have always comprised at least 80 per cent of legal aid work - this cannot mean that 80 per cent of the problems experienced by people eligible for legal aid are solely matrimonial. Even the tjnpes of problems diagnosed in local legal advice- centres would suggest otherwise.
^See the standpoint taken by the Pabian 'Society of Labour Lawyers' in "Justice Por All" (1968).
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claim of most of these writers is that the profession has merely 
failed to appreciate the extent of the problem. If, they point out, 
the legal services are supposed to solve problems and conflicts in 
society, then these services should function effectively as "social 
services", and not be dominated by a legal profession of "independent 
practitioners for the middle and upper classes" (Paterson, 1968, P®8). 
This approach requires that non-professionals be involved in the 
administration of legal aid to ensure that the problems dealt with 
and solutions provided operate in the interest of everyone and are 
not of benefit only to the legal profession; and, more generally, 
it requires that inefficiencies in the legal aid scheme be identified 
and rectified in order to make it function more effectively. Thus, 
in 1938, Allen Jones argued that the scheme based on the ’charitable* 
nature of the legal profession v;as unreliable and that legal bureaux 
along the lines of those then found in Sweden ought to be established; 
more recently Brooke (1966) and Zander (1968) have claimed that 
limitations in the code of conduct of the legal profession restrict 
the provision of legal aid and suggested that centres staffed by 
state-paid salaried lawyers should be set up; and, since then, 
these two writers, together with Abel Smith (Abel Smith, Zander and 
Brooke, 1973) have conducted research to find deficiencies in the 
legal aid scheme and suggested a series of remedies to remove these 
deficiencies and allow the scheme to meet the need for legal services •
A vast amount of literature, concerned with both civil and 
criminal cases, and emphasising the ineffectiveness of the services 
provided by lawyers .for the poorer sections of the community has
^For instance, they suggest (P.226) that much closer links need to be established between legal advisers and local communities.
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appeared over the last ten years in this country and in the United
States; and the continual ideological pleas have been in some way
responsible for bringing about changes in the organisation of civil
and ci'iminal legal aid « However, as Morris (Morris, Y/hite and
Lewis, 1973) pointed out, the defining of the *legal needs1 and
'legal problems' of the poor, used to illustrate the shortcomings
of the legal sendees, is after all only one perception of the
social situation, and in such cases is largely a function of the
agency to which a problem is referred. An interesting example of
the possible varieties of such definitions appeared in an article
by Fogelson and Freeman (19&8) describing a research project which
attempted to find out what social T,Yorkers knew about the law. The
researchers employed three lawyers to code the legal' incidents
identified in a group of social work cases: two of the coders
recognised the same legal incident only two-thirds of the time:
and adding all recognised legal incidents together there were found
<>.
to be legal problems in almost all the cases - a mean average of 
7three per case » If nothing else this research demonstrated that 
legal problems could always be found if one looked hard enough; 
and, although their lawyers might not have been very good at this, 
the writers admitted that,
“The core of the legal art is the ability to place the situations properly within the correct legal frame of reference”. (P.228).
In this country, for example, the Criminal Justice Act 19^7 did encourage the wider provision of aid in criminal cases, especially in the Magistrate's Courts; and the Legal Advice and Assistance Act 1972 introduced help in drafting letters and pursuing claims and made provision for the establishment of full-time local legal centres.
7It is interesting to note that problems involving property were the least frequent, and in 75 per cent of those recognised the clients were on the defensive. They were on the defensive in two-thirds of all the recognised problems anyway.
55
Similarly* pursuing the suggestions that improvement of the legal 
services depends upon increasing the availability of lawyers* Silver
(1969) argued that* if the 16*5 per cent of the population of the 
United States who were poor had as many lawyers, per capita, as the
grich , then more lawyers would be needed for this 16.5 per cent 
than existed at that time in the whole of the United States; and 
she added that, since five times as much effort would be needed to 
serve the poor* because of their ignorance of the law, this number 
should really be increased five fold*
It is not surprising to discover that the recommendations 
recently proposed by the *social service1 lawyers are not new; in 
many respects they are not very different from the suggestions of 
the first person to write on the subject of legal aid and the poor, 
a County Court Judge, who in 1914* advocated the establishment of 
an'official Justice Department, a scheme for lay advocacy, and 
arbitration in the County Courts (Parry. 19143 P.185)* This is 
less surprising after the discovery that the problems of the poor, 
which the present services are failing to resolve, are defined by 
these writers without recourse to the people involved, and thus 
the. solutions can repeatedly be found to be inadequate by further 
problems being diagnosed*
Particularly amongst American commentators (e.g. Caplovitz,
1967) there has been some recognition that existing legal remedies 
may even compound rather than solve some problems, especially because 
of the lawfs concentration 011 individualised conflicts* Carlin,
gOn the grounds, she suggests, that they have at least as many legal problems. It is worth noting here that there are proportionately many more lawyers in the United States than in this country.
56
Howard and Messinger (1967) pointed out that the * social service1
approach could lead to a ‘’welfare orientation” and ’’individualised
justice”: the processing of all disputes by benevolent administrators,
who themselves define the individuals social problem and its solution,
assuming that the interests of the poor client, which by himself
he can neither recognise nor assert, are always in harmony with
those of the administrators and the state* Previously Carlin and
Howard (19&5) suggested that, at least as regards ‘Legal Aid
Offices* in the United States, this assumed harmony actually masked
the influential positions of local business Interests and the local
bar, who, by means of their control of the ‘Community Chest* and
other sources of finance for the Offices, could restrict the advice
and representation given to problems where no conflict with their
own financial interests was involved* These writers argued that any
solution to the problem of legal services and the poor requires a
broader approach: for instance, in the tactic of *Neighbourhood<•Lav/ Centres* employing social workers, 3.aymen and sometimes even 
members of the indigenous lov/er classes, as well as lawyers; and 
through the commitment to long term solution to local problems by 
encouraging participation of the local population and providing, 
as well as ‘service functions*, ‘representative* actions, test cases 
and lobbies for legislative change*
Although primarily found in American efforts, this type of 
approach has been adopted by some writers and reformers in Britain. 
‘Neighbourhood Law Centres* dealing with community problems which 
private lawyers would not handle have been recommended on several 
occasions; and now a few centres, modelled in some respects on
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qUnited States’ examples, are operating in London and elsewhere •
White (Morris? White and Lewis, 1973) criticised the legal aid 
scheme for artificially individualising all conflicts, and argued 
for an "open society" approach, in which law would play a "dynamic 
role" representing individuals and interest groups and bringing 
out conflicts in order that they he adjudicated within a "rule- 
limited area of open and rational exchange" (P.24). Y/hilst, in 
the same book, Lewis suggested: that the approach of the legal
profession to the problems of the poor incorporated a "bourgeois 
notion of individual rights", that legal action was not necessarily 
always the best solution to problems, and that rights might be better 
protected by group organisation®
Such a broader approach has, however,- always been closely 
'linked to the policies initiated, in the ’War on Poverty’ sponsored 
by the United States federal Government through the 0E0. The stated 
aim of the war, begun in 1964, was to overcome the apathetic psycho­
logical base of poverty, thus reintroducing democracy to the poor10: 
Cahn and Cahn (19&4* P.1333) noted that,
"At stake is the practicability of democracy".
The seemingly unlimited availability of 0E0 funds, with few strings 
attached, and the possibility of using this to set up local law centres 
under the auspices of the war, certainly permitted the development
9Notably the "North Kensington Neighbourhood Lav/ Centre" opened in 1970.
10This war on poverty neatly coincided with the United States’ war in Vietnam• It helped to direct attention away from this, as well as from other aspects of Federal policy, although perhaps did not do as much as hoped - Silver (19&9) suggested that effective legal services might also have prevented riots®
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of attempts at a "broader approach to legal aid, which would extend 
citizenship, justice and participation in the legal order to the 
poor - or, as Lowenstein and Y/aggoner (1967) more bluntly put it: 
equal access to the power structure*
However, restrictions have appeared in the apparent freedom 
which supported this approach* Since 1967 *Neighbourhood Law Centres* 
have had to find at least 20 per cent of their funds locally, and 
in many cases this has led to a return to the 9Community Chest*, 
or control by the local bar association or *Legal Aid Office** The 
continued influential power of local interests was mentioned by 
Cahn and Cahn (1968) who described how certain local groups were 
able to procure the withdrawal of 0E0 funds from the Child Development 
Croup of Mississippi, which had strong support from the local black 
community in 1968* The defeat of the United States in Vietnam and 
the extension financial crises at home, have seen the withdrawal of 
0E0 funds from many centres fin recent years and an official "slow 
'down" in the *War on Poverty* has begun.
Not only have events such as these cast doubt upon the feasibility 
of pursuing such a *broader* approach, which still has to rely upon 
money from somebody who can withdraw this without question; but 
the protagonists themselves have questioned the ability of even the 
most radical schemes to solve the problem of providing legal aid for 
the poor* Cahn and Cahn (1966, P*939) pointed out that to meet the 
supposed requirement for representation, in criminal cases alone,
11in the United States, under the rules in the Cideon and Gault cases ,
^Gideon v* Wainwright* 372, U.S. 335 (1963)*In Re Gault* 387, U.S. 1 (l967)•
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would involve increasing the number of 'Public Defenders' forty 
folds at a cost of around 0200 million per annum * More importantly 
than this, however, they claimed that in their zeal to extend legal 
services reformers had forgotten to ask the question "qui custodiet 
ipsos custodes?". and went on to argue that justice would never 
be achieved by merely extending a legal system which was too "cumber­
some” and "obsolete" to meet the requirements of a different class* 
Furthermore they said that the legal system predefined the universe 
of legal need,and that the legal profession was not interested in 
changing the structure of the systems and indeed was incapable of 
doing so*
Throughout this article Cahn and Cahn drew analogies between 
the legal system and American capitalism: for example, the "Justice
Industry" should be redesigned to take account of changes in the 
nature of supply and demand, production and distribution methods were 
obsolete and manpower unnecessarily limited; and finally they 
asked, since the middle class and private enterprise no longer used 
the law to pursue many of their interests, why should the poor, who 
anyway could not afford to "invest in justice", be expected, to* 
Rather, they suggested, the poor should be given their own "middle 
class insurance companies", "real property negotiators" and such 
like, even their own "Neighbourhood Justice Industry" in the form 
of a corporation - non-profit making, of course*
Cahn and Calm appeared to come virtually to the conclusion 
that, since the legal system was part of the machinery of capitalist 
society, it could only be equally beneficial to the lower classes 
if they became capitalists themselves. Their commitment to a legal 
solution did not permit them to suggest other reactions such as
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apathetic ignoring of the law or changing of the social organisation 
itself, although such reactions might well he more likely to commend 
themselves to the lower classes, whose interests could presumably 
only he met hy capitalistic organisations if those interests were 
similar to the interests which such organisations were designed to 
protect# Once again it is interesting to note that the conclusion 
seemingly arrived at hy Cahn and Cahn is similar to observations 
made hy Judge Parry, who stated that he had alv/ays argued that the 
lav/ was insufficient to help the poor because it was enacted and 
administered hy the rich (Parry* 1914* P« 246) •
Thus the differences of approach and emphasis of the majority 
of writers and reformers have resulted-in their recommending different 
appraisals of the problem of legal aid and different reforms to 
solve the problem# However, it can he seen that these differences 
of approach and emphasis are differences of degree only: the major
criticism hy the ♦social service1 lawyers of the position of the 
legal profession is that the latter have failed to appreciate the 
extent of the problem, and consequently much the same recommendations 
are made hy reformers in the 1970*s as were first suggested in 
1914* Virtually all of the writers are concerned to ameliorate 
the position of the lower classes hy extending some form of legal 
services to them, and consequently disagreements are at the level 
of the tactics required to meet the already perceived problem and 
not at the level of the conceptualisation of the problem itself#
This similarity of conceptualisation is a function of the 
fact that most of the writers on legal aid are operating within 
the same paradigmatic approach towards the law# All assume that
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law is independent of any conflicts within society and that there
is consensual agreement upon the use of the legal system to provide
solutions to social problems® This consensual agreement is based*
in the case of the legal profession and the * social service* lawyers*
on the assumption indicated by Carlin* Howard and Messinger (19&7)
namely that the interests of the lower classes* which they themselves
can neither recognise nor assert* are always in harmony with the
*public interest* which the legal profession and the administrators
claim to represent, and which the legal system is organised to
protect® The *open society* lawyers are prepared to concede that
the British and American social organisations exhibit a variety of
conflicts of interest, but the law* which they want increasingly
to use to arbitrate between conflicts in a "rule-limited area of
open and rational exchange" (Morris, White and Lev/is, P®27)> appears*
to them, to be independent of these conflicts, and in some way
12neutral and above them © The legal system is taken out of itsr-
social context and reified as a functional institution charged 
with the task of providing solutions to social disputes based upon 
principles unrelated to the disputes themselves® Conflicts of 
interest there may be within the social organisation, but these 
conflicts are an inevitable product of complex society: and are*
in fact, functional in ensuring that social institutions are repre­
sentative of all the groups in the social organisation and in maint­
aining a system of "checks and balances11 on the unquestioned domination 
of the institutions by any;one'interest group®
12Similar*, perhaps, to the way in which the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity appeared to be divorced from the conflicts between powerful interest groups, which were only recognised or studied at a local or state level in the United States in the 19^0*s® An appearance which has been transformed into a disasterous reality for many Neighborhood Lav/ Centres* ♦
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Punctionalism is used here, however, in a very general sense 
to characterise what appears to be the dominant concern of the writers 
over the functional role of law in maintaining social order, defining 
problems, preventing domination, and so on* It is not suggested 
that all of the writers adopt a Parsonian theory of the function 
and integration of social institutions; their positions are much 
less developed than this, and seem to be based primarily on an 
assumed consensus about the role of institutions and the need for 
existing institutions to continue to fulfill these roles.
As seen, however, this approach can take one of two forms: 
either a strict consensual form or a pluralist*, functional-conflict 
form; but in one form or another it has traditionally dominated 
the thinking of lawyers and laymen about the working of the legal 
system in British and American society. Its reification of the 
legal system as a functional institution to solve social disputes 
is, as will be developed later, an attractive position for lawyers, 
and has prevented any questioning of the social bases of changes 
in the provisions for legal aid, or of the law generally. The 
provisions for legal aid are thus assessed in terms of their functional 
effects, and changes suggested if these effects are felt to be in­
sufficient to satisfy various functional prerequisites.
This approach manifests itself-in many aspects of the writing 
on legal aid, for instance, in the total inability to comprehend 
differences in class interests, and in the confusion and ambiguity 
surrounding the identity of groups presumed to be outside of the 
law or requiring legal aid. Most commonly those *in need’ are 
simply referred to as "the poor”, and whether this means those
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13below legal aid eligibility limits , those below the Supplementary 
■f )Benefit level , those earning less than the average weekly wage,
or those not owning at least £1,000 worth of stock market shares is,
perhaps deliberately, not made clear, Abel Smith, Zander and Brooke
(1973) wishing to discover those fin need’ of legal aid used primarily
geographical criteria to determine their interest group, electing
to study the inhabitants of three of the less salubrious London
boroughs; whereas Carlin, Howard and Messinger (1967* P*61 seq.)
15suggested that the criterion of * legal competence1 might be used 
to identify those groups not benefitting from the legal system* The 
loosely termed class of the poor are identified as an interest group 
by all writers, largely by negative criteria - they cannot afford to 
employ lawyers, they do not benefit from many of the lawyers traditional 
skills, they do not know their legal rights, they do not have sufficient 
property to have regular need of legal services, they do not have 
sufficient power to demand rights or changes - and they are usually, 
presumably, contrasted to the rich, who need and can afford lawyers 
to look after their property, which the law has been designed to 
protect, and are in a powerful enough position to ensure that services 
are maintained to their advantage*
13Necessarily a tautologous definition, but one which is consistently employed: for instance, Abel Smith, Zander and Brooke (1973, P.1W-)compared the type of legal problems diagnosed to the eligibility for legal aid of their respondents*
A I A group which would exclude some people eligible for legal aid in this country.
15 •LegalTcompetence* is the ability to recognise that one has legal problems and to have the confidence and resolve to solve these problems by recourse to the lav/. This competence is lacking in those who need to benefit from legal aid - not surprisingly, the argument'is tautological.
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Silver (19&9) contrasts the 16*5 per cent of the U.S. population 
whom she regards as poor with the small percentage who are rich 
and make fullest use of legal services, suggesting that the 70 or 
so per cent in the middle do not really have much need of the legal 
system* This polarisation of the have/have not dichotomy is far 
from typical of legal aid commentators, hov/ever, whose assumptions 
about the interests which legal services are needed to protect are 
generally much less clear 13^ thought out*
Carlin, Howard and Messinger (19&5$ P®58-9) point out that, 
when ’’the poor” are allowed to define their own interests, this 
’’weakens the lawyer's capacity to recognize legal rights and. seek 
legal remedies”* The inability of the functionalist lawyers to 
perceive what may be in the interests of members of a different 
class is demonstrated in an article by Hassard-Short (194*0$ a*^ 
one time secretary of the 'Poor Person’s Procedure’ Committee, who 
praises the efforts of lawyers to procure ’’outside of the Poor Persons’ 
Procedure”, a limited amount of compensation for the dependants of 
a workman, killed as a result of an accident.
”A personal injury case had been settled for a sum of £60, which at the time seemed quite a fair settlement* Subsequently the injured man developed paralysis. The insurance company was approached by the Poor Persons Committee, and notwithstanding the fact that it appeared doubtful if the paralysis was a direct result of the accident, a further payment of £50 was granted by the company. While the cheque was in the post the man died, but the insurance company very generously allowed the widow to have the £50*”
(Hassard Short, 194*1$ P®29)
No appraoch sympathetic to any conception of working class interests 
as distinct from those of the rich, the law-makers or the insurance 
companies, could accept such a pittance with the bland complacency
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evidenced by the functionalist lawyer* Therefore,, only by identifying 
those interests that the law serves in an unequal society, in terms 
of a theory which posits the existence of classes with different 
interests sometimes mutually exclusive in nature, can the position 
of legal services be assessed* By abstracting the legal system from 
its social basis the functionalist approach has rendered itself 
incapable of identifying the interests or needs which that system 
is in a position to protect, resulting in the vague references made 
to an indefinable group of those in need, who can somehow be seen 
to be unprotected*
Another manifest result of the concern with the problem of
function is the ’fact gathering1, empiricist research which this
concern breeds* If the legal system is charged with the task of
providing solutions to social disputes, then the chief interest of
researchers will be in v/hether or not it is fulfilling that task*
Thus numerous surveys have been carried out to determine, for example,
whether sufficient numbers of people are being granted legal aid in
16the criminal courts » Perhaps the best (sic*) example of this 
concern, however, is Abel Smith, Zander and Brooke’s (1973) massive 
social survey effort in three of the poorer London boroughs* With 
the help of research assistants, the authors interviewed a random 
sample of 2000 respondents, catalogued the work of over 100 advice- 
giving agencies and produced over 50 tables of statistics to back 
up their *findings*, that working class respondents had a multitude 
of "legal problems" for which they were not receiving any legal help - 
often because the respondents themselves did not identify the incident
16For instance, Zander’s studies of Magistrates Courts (Zander, 19^9 and 1972)*
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as a ’’legal problem”* They also ’discovered* that only 20 per cent 
of the lower educational group (as opposed to per cent of the 
upper) would contact a solicitor with a problem, and that the only■ 
occasions when a majority of the incidents in a problem area reached 
lawyers was 7/hen they concerned real property or matrimony*
The ’need* which the Abel Smith, Zander and Brooke survey
thus found was a ’need* which all the functionalist lawyers had
known was there already; the survey merely spelt this out in statistical
tables and 'types of legal problems, backing up the case for further
extension of legal aid within the current framework* In chi ill-fated 
17’’altitude survey” , there is a hint, however, that the problems 
informing the research might have been of less concern to others:
38 per cent of respondents said that the legal services currently 
provided we re adequate and 48 per cent said that they did not know 
whether the services v/ere adequate or not; and 63 per cent of 
respondents expressed unfavourable or non-committal attitudes towards 
the legal profession generally* This, the only attempt by the researchers 
to discover the reaction of the perceived class of the deprived to 
the lawyers and the legal aid scheme, encountered largely apathy 
and disinterestedness; suggesting the inability of such an approach 
to appreciate the interests of, or even to communicate with, that 
section of the community which is not bene fitting From the working 
of the legal system*
Indeed the surveys of legal need have, by and large, always 
been conducted by and directed towards lawyers, either members of 
the practising profession or those financially dependent on the
17V/hich 7/as relegated to the Appendix (Abel Smith, Zander and Brooke,1975> Pe2A8 et seq*)*
teaching or reform of lav/, suggesting that the failure of the lav/’s 
claims to neutrality and universal applicability may be primarily 
a problem for this group* Ultimately their material dependence upon 
the viability of the existing legal system requires that, to maintain 
the legitimacy of their position, lawyers must assert the universal 
availability of legal remedies and concern themselves with perceived 
problems in this availability, and so it is not surprising to discover 
that the concern with the problems of legal aid lies largely with the 
lawyers* As seen above this concern, although differently emphasised 
and appreciated, is alwaj^ s directed at the same problem of the inability 
or unwillingness of members of the lower classes to use the legal 
system and the services offered by the lawyers*
Legal aid, the means by which this imbalance is adjusted, is 
seen as a continual development towards the final solution of this 
problem: indeed it is regarded as a ndeus ex machine11, which,
if only correctly assembled/'will restore equality and legitimacy 
to the legal system* This conception of changes in the availability 
of legal aid as being part of a gradual development towards the current 
system, or towards some projected ;final goal or solution, which will 
eventually be reached, is again typical of a functionalist approach, 
which, because of its concentration on the functional integration 
of current institutions, is incapable of conceiving of social change 
except as teleologically producing current institutions or a projected 
future functional integration of these* The legal system is such 
an institution and thus legal aid has developed and is continuing to 
develop to ensure that the system functions equally for all, as the 
lawyers claim*
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There is little evidence, however, that the development of 
legal aid is approaching this end* Surveys, such as that hy Ahel 
Amith, Zander and Brooke, continually discover new deficiencies 
in legal aid schemes and yet recommend remedies to overcome these 
deficiencies not substantially different from those suggested back 
in 1914* The widely proclaimed neighbourhood approach in the United 
States has shown itself to be subject to the vagaries of federal 
politics as well as of local politics, and some of its strongest 
supporters have suggested that unless the lower class can be given 
their own ” justice industry” they will not benefit from the administration 
of a legal system (Cahn and Cahn, 1966).
However, Cahn and Cahn themselves seem unable to appreciate the 
fundamental contradiction in their conclusion: and their dilemma,
although perhaps more exaggerated, is the same as that present in 
all the attempts to extend the provision of legal remedies for the 
problemsof the lower classes, as defined by the lawyers and the 
legal system* Because of the need to secure their legitimacy and the 
ideology based on this the writers are unable to appreciate the 
social nature of the legal aid schemes, and the bases of these in 
the ideological, political and economic practices of the particular 
groups introducing and implementing them, rather than in some overall 
scheme for integration. They can only understand such schemes in 
terms of their ability to meet the perceived ’needs* of *the poor*.
If any understanding of the nature and importance of legal aid 
is to be achieved, which does not merely assess it against these 
undefined and constantly changing ideological goals, but attempts 
to reconstitute it as a social product and to locate it within a
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particular socio-historical conjuncture, then it will be necessary 
to avoid adopting the problems and perspectives of lawyers and to 
look for an approach which will permit the study of legal aid a s 
a part of the social structure.
Morris (Morris, ?/hite and Lewis, 1973* P*47) was apparently 
aware of this requirement, and attempted to set up "a sociological 
approach to research into legal services’1# She argued that the 
soliologist must ask ’’whose lav/ defines the need?” and ’’who deternmies 
access to services?”, and pointed out that social change was only 
brought about by groups in their own interests and that not all groups 
have equal power to effect social change. She went on to say that 
the role of the lawyer was a mystifying one, being concerned to 
reconstruct his clientfs cases so that they did not threaten the 
norms of society; and that in order to escape the perpetuation of 
the lawyers* definition of legal need, one should look at differing 
perspectives. At the same time, however, she seemed to display a 
concern to ameliorate the problems of legal aid, suggesting that 
the gap between various definitions should be reduced and that 
legislation should bring about wider social change; but, in spite 
of this confusion of concerns, any attempt to adopt a •sociological 
perspective* is immediately suspicious, if only because approaches 
within sociology are so diverse; and, to some extent, suspicions are 
confirmed since Morris does not seem to get much further than the 
conclusion that it all depends upon which perspective is adopted.
As mentioned, however, most of the writing produced by lawyers 
on legal aid has been firmly within a functionalist paradigm, a 
paradigm which is in keeping with the lawyers need to secure legitimacy, 
because it emphasises the importance of the legal system as an
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integral and independent part of the social organisation* Furthermore, 
as suggested, a functionalist approach is incapable of perceiving
the interests of the lower class other than as defined by the functional 
18institutions , and directs attention towards a continuing redefinition 
of those interests in order to ensure that a demand is there to be 
met* The desire to avoid the concerns produced by the perspectives 
of the lawyers and the inability of functionalism to explain social 
change or social conflict, requires, not the selection of any other 
approach at random, but the search for an explanation which can take 
account of change and conflict* Father than taking reified social 
phenomena as a beginning from which integration is developed, such 
an explanation must treat these as end results of particular social 
processes and seek to identify the constituent parts of these processes 
in order better to understand the nature of the phenomena themselves*
It is not, however, sufficient here to identify one important
element involved in the production of legal aid, for instance the
legal profession, and attempt to explain the constitution of legal
aid through an understanding of this element, for instance through
19a sociology of the profession * The initial attraction of such 
an approach i3 that the sociology of the professions appears to 
constitute a body of theoretical knowledge about the development 
of professional institutions and their links with the actual relation- 
ships between professionals and clients, which can be applied to 
legal aid in order to explain the particular relationships in this
18A position which is, of course, based on a tautology*
19Although this approach does appear to have been attempted: see
the unpublished paper given by Whetton (1973) to the third Socio- legal Group Conference at Manchester©
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area* However* most of the writing on the sociology of the professions 
is of little help in understanding the relationships established 
by the legal profession, since, as Johnson (1972) puts it, this work 
is largely confined to studies attempting to define the special 
attributes of a profession or to produce a ‘'checklist for measuring 
the degree to which an occupation is professionalised1'* Johnson 
himself goes on to argue that in order to understand the importance 
of the professions it is necessary to abandon the notion of profession­
alism altogether and return to (Johnson, 1972, P*18)
"The attempt to understand professional occupations 
in terms of their power relations in society - their sources of power and authority and the ways in which they use them”.
Johnson suggests that these *power relations® can be studied
by concentrating upon the way these relations affect the relationship
between professional and client, and develops a three fold typology
of this professional controlCollegiate, where the professional«-
group determines the nature of the services provided: Patronage,
T/here the client determines this; and Mediation, where it is determined 
20by a third party • Johnson's typology does not assist in an under­
standing of the importance of the legal profession in producing 
legal aid; in fact, quite the reverse since it suggests that only 
by studying the relationship involved in the legal aid situation 
can we understand the legal profession itself* The typology does 
not permit the consideration of other social elements which may be 
decisive in determining the nature of a professional institution 
and its relationship with its perceived client group, nor does it
20The legal profession, he suggests, would fall largely into the first type*
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help to explain how or why professional groups may he in a position 
of power and authority within the social structure and in what ways 
this position and the ideological practices dependent upon it determine 
the nature of the professional institution® Elliott (1972> P«136) 
warns that,
"Professional ideas on what should he done, hased on their particular knowledge and expertise, should not he regarded as absolute claims hut as relative to the profession in question and its place in the social structure®"
This is not just a warning against adopting the problems of the
profession and their own definition of themselves, hut also against
studying the professions as independent groups within society,
capable of determining their own relationships and ideologies*
Thus rather than identifying the legal profession as an important 
element in the production of legal aid, and seeking to use a study 
of this element to discover its effect in determining the nature 
of legal aid, it is necessary to realise that this element itself 
is a social product, which can only he understood in relation to
21its position in the social structure and its social constituents o 
The legal profession is affected by its own ideology and the ideological 
limitations imposed by its position in the social structure and its 
conflicts with other groups and other classes; by its needs to 
secure financial security for its members; and thus ultimately by 
the changes in the economic relations within the social structure, 
on which this security and these relationships are based* These 
factors influence the nature of legal aid through the professions 
involvement in the legal aid schemes, and it is this involvement and 
its interconnection with the practices of other groups in creating
n.j Including its involvement in the production of legal aid®
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legal aid which must be studied in order to determine the social 
nature of aid and fully to understand its character and its limitations.
Furthermore this understanding must avoid the problems of 
legitimacy pre-given in the position faced by lawyers writing and 
working on legal aid, and the defining of the interests of all in 
the terms prescribed by the administrators or controllers of the 
legal system. Also it must avoid the teleological notion of social 
change adopted by the functionalists; and the simple causality 
presented by those who wish to pin their hopes for explanation upon 
a ’sociological* appreciation of the individual elements apparently 
involved in the production of legal aid, such as the legal profession. 
"What is required is rather an explanation which seeks to locate the 
social basis of the phenomenon of legal aid in the variety of practices 
historically involved in its formation, treating these in their 
structural position within a particular historical conjuncture and 
taking account of the differences and conflicts of interest between 
different classes and groups in that structure.
Such an explanation, however, would be, in all its different
aspects, an exposition of the structural configurations of the society
itself in that particular period and would properly constitute a
massive undertaking. ■ But the framework informing such an explanation,
2?a framework which owes much to the theoretical work of Marx ~ in 
discovering and elaborating the interrelationships of the major 
elements, can be used to begin a partial understanding of legal aid 
in a particular historical conjuncture, by looking at the operation
22Particularly the methodological insights revealed in the ’drundrisse* (1973) and. incorporated in the analysis presented in ’Capital* (1970)*
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and interrelation of its major determinants and their immediate social 
position. This framework does not attempt to define the interests 
of all in the terms prescribed "by the dominant institutions of any 
particular period; "but posits a social structure in which there 
are different definitions and conflicts of interest, conflicts based, 
ultimately, upon the different economic positions of social classes 
and the resultant need to secure and legitimate these positions or 
to change them. It does not suggest that it is economic factors 
which determine all social configurations: Poulantzas (1973)> for
instance, has pointed out that political and ideological differences 
also may produce different fractions, categories and strata Y/ithin 
classes, whose different interests may at times conflict or at other 
times coalesce into alliances, even across classes: he gives the example
(Poulantzas, 1973* P*41) of the categories of the bureaucracy or 
the intellectuals, whose role in ideological apparatuses places their 
immediate interest outside of their class position. However, it 
does accept that the political, ideological and economic practices 
of different groups (a term which will be used, to encompass Poulantzas’ 
different examples of fractions, categories and strata) will be 
mutually exclusive differences of interest which, in the last instance, 
will represent different class positions.
Neither does this framework treat social change teleologically 
or attempt to explain it by establishing causal links with pre-existing 
factors. It treats all social phenomena as the result of the inter­
relationship of the social factors comprising them, none of these 
being the sole causative factor, but all together acting as the 
structural cause for the existence of the phenomena; and the strength 
of the explanatory power of the framework lies in its ability to
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display the effect of these structurally interconnected factors as 
the social phenomenon under scrutiny* In other words the structural 
interrelationships of events produce a s ocial phenomenon which is 
explained theoretically by disclosing the nature of the phenomenon 
as the social effect of the structural situation* In a full appreciation, 
of course, this phenomenon is the society itself and thus the explanatory 
value of the theory is in its ability to demonstrate the effect of 
all the elements as the society, at any given moment* In this 
undertaking, however, only legal aid is being discussed, and this 
is only a small part of the society; consequently only a partial 
understanding is available*
This partial understanding must also be limited to a particular 
historical conjuncture; the changing relationships of social factors 
over time do not allow for a full history to be developed in a 
relatively limited piece of work* Furthermore the understanding 
gained of any particular historical conjuncture cannot act as an 
immediate guide for action in the current situation - any action 
must be undertaken with a full awareness of the problematic within 
which it is situated and the aims which it has in mind: the theoretical
understanding of a social phenomenon within a particular conjuncture 
may assist in the development of these; but it cannot simply dictate 
a solution based on them*
Thus it is necessary to concentrate on one particular period 
and look at the interaction of the practices of different groups, 
and different classes, in creating the phenomenon of legal aid.
The period chosen is that falling roughly between the two world 
wars, that is the 1920*s, 1930's and early 1940*s, continuing into 
the second war because those factors of importance immediately before
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the war continued to be of importance during it, but were changed 
in certain illuminating and important ways, laying the foundations 
for the legal aid scheme which was to develop after the war* This 
period was the period of the transition of welfare schemes in this 
country from the philanthropy of the 19th-century to an acceptance 
of the ‘need* for and preparation of state financed schemes giving 
claimants automatic entitlement to benefits, which were eventually 
introduced after the war* In relation to legal aid, particularly 
it was tile period in which the first real expansion of the provision 
of legal help for the lower classes took place: beginning officially
in 1914 and leading eventually to the failure of philanthropy and the 
acceptance of the ‘need* for state payments and automatic entitlement, 
again finally introduced after the war* Consequently it can be seen 
that there was a change from an attitude of charity towards the lower 
classes to one of the entitlement to benefits; and this political, 
ideological and economic background is very important for an understand- 
ing of the legal aid problem today*
Therefore in the following two chapters it is intended to discuss, 
with reference to the period of the 1920fs, 1930fs and early 1940*Sj 
the positions and practices of the groups involved in the production 
of legal, aid and the class situation underlying this, and to look at 
the interrelationship of these in producing the effect of the social 
phenomenon of legal aid and the ways in which this interaction and 
its effect in producing legal aid in turn changed these positions 
and practices. Although it is not a total explanation of legal aid, 
this discussion should clear the way for an understanding of the 
social nature of aid and the bases of the problems and contradictions 
surrounding it during this period, and afterwards, to be developed.
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CHAPTER THREE
"The Creation of Legal Aid 1920 to 1942 - The Protagonists"
As suggested in the last chapter, any appraisal of legal aid 
must take account of its creation as the product of the practices 
of different groups within a class society, within particular situations 
of conflict* These practices can be seen to be relatively autonomous 
of each other and of underlying socio-economic structures; that 
is to say that they are not in any immediate sense determined by 
socio-economic changes, but that at the same time such changes must 
produce conflicts which in an uneven and. fluctuating way will have 
to be recognised by and incorporated within various practices* It 
may be fruitful, in understanding the effect of this process, to 
emphasise the different levels of practice already referred to - 
economic, political and ideological - any one of which might be 
dominant at any particular time, although obviously all are inter­
dependant* To attempt a total explanation of the interdependence 
of the various levels of practices of various groups and their 
ultimate dependence upon major contradictions and struggles is naturally 
beyond the scope of this piece of work, although it is within such 
a structure that its more limited aims are situated*
These more limited aims are to look at the interests of relevant 
groups as expressed and implied in their practices and to draw out 
important elements and relationships within these, in so far as such 
were effective in the creation of legal aid; and at the same time 
to look at the converse of this, the effect of the process of the 
creation of legal aid upon the interests and practices of proximate
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groups* Therefore this chapter is concerned only to look at relevant 
groups and identify the interests of such groups and changes in these 
throughout the period; the final chapter will concentrate more upon 
the embodiment of these interests within legal aid and the effect 
of changes in legal aid upon them* The most important group which 
might have appeared to be concerned for the operation of legal aid 
in this period was the official representative of ’national policy*, 
the government in Parliament.
The change in the nature of the government after the first 
world war, gaining power in an election involving a wider section 
of the population and faced with war-time promises to find solutions 
to some of the more pressing problems of poverty, might have been 
expected to make ministers and M .P* *s more concerned with legal 
changes* Especially in the early post-war years the government had 
to placate militant working class demands inside as well as outside 
Parliament, and yet bolster up existing institutions against feared 
economic crises* In his book on "British Social Policy”, G-ilbert 
(1970 pp 19-24) notes the fear of the Lloyd George Government of 
"revolutionary spirit" and the need to back some form of social 
reform* However, "welfare services" were strictly maintained within 
their original limited scope without endangering existing private 
interests, for example, those of the private insurance companies, 
who were given much power in the State insurance schemes for health 
and .unemployment* It would be mistaken, however, to assume that 
the various governments were actively concerned as major protagonists, 
throughout the changes in the ’welfare services*, even during times 
when these limited measures were subject to the catastrophic demands 
resulting from the poverty of the 1920*s and 1930’s* The brunt of
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these demands was increasingly born by social workers and other 
agencies charged with administering Welfare1• Gilbert suggests 
(1970, P.307) that issues of social reform were not discussed in 
the Parliamentary forum, that it was felt by many M.P.’s to be 
squalid and boring to discuss social reform and that consequently 
decision making and control tended to reside at a different level*
In so far as legal aid was a ’welfare service1 (and as will 
be seen there is little precedent for seeing it as such in the 
inter-war period) it remained similarly very much on the periphery 
of party political issues of the day* Difficulty v/as experienced 
in getting M.P.’s with sufficient knowledge and interest simply 
to sit on the Finlay Committee in the 1920’s. No legislation con­
cerning legal aid was passed during this period; and questions 
in the House of Commons were rare, usually coming from legally 
qualified M.P.’s, and always answered by the Attorney General with 
statements prepared by the Lord Chancellor’s Office; which generally 
suggested that the matter was already in hand, but in the hands 
not of the Ministers but of the civil servants in the Lord Chancellor’s 
Office (or in criminal cases in the Home Office)*
However, this is not to suggest that Parliamentary activities 
were irrelevant to the creation of legal aid* Government departments, 
although not directly influential, were important in putting economic, 
political and ideological limitations upon potential changes, partic­
ularly via the mediation of the Lord Chancellor’s Office* Of obvious 
importance here was the role of the Treasury, who, as controllers 
of public resources, could sanction or destroy many aspects of a 
public scheme* Thus one can identify the interests of the Treasury 
in reducing the cost of any financial commitment to legal aid and
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opposing any scheme which would be likely to commit large amounts 
of public money to a state run benefit on a permanent basis*
The rules governing the ’Poor Persons1 Procedure* introduced
in 1914, had envisaged the provision of a government grant towards
the expenses of the Poor Persons Committee and the running of the
scheme, but once the rules had come into operation the grant was
not forthcoming* The money which was used to finance the scheme
at this stage, came from the deposits of up to £5 or £15 paid by
applicants before they could be granted a Poor Person’s Certificate
in matrimonial cases; the money was controlled by the Treasury,
and at their request paid into the Pay Office to be withdrawn by the
Poor Persons Committee, not as needed, but only at the conclusion
of each individual case* When control of the scheme was'passed to
the Law Society in 1926, a grant of £4,500 was made to them by the
Treasury to cover the cost of the changeover and the running of the
2scheme for the first year • After a Law Society estimate that they 
had only used about £3,800, the Treasury proposed to give only £3,000 
for the next year, and, in spite of much disapproval and pleading 
by the Law Society and the Lord Chancellor’s Office, refused to 
revise this figure, insisting that the grant was only being made on 
a temporary basis until the difficulties of the changeover had been 
sorted out*
Perhaps the clearest example of the limitations and controls
Under the 1920 rules £5 was the maximum deposit for divorce petitions; 
£15, reduced from £20 after much discussion with the medical profession who carried out the examination in non-consummation cases, was the maximum for nullity suits*
2The money was late: it was due in April 1926 and by July the first£500 had still not been paid*
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set by the Treasury over legal aid, however, was the report of 
the Government Actuaries Department to the Lord Chancellor’s Office 
made during the sitting of the Finlay Committee, after the suggestions 
of a ’legal benefit* scheme similar to the national health scheme 
had been referred to them. They pointed out that employers were 
already complaining about the cost of health insurance and that any 
further contribution was impossible, especially if it would involve 
litigation between the poor or against the employers. They also 
introduced ideological arguments to back up their economic prescriptions: 
how could the money be distributed to a private profession? and 
if people felt entitled to money would they not go to solicitors 
with all kinds of unjustified problems? They also requested that 
the Lord Chancellor’s Office should come to any other feasible 
solution. This is not to suggest, however, that the Treasury were 
opposed to any form of financial support for legal aid: they were
prepared to allow that deposits held by local law societies on 
behalf of poor persons claiming certificates were not taxable and 
were prepared to support the Service Divorce Scheme in 1942, although 
it would mean slightly less money being received in court fees; 
but their extreme reluctance to accept any form of permanent state 
expenditure on legal aid was a very important factor in conditioning 
decisions made about its scope.
Other government departments also occasionally approached the 
Lord Chancellor’s Office on specific issues concerning legal aid.
In 1931 the Foreign Office was faced with the problem of a poor 
Englishwoman unable to pursue a legal claim in Belgium, and contacted 
the Lord Chancellor’s Office to see if some agreement could be made 
between the two countries concerning legal aid. A treaty was eventually
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signed securing reciprocal availability of poor persons * litigation 
schemes^, although in 1924 the Lord Chancellor*s Office had expressed 
itself disinterested in foreign conventions and "hypothetical advantages 
elsewhere”*
As can be seen the influence of the government, where this v/as 
relevant at all, was used primarily through the Lord Chancellor*s 
Office, and in this respect the importance of this office was immense* 
However, as well as representing the locus for Parliamentary interests, 
the Lord Chancellor*s Office during the inter-war period operated 
as the central mediatory agent for other interests concerned in the 
production of legal aid* It should be noted that this is not simply 
a function of the fact that the Lord Chancellor’s Office files 
provided much of the raw material for this study: the fact that
important correspondence with other major agencies is contained within 
these files is an indication in itself of the importance of the 
Office* In over twenty years there was obviously more than one 
Lord Chancellor, tenure of the office changing hands several times; 
but most of the work within the Office was done, not by the Lord 
Chancellor, but by permanent under-secretaries, and the incumbents 
of these posts remained secure in their positions throughout the 
period*
Particularly influential in this respect was the senior civil 
servant in the Office, Sir Claud Schuster, who throughout the 1920*s, 
1930*s and 1940*s was the primary intermediary bet?/een the various 
groups concerned with legal aid as well as an active protagonist 
himself in the creation of aid* It seems that one of the major
3More advantageous to the British than to Belgians*
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concerns of the Lord Chancellor’s Office was to resolve conflicts 
between other groups and to attempt to maintain some sort of coherence 
in political, economic and ideological practices within legal admini­
stration generally. For example, after the report of the Second 
Lawrence Committee, Schuster wrote to Lawrence noting the difficulties 
of obtaining a unanimous report, and remarking how the solicitors 
on the Committee had been instrumental in winning over the support 
of the Law Society and the profession. In return Lawrence thanked 
Schuster for "running" the Committee well and ensuring that the 
barrister on it was brought into line - albeit at the last minute.
Part of the power inherent in the mediatory role of the Lord 
Chancellor’s Office stemmed from its position as the state body 
responsible for legal administration, on the civil side. This was 
a permanent situation, independent of the power accorded to the 
Office by different governments or the referrals made to it by other 
state organs, or external groups. It meant, for example, that it was 
the Lord Chancellor’s Office which made the official decisions as 
to v/hether or not committees should be set up to investigate possible 
changes in the legal aid provisions, and also determined who would 
sit on those committees and who would give evidence to them. The 
Office also drew up the terms of reference of the committees and 
translated their reports into changes in the rules governing the 
availability of legal aid.
Obviously the initiative for these activities did not come 
merely from within the Lord Chancellor’s Office; many of the decisions 
made represented the interests and suggestions of various other 
groups and individuals. The setting up of the First Finlay Committee 
to investigate criminal legal aid was put to Schuster in the form
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of a demand from the Magistrates Association, particularly by a 
woman J.P., G-ertrude Tuckwell, whilst the Second Lawrence Committee 
was still sitting; Schuster promised to establish the committee, 
although he did not expect anything to come of it# At the time when 
the Second Lawrence Committee was set up the divorce court judges 
and barristers were worried about changes in the divorce procedure 
which might be brought about by expanded legal aid, and it was made 
clear to the committee that the Lord Chancellor would not accept the 
extending of divorce jurisdiction to the County Courts# The case 
of Treasury refusal to sanction any legal insurance scheme has already 
been mentioned; this immediately became Lord Chancellor1s Office 
policy#
It would, however, be a mistake to see the Lord Chancellor*s 
Office in its mediatory role as a passive agency for translating 
various interests and ideological claims into political decisions, 
the Office both created its own further ideological interests and 
modified the interests informing the original claims. In the early 
1920*s the possibility of a legal help scheme financed and controlled 
by the State was suggested to the Office# This was initially used, 
as a threat to try and coerce further co-operation and voluntary 
effort out of the Law Society, by claiming that it would mean auth­
oritarian control and would result in incompetent and speculative 
solicitors establishing themselves and making money out of the scheme. 
After the control of the *Poor Persons* Procedure* had passed to the 
Law Society, there was continuing awareness of the possibility of 
using state money to finance individual lawyers taking poor persons* 
cases, but this proposal was still used by the Office primarily 
as a threat to the profession. However, as other solutions became
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less immediately effective the possibility of state finance remained; 
by 1939 Schuster had suggested it confidentially to the President of 
the Law Society for comment, and by 1942 he recognised it as the only 
major alternative and pointed out its necessity to the Treasury.
Thus the proposal that state money be used to finance the work of 
lawyers taking poor persons* cases had originally been used as an 
ideological tool with which to extract further effort from the legal 
profession but now had become a major part of the Lord Chancellor's 
Office's ideological prescriptions for the legal aid scheme.
In such a context the statements of the Lord Chancellor's 
Office became the predominant rationality within the ideology of 
legal aid, and a major determinant of the form in which other groups 
expressed their position, thus effectively determining their interests. 
Whilst the Finlay Committee was sitting in the mid 1920's, Schuster 
prepared a memorandum on the state and prospects of civil legal aid 
to complement a similar memorandum on the criminal side produced 
by the Home Office. The memoranda were written to clear up the 
situation for committee members and others involved, and to allow 
"false accounts" and exaggerated recommendations to be assessed in 
their proper perspective.
The memorandum prepared by Schuster is interesting in itself 
as. a statement of the Lord Chancellor's Office's ideological position 
at this time. Demands for divorces, increased by the war, were 
identified as the major cause of the problems in a scheme not prepared 
for such a massive demand. The County Courts, admitted Schuster, were 
primarily a debt recovery agency used against the working class by 
an increasingly important credit system, which had to be allowed to 
work freely, unhampered by any delays which might be caused in the
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County Courts if poor litigants were represented by lawyers* The 
lower classes, he pointed out, were only worth suing in the County 
Courts for debts, it would be pointless to sue them in the High 
Court because of the higher costs here, which could not be recovered 
from a poor person, and thus when using the ’Poor Persons’ Procedure’, 
which was only available in the High Court, they were usually plaintiffs 
and, as such, ought to be dissuaded from litigating for fear that 
they might use this privilege as an instrument of oppression* Similarly 
he felt that, although some of the legal advice available to the working 
class under trade union schemes and 'Poor Man’s Lawyer’ Centres might 
be useful, the provision of too much legal advice ought to be avoided 
as this would lead the poor to exaggerate their rights and create 
false grievances*
These ideological propositions were accepted, of necessity, 
by most of the other groups involved in the production of legal 
aid; and, as mentioned, were the yardstick against which false 
accounts were to be measured* Their importance was not due to the 
fact that the Lord Chancellor's Office was uniquely able to dictate 
the format of legal aid; but that because of its position as state 
body and prime mediatory agency, the propositions made to it could, 
along with other demands, be translated into a more coherent ideological 
framework and attain a general authority beyond that of their individual 
protagonists and supporters*
This form of the autonomy of the Lord Chancellor's Office can 
also be seen in the appointment and operation of the committees, set 
up to investigate certain problems in the ’Poor Persons' Procedure*, 
and particularly in the status of the chairmen of these committees*
These committees acted as the official face of the mediatory rol3
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played by the Lord Chancellor's Office, and like the Office itself 
incorporated and reflected various interests and yet at the same 
time structured and conditioned the expression of these. The chairman, 
always a High Court Judge, was in effect appointed by Schuster; but 
not as a choice from many, rather as the selection of the one obvious 
person qualified and experienced enough to undertake the duties 
involved. Although four major committees reported in the 1920's and 
1930's, there were only two different chairmen, Lawrence and Finlay; 
and their involvement in the production of legal aid went much beyond 
their official duties as chairmen. Even after retiring from chairman­
ship, because of the work involved, Lawrence continued to be in close 
correspondence with Schuster in connection with various problems 
which arose in the running of the 'Poor Persons' Procedure', and was 
asked by Schuster to assist in drawing up the rules to amend the 
scheme in accordance with the recommendations made by the Finlay 
Committee in 1928, a task obviously reserved for those distinguished 
in the field.
The other members of the committees were appointed jointly by 
the chairman and Schuster according to a fairly well-established 
formula and representing the major interests involved: two barristers,
two solicitors, one Treasury official, one Home Office representative,
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jlone M.P* from each party , one woman and Schuster himself* Apart 
from the two areas of difficulty, the selection of members for the 
committees followed a similar procedure to that of the selection of 
the chairman: Treasury and Home Office representatives were sent by
their Ministries, solicitors chosen in consultation with the Law 
Society from those prominent in previous official dealings concerning 
legal aid, and barristers chosen for similar reasons by the chairman, 
who himself already a High Court Judge*
The terms of reference of the committees, obviously crucially 
important in controlling the types of questions to be explored arid 
evidence to be submitted, were decided by the Lord Chancellor*3 
Office, usually by Schuster and the Lord Chancellor himself* This 
operated both at an official and an unofficial level: for instance,
whatever was said officially, it was noted that the Second Lawrence 
Committee ’’knew" that the Lord Chancellor did not want Divorce 
Jurisdiction to be extended to the County Courts. The evidence to be 
heard was also effectively determined by the Lord Chancellor*s Office,
^During the appointment of the Finlay Committee, Schuster expressed doubts about the possibility of finding a Labour M.P. with sufficient knowledge and capability to take part* He was right, the Labour M.P. 
and the female member, Dorothy Jewson, over whose appointment similar difficulties were expressed, refused to concur with the memoranda and Treasury evidence and submitted a minority report, suggesting further- reaching changes - obviously they did not have the right kind of 
knowledge and capability.
5This was an innovation for the Finlay Committee and one which caused 
several problems. No-one suitable could be found, especially with 
fears such as that expressed by Leeson of the Magistrates' Association that the attitudes of some women might ”run to crankiness”; and eventually the choice of a Labour Party member, Dorothy Jewson, had 
to be counterbalanced by ensuring that one of the lawyer members was also an M.P., so that there would be two Conservative M.P.'s on the committee as well as two Labour. Dorothy Jewson was also noted for 
her interest in birth control and similar feminist issues*
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who first asked those considered important 7/hether they would like 
to give evidence, and also received other evidence submitted, thus 
being able to control what went to the committees and in what form.
The day to day running of the committees was carried out by secretaries 
from the Lord Chancellor's Office and meetings were held in rooms 
provided by the Office. The records of the interviews conducted by 
the Finlay Committee suggest that most of the questioning came from 
Schuster and the chairman, and that certainly the direction of the 
questioning was determined by these two. It was once more Schuster, 
in conjunction with the chairman, who prepared the first draft reports 
of the committees; and these reports always formed the basis of the 
final report, except, of course, for the minority report of the two 
dissidents on the Finlay Committee.
Thus, although providing an official face for debate over 
different interests, the committees remained very much a part of 
the mediating machinery of the Lord Chancellor's Office, the chairmen 
themselves becoming affiliated to this machinery both during and 
after their service on the committees. Much is said about the nature 
and working of the committees by Lawrence's expression of gratitude 
to Schuster, after the sitting of the second committee of which he 
was chairman, for "running" the committee well and getting Bayford 
(a barrister) "into line" at the last minute.
Such was the position of the chairmen of these committees, 
that, although they v/ere High Court Judges, their practices concerning 
legal aid were more closely affiliated to their role as representatives 
of the supposed neutrality of the Lord Chancellor's Office. Thus 
they could not be seen as representing the particular interests of the 
courts and the judiciary. In fact, in many ways the position of the
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courts and the judiciary was very different to that of the Office, 
often they attempted to put a block in the way of changes which 
otherwise the Office might have been prepared to support. The 'Poor 
Persons' Procedure1 was only available in the High Court and was 
effectively used only for divorce cases; this divorce procedure was 
originally only available in London, partly because the judiciary^ 
felt that such important decisions concerning marital status should 
be controlled and limited by the strict operation of a well-established 
procedure. In 1928 after the suggestion that divorce jurisdiction 
should be extended to some Assize Courts in undefended cases, the 
President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, wrote to 
the Lord Chancellor remarking that collusive divorces^ were already 
becoming a scandal and that the procedure ought to be tightened up, 
thus by implication not favouring the extension of these procedures 
to inexperienced District Registra.rs when problems were already being 
experienced in the Principal Registry over poor persons' divorce 
cases. In fact, when jurisdiction was extended to some Assize Courts, 
the District Registrars were invited to London to watch the Principal 
Registry at work, at the request of the President of the Probate, 
Divorce and Admiralty Division.
The position of the judiciary in regard to legal aid was partially 
dependent upon the different situations in the different levels of
^Primarily the divorce judges in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty 
Division, and the Principal Registry which prepared the divorce cases 
in London.
^Collusion, a ground for refusing divorce, occurred where both parties 
agreed to divorce and attempted to rig up a situation which would give one of them legal grounds. Obviously this was a risk in cases where the petition for divorce was undefended. However, this was the 
situation in over 90^  of the total petitions.
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courts* A Poor Persons' Certificate would exempt the applicant from
8paying High Court fees , for other litigants, however, these fees 
were still prohibitively high, sufficient to ensure that every year 
a profit was made by the court on fees. The County Courts, sometimes 
claimed to have been set up as tribunals for the lower class, also 
charged heavy fees, effectively excluding lower class litigants.
Prominent members of the Lav/ Society, quoted in the Lav/ Times (Harrington 
Edwards, 1928, P.23&), were amongst those who felt that the County 
Courts did provide a service for the poor, for instance Mr. Dennis 
Herbert (London),
"A poor person could generally do his work in the County Court without any professional assistance".
However, this was not the attitude of Parry, a County Court Judge,
who in his book on law and the poor (Parry, 1914» P*25) pointed out
that he was aware that the County Courts were merely debt collecting
agencies; nor that of Schuster, himself, who in his memorandum to
the Einlay Committee on civil legal aid stated that the County Courts
had alv/ays been debt collecting agencies with the poor as defendants,
and that, as such, they were vitally important' for the operation of
the credit system. Indeed the statute v/hich introduced the County
Court system in 1846 had originally been called an’Act for the Better
Recovery of Small Debts".
The Magistrates' Courts, although primarily concerned with minor 
criminal offences, had made claims to be the traditional advisors to 
the indigenous lower classes. In 1888 the Law Journal had noted,
"The practice of resorting to a Court of Summary Jurisdiction when it is presided over by a stipendiary magistrate for legal advice is one
As already mentioned Poor Persons’ Certificates were effectively used only for divorce petitions during this period.
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that appears to be growing in favour with a 
certain class of people. It is natural that 
poor persons....should look up to his worship as something more than the judge of a criminal Court and should treat him as a trustworthy, 
confidential family advisor".
(Law Journal, 1888, P.470) 
and, in evidence to the first Finlay Committee, the Chief Metropolitan 
Magistrate claimed that magisterial legal advice was still providing 
a satisfactory form of advice for the poor, as well as helping to 
enhance the authority of the magistrate. Certainly in the evidence 
submitted to the Finlay Committee by the magistrates and the prison 
governors there was little feeling that injustice occurred in these 
courts through a lack of legal aid, although they are not unanimous in 
this and do not say what was meant by "injustice".
Not surprisingly the High Court, particularly the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division, was primarily concerned with maintaining 
control of divorce jurisdiction and keeping it within strict pro­
cedural limits. Members of the Principal Registry felt that cases 
in the provinces were rushed through too quickly and too cursorily; 
and those registries in the provinces which already had jurisdiction, 
such as Birmingham in 1929s were worried about further extension and 
cases not being dealt with with complete efficiency in new areas. In 
1938 when the Law Society were seeking even wider divorce jurisdiction 
at Assizes, and jurisdiction in ordinary, as well as poor person’s 
cases, the President of the Division was again opposed to this and 
was told by Schuster that, in the face of a crisis, opposition to 
expansion must be determined, for obvious reasons. These reasons were 
basically the same ones as previously mentioned, that the procedure 
was difficult and must be strictly controlled especially in ordinary 
cases where property may be involved,' and were given by the President
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in a reply to the Law Society* The outcome was the extension of 
jurisdiction in poor persons’ cases to four more Assize towns.
Needless to say, the members of the High Court did not express such 
a concern for discrepancies arising in other areas of the legal aid 
scheme. The President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, 
was aware that the practice of not taxing expenses in cases where a 
deposit of under £3*33 was paid by the applicant had allowed some 
disreputable solicitors to make small profits out of poor persons’ 
cases, but he felt that the Law Society was also aware of this and 
that it was their problem.
The concerns and practices of the County Courts in the production 
of legal aid in this period are less important; they were rarely 
directly involved, partly, of course, because the 'Poor Persons’ 
Procedure’ was not available in the County Courts. As mentioned 
above there was strong opposition from the Lord Chancellor, amongst 
others, to the extension of divorce jurisdiction to the County Courts, 
and so the question of their involvement was virtually closed. In 
the few non-divorce, poor persons’ cases which could be remitted to 
the County Courts there was a minor problem; and, in conjunction 
with the Council of County Court Judges, Schuster and Finlay agreed 
early on in the later sittings of the Finlay Committee that if a poor 
person's certificate had been granted in such cases it should remain 
available in the County Court, but that the barrister concerned 
should be given the option of giving up the brief. Other than this 
the Council of County Court Judges was adamant that there be no 
extension of legal aid to the County Courts; it would make their 
task impossible if too many cases were defended, and anyway where the 
poor could already afford to pay there was no justification for turning
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the courts into a "soup kitchen”•
Similarly the interests of the Magistrates1 Courts were largely 
irrelevant* Their claims to have been the legal advisors to the 
lower classes are difficult to substantiate, since there does not 
appear to be much evidence of this activity other than the statements 
made by a few Metropolitan magistrates*
Although the terms of reference of the Finlay Committee covered 
the question of aid in Magistrates’ Courts, Schuster had stated before 
the committee began sitting that there was no hope of a solution to 
this question, particularly as the voluntary effort of the profession 
was already at full stretch* Those magistrates consulted were con­
vinced that there was no injustice under the existing system of no 
representation; as the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate stated in his
9evidence to the committee, it was not in the ’’interests of justice”
to allow defendants to waste time elaborating defences when they were
obviously guilty* However the Magistrates’ Association felt that in
some difficult summary cases legal aid may have been useful in helping
to clarify the case, and that in such cases it would be pointless
10asking the accused to reveal his defence before granting aid • There 
was a suggestion in other evidence submitted to the Finlay Committee 
that aid may have been desirable in the civil matrimonial cases heard 
in the Magistrates’ Courts, especially bastardy cases, but it was
9The test for the court to use in determining whether to grant legal aid in High Court criminal cases was whether such aid would be "desirable in the interests of justice”*
10This again was the existing rule under the 1903 Poor Prisoners Defence Act; it would be pointless in these cases because it was 
the nature of the defence which needed clarification*
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again pointed out that application for certificates and elaborate
hearings would greatly prolong hearings, whose major advantage was
their simplicity* Again the attitude of the magistrates was that,
except in "exceptional cases", aid was not necessary in the Summary
11Courts, xndeed that it would be a positive drawback •
Thus the lower courts, though not entirely irrelevant, were less 
important than the High Court in the construction of legal aid during 
this period, their major involvement being merely to confirm existing 
views that aid was not necessary in such courts*
At least until 1926, v/hen control of the 'Poor Persons' Procedure 
was passed to the Law Society, the administrators of the scheme in 
the Poor Persons’ Committee constituted another important body with 
interests in the availability of legal aid. Being concerned with the 
day to day running of the scheme, the Committee was often first to 
become aware of its mary faults and contradictions* This awareness, 
however, often provided a bone of contention with other groups more 
concerned with the ideological success of the scheme: for instance,
in 1923 the Law Society, believing that there had been a decrease in 
divorce cases since the war which would eventually solve the problem 
of pressures on the scheme, refused to believe figures produced by 
Hassard Short, secretary of.the Poor Persons' Committee, showing IO64. 
cases on the files awaiting a solicitor. The effect of such disagree­
ments was that the Poor Persons' Committee came to be regarded as 
pessimists and bureaucrats rather than a party with an interest in
11The 1930 Poor Prisoners Defence Act, passed after the Finlay Committee had reported, made aid available in the Magistrates*Courts in "exceptional circumstances" to be decided by the Magistrates 
and removed the requirement upon the defendant to disclose his defence when applying for help.
the future of legal aid* However, because their position in a direct 
sense represented the political expediency of the scheme, the contra­
dictions in this position did provide a major source of economic, 
political and ideological change for the other groups involved*
Thus it was in response to the shortages of volunteer solicitors 
revealed by Hassard Short in 1922 and 1923, that the Law Society 
sent its circular letter to members stressing the need to pull together
for the "honour of the profession" and to justify privileges; and
12that Schuster used the threat of state finance to try to coerce 
solicitors into making this effort*
When control passed to the Law Society, the Poor Persons*
Committee was, naturally, disbanded; but, being the only people 
capable of handling the real administrative problems of the scheme, 
its officers did not disappear* In fact they moved, virtually 
*en bloc*, to the Law Society and for the first few years, at least, 
continued to be paid by the Treasury, only now with the money coming 
to them as employees of the Lav/ Society instead of directly from the 
State to them as civil servants as in the past* The running of the 
scheme did not change substantially once it was in the hands of the 
Law Society, as its administrative problems obviously remained very 
much the same* Thus the outlook and practices of the officers 
continued to be different from those of the Law Society, and of the 
other groups, and continued to provide conflict and force change: 
for instance in 1935 Hassard Short again reported a backlog of oases 
in the London area, which prompted the setting up of a committee to 
consider further extensions of divorce jurisdiction at Assizes.
^^Later to become a real alternative 
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The administrators of the *Poor Persons* Procedure* were not
the only group within the Law Society with interests different from
those of the higher officials of the society. The Law Society may
have formally represented the interests of the solicitor*s branch
13of the legal profession , but these interests were quite often far 
from homogeneous and there are even cases of open conflict between 
the positions of the central Law Society in London and those of 
provincial law societies, which will be referred to later.
Throughout the country this period was one of consolidation
for solicitors, consolidating the professional position which had
been assured by the strength of the Law Society, the reforms of
A )property law and the securing of important monopolies • Certainly
conveyancing was becoming increasingly lucrative and Important even
at the expense of lawyers' "traditional business and commercial
concerns" and there was little need for even average solicitors to
look around for new work. Thus most solicitors entirely ignored
litigation in matrimonial and personal injury cases, virtually the
15only areas of law which directly affected the lower classes • Many 
solicitors 7/ere fairly explicit in their expression of dislike for 
such work, for example, in 1929 a Kent solicitor in the local law 
society wrote to point out that many poor persons* cases were turned 
down as "not the right kind of business".
13It certainly in no 7/ay represented the very different interests 
of barristers.
^^Por a fairly brief note of these developments, see Abel Smith 
and Stevens (1967 > Ch.8).
15Directly affected them, in the sense that it was not possible to 
get a divorce or compensation for injury without recourse to law.
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At the beginning of this period much legal 7/ork, including 
divorce work, could only be done in London; thus one third of the 
solicitors* profession worked in London, often doing work as agents 
for large provincial firms* Needless to say this branch of the 
profession was particularly powerful and influential in the Law 
Society, and, like the officers of the High Court, very concerned 
with the strictness of procedure and the good repute of the law, 
since it was the concentration of these qualities in London which 
gave these solicitors their status* The interests of these London 
solicitors, often expressed in the official practices of the Law 
Society, were often distinctive and very different from the practices 
of provincial lawyers, both the successful and less successful ones*
In the area of poor persons* cases this was evidenced in the different 
attitudes to extension of divorce jurisdiction - provincial solicitors 
being fiercely in favour of maximum extension, and London solicitors, 
who benefitted from the agency work in ordinary divorce cases from 
areas where there was no local divorce, being indifferent or even 
hostile to such moves*
For the most part, however, indifference to poor persons* cases 
was not confined to London; the majority of successful solicitors 
did not want to be concerned with the marital problems of the working 
class* Many solicitors, in evidence to the Lawrence and Finlay 
Committees, pointed out that the vast majority of lower class work 
was done by a small group of solicitors* These solicitors, less 
well-off than their illustrious colleagues, often ran very precarious 
businesses with a rapid turnover’of one-off cases, and thus were much 
better suited to the type of work involved under the *Poor Persons* 
Procedure*: in 1920 one solicitor claimed that he could conduct
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1000 Poor Person’s cases a year for a cost of around £5 a case plus
expenses. In 1925 a Wrexham solicitor complained of the unfairness
of this burden of poor , persons* cases falling on the poorest branch
of the profession, but gained little solace from the Law Society who
16often castigated these solicitors for making money out of the poor , 
although it was really the legal system itself and the unethical
17practice of using contingency fees on which these solicitors survived • 
The line between these poor persons* solicitors, and the ’speculative 
solicitors* and bogus ’legal aid societies’*^ outlawed by the Law 
Society was very thin if it was there at all; for instance, in 1933 
when the Law Society attempted to add a clause to a Road Traffic Bill 
attacking ’speculative solicitors’ by limiting costs in accident 
cases, one solicitor wrote to Schuster complaining that they had gone 
too far, had over-estimated the number of ’speculative solicitors* 
and made it difficult for ordinary solicitors to get decent costs*
It is difficult to see what immediate threat the poor persons' 
solicitors and 'speculative solicitors' posed to the Law Society, 
certainly they made money out of the legal system in accident cases 
and it was admitted in 1940 that they had also always made more than 
merely their expenses out of the money paid as deposits in divorce 
cases, but this was not money which would otherwise have gone to the 
respectable solicitor* It was rather the threat to the ideology of
16No doubt they were afraid of how suspicious the charitable scheme would look if the same work could be done for almost the same cost 
without the appearance of charity*
17For the Law Society to point out this, however, would be even more damning, since it would involve an admission that the legal system could be exploited to finance *unlucrative' work.
18See Chapter 1, P* 9»
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detachment and neutrality from all but honourable, individual clients, 
(to which successful solicitors could happily subscribe) provided by 
the practices of these solicitors, which the Law Society, comprised 
largely of solicitors from the upper end of the profession, felt it 
necessary to challenge* In many other ways the Law Society, although 
responsive to the requests of provincial law societies for example, 
failed to represent the interests of all solicitors, often favouring 
some at the expense of others, and this must always be remembered 
when discussing the importance of the legal profession and the Law 
Society in the creation of legal aid*
The Lav; Society was a veiy important body in the creation of 
legal aid during this period. In commanding a monopoly over the 
administration of legal remedies to the populace, the Law Society 
obviously came under a duty to maintain the legitimacy of the viability 
and universality of the legal system* This was implicit in their 
repeated requests for volunteer solicitors to ensure the success of 
the charitable ’Poor Persons’ Procedure' and thus to maintain the 
privileges and status of the profession; and explicit, for example, 
in suggestions that all lawyers should pay a contribution towards the 
expenses for the few solicitors who conducted poor persons' cases, 
thus ensuring that the burden fell equally on a profession which 
benefitted equally from the carrying of the burden. Also any scheme 
to provide free or subsidised legal remedies for the lower classes 
was forced to enlist the co-operation of the legal profession because 
of its powerful control over the administration of the legal system 
and its virtual monopoly in representing qualified lawyers.
In this situation a voluntary scheme was the most obvious solution 
since it did not involve the intervention of the state in the running
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of the legal system and did not disturb current professional practice„ 
Furthermore control of the scheme by the Law Society was recognised 
to be necessary, since effectively they already controlled legal 
administration and would only co-operate in a legal aid scheme in 
which they also exercised a fair measure of control. The need to 
maintain the support and goodwill of the Law Society for the scheme 
to continue was often admitted: in drafting the final report of his
committee Finlay himself admitted that it was pointless making 
recommendations which did not have the support of the Law Society; 
and a year or t?/o later the Secretary of the Law Society stated that 
it was only goodwill within the profession which had kept the scheme 
going up to date.
Many members of the profession knev/ that the running of the 
scheme could be made easier if certain changes were made, and the 
Law Society was forced to accept the need for at least some of these 
changes. Thus they pressed for an extension of divorce jurisdiction 
to the County Courts or the Assizes, against the wishes of the Courts 
and the Lord Chancellor's Office. Schuster had always made it clear 
that County Court divorce was impossible, but throughout the inter­
war period jurisdiction in divorce cases was extended to more and 
more Assize towns. At the beginning of the second war, vrtien lawyers 
were no longer taking poor persons' divorce cases, the Law Society 
decided to support a scheme whereby one or two solicitors were paid 
small sums out of the deposits to conduct divorce cases as the only 
solution to the problem of collapse of the 'Poor Persons' Procedure', 
a scheme which they, along with most other interested parties, had
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19previously opposed, but which now went through almost immediately •
Thus the Law Society could ensure that the interests of the 
profession were incorporated into the legal aid schemes, although 
in doing this they were often politically and economically opposed 
to other groups. Over the extension of divorce jurisdiction they 
were opposed by the courts, the barristers, the Lord Chancellor's 
Office and even some of the solicitors based in London who gained 
from agency work; and, over payments for running the scheme, they 
were opposed by the Treasury, the barristers and the Lord Chancellor's 
Office•
Also, in order to maintain credibility in the scheme to their
members and other important groups, they were forced into official
attempts to minimise the problems and contradictions in the scheme;
for example, in 1923 they confidently predicted that the backlog of
cases reported by Hassard Short would be solved by the decrease in
the number of applications for divorce which had supposedly been
20taking place since the war • This meant that those directly exper­
iencing the short-comings and contradictions of the scheme were a 
source of embarrassment and conflict to the La?/ Society: so later
in 1923* when Hassard Short confirmed the backlog of cases, they 
openly stated that they refused to believe him; and, in the late 
1930's when provincial law societies in South Wales became so swamped
19It was at this time that the Lav; Society admitted that they knew 
that poor persons' lawyers had always taken small sums from the deposits in order to make the scheme economically possible for them.
20The backlog did not disappear, and eventually resulted in control over the scheme being passed to the Law Society in 1926.
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with cases that they refused to operate the scheme, the Lav/ Society 
replied by stressing again the professional duty to run the scheme 
and the fear of a government department taking over if it failed.
The Law Society’s attempts to maintain professional confidence 
and interest in the scheme continued throughout the inter-war period, 
with mar\y circular letters intended to coerce volunteers being sent 
to all solicitors. However the continual shortage of solicitors and 
backlog of cases is noted many times: in 1923 Hassard Short predicted
collapse of the scheme within months; in 1926 the shortage led to 
control of the scheme being passed to the Law Society; in 1928 the 
Law Society requested a lowering of the financial limits to reduce 
the number of cases, in 1935 they requested a greater discretion in 
refusing certificates; and in 1939 they reported a severe shortage 
which got worse after the war started. This need to maintain confidence 
in the operation of the scheme is linked to the Lav/ Society's close 
connections with the Lord Chancellor’s Office, which v/ere usually 
backed up by personal friendships between Schuster and the secretaries 
and chairmen of the Law Society. Throughout the period there was an 
almost constant correspondence between these parties, and it is from 
this correspondence that most of the Law Society's clearest policy 
statements come.
It is possible, however, to find evidence of the different 
positions of provincial law societies or individual lawyers either 
in correspondence directly to the Lord Chancellor's Office or in 
published material. Many provincial law societies v/rote to the Office 
expressing support for the scheme but raising local problems, such as 
the need for divorce at Assizes nearer their area. Several articles
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appeared in the national and in the legal press; for example,
Harrington Edwards (1928) praised the scheme but said that more money
was needed, especially for advice and representation in the County
21Courts, where he knew from experience that it was often necessary •
Many of the individual lawyers working in the legal aid scheme 
were lawyers working in ’Poor Man’s Lawyer' centres in London or one 
of the large provincial cities, who were primarily concerned about 
the lack of facilities and finances for these; they felt that these 
could be improved if the Law Society were to take them over and provide 
some money* Although they were not often directly involved in the 
debates surrounding the production of legal aid, the position of these 
'Poor Man’s Lawyer' centres as the only other means whereby poor 
people could obtain legal help during this period is important, 
particularly as the centres were sometimes quoted as examples of 
what the official scheme could be, or ought to be doing. The 'Poor 
Man's Lawyer' centres were entirely unofficial and usually controlled 
and run by an individual, philanthropically inclined, lawyer* Most 
of the centres were in London and elsewhere the service was, to say 
the least, patchy; services were often confined to advice as to 
legal status only or perhaps the writing of a letter or two, and many 
centres opened on only one evening a week*
In spite of their limited scope the centres were felt to be 
something of a threat by some lawyers: they were criticised for
helping clients who could afford to pay ordinary lawyers’ fees, or 
for referring clients to certain solicitors who charged lower fees
21The reaction of the Law Society Y/as to doubt the validity of Harrington Edwards' factual statements, and to point out that the 
existing scheme had already been shown to be quite satisfactory*
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for these clients and were thus accused of being * speculative 
solicitors*• There was thus some antagonism towards them and 
opposition to any take-over by the Law Society or the G-overnment; 
but by 1926 the Lord Chancellor’s Office had resigned itself to 
the necessity of supporting any voluntary effort, and, although 
there was no question of providing any finance or administrative 
backing, the centres were given some recognition and encouragement 
in the final report of the Finlay Committee and were listed in the 
appendix.
It can be seen that mary of the different activities of partic­
ular solicitors were not represented in official Law Society practices, 
and that often the interests of the individual solicitors who dealt 
with poor persons were very different from those of the Law Society.
The economic security of these firms was in no way as definite as that 
of the large London firms, and thus their concern for organisational 
changes in the provisions for legal help for the poor was more 
immediate, although, at the same time, many of them made some money 
and gained a lot of valuable experience from poor persons1 cases.
This divergence of interests between the official representative 
body and the individual members of the profession was similarly 
very much in evidence in the other branch of the legal profession.
With its monopoly of representation in the High Court secure, the 
Bar was reckoned to be generally very strong in the inter-war period, 
and as always was politically well organised to protect this security. 
Thus it was opposed to reform of .the divorce procedure, and to its 
extension to Assizes, since this would involve travelling to the 
provinces, and obviously it was strongly opposed to any extension of
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County Court jurisdiction . Concern was also expressed by some 
barristers that poor persons who could afford to pay for lawyers 
were being allowed to use the scheme, although it was admitted that 
this was primarily a problem for the Law Society, since it was mainly 
solicitors who were losing business.
However, then the ’Poor Persons’ Procedure’ was very useful
for the younger and less experienced members of the Bar; it provided
them with work when they could get no other work, and gave them
valuable experience which could be seen and judged by those who
mattered. In order to protect these advantages, the Bar was opposed
to the setting aside of special days for poor persons' cases, since
this would mean that those conducting them would not be seen; and
it was opposed to the payment of fees for the conducting of cases,
since this would turn poor persons into fee-paying clients and it
would mean that young barristers conducting their cases would have 
23to be supervised • Thus, for example, in 1913 the Law Journal 
(P.710) noted that the new Poor Persons* Rules were having to be 
redrafted to prevent the possibility of barristers recovering even 
expenses, and in 1925 Schuster admitted that this was done at the 
request of the Bar and on behalf of its younger members.
Because of the valuable, unsupervised experience which the 
'Poor Persons' Procedure' provided for barristers at the beginning
22The Bar's monopoly of representation did not extend to the County Court, and barristers did not like working in them as it did little 
for their reputation; under the 1926 rules they secured the right to drop poor persons' cases which*were remitted to the County Court.
23They did not have to be supervised if they were not getting paid 
for the work, and thus the poor persons' cases provided an easy form of training for the Bar.
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of their careers, there was never a shortage of barristers to conduct 
cases during the inter-war period. However, after the second 7/ar 
had started, the number of younger barristers looking for work began 
to decline; there was still a large number of barristers ‘in practice’, 
but these men were established figures who did not need any free 
experience and would not take poor persons' cases, especially as in 
such cases the brief could not be returned. It was the backlog of 
these cases resulting from this severe shortage of barristers willing 
to take them which was one of the major causes of the introduction
p )of the Service Divorce Scheme for the duration of the war •
The divergence of interests over poor persons' cases between
the younger and older members of the Bar, however, was less important
a factor in the formation of legal aid than were the splits within
the solicitors' branch of the legal profession. This was partly due
to the greater overall cohesion of the Bar, with much smaller numbers
and with no real threat being posed to those at the top by the less
dignified activities of those at the bottom so that, at times, all
were prepared to act to protect the practices of some; and partly
due to the lesser importance of legal aid to the Bar in economic and
ideological terms, since the 'Poor Persons' Procedure' was not a
burden and barristers did not claim to deal directly with the whole
of the society, but with only such clients as were referred to them
by solicitors. This is not to say that the views of the Bar were
not heard - they were often heard first and were always represented
on committees; but for most of the period they were less pressing
*and therefore less important.
this scheme special rules allowed for briefs to be returned by counsel without reason.
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It was the legal profession, the courts and the Lord Chancellor's 
Office who were the main participants in the making of decisions 
concerning the 'Poor Persons' Procedure', and thus the major parties 
involved in the production of legal aid during this period. However 
other elements within the controlling class were involved to some 
degree in the economic, political and ideological problems which 
surrounded legal aid, by virtue of their interest in the administration 
of the legal system as a universally available source of remedies; 
their concern was directed towards the success of the 'Poor Persons' 
Procedure' in order to achieve this. Obviously the amount of influence 
wielded by some of these groups was rather limited, but their different 
interests were often important in exposing further contradictions 
within the schemes.
Non-professional lawyers and the legal journals were much less 
concerned with the problems of legal aid and legal help than is the 
case today; major developments in the legal system and in legal 
practices were to be found more in the areas of property law reform 
and consolidation of monopolies. Various philanthropically inclined 
individuals did attempt to get their views heard, however, both 
through direct correspondence and published material. One could 
hardly identify a coherent ideological or political position in this 
material, partly on account of its paucity alone: for instance,
there were only three or four books published, either by lawyers, 
such as Parry's earlier book (Parry, 1914) and the Left Book Club 
edition of 1938, which made tentative links between legal disability 
and class inequality ('Barrister*, 1938); or by closely concerned 
laymen with legal backgrounds such as G-urney Champion (1926). The 
Left Book Club edition and another book six years earlier by an equally
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anonymous solicitor (1Solicitor*, 1932), though purportedly from
different political stand points, made similar points about the
advantages of the legal system for the rich and the need to face up
to the problems of inequality, although the solicitor 7/as more
optimistic about v/hat could be done to solve those inequalities,
since he appeared to put the blame for maiy of the problems on the 
25Magistrates •
Gurney Champion's book was much more emotional and far reaching,
pointing out fairly clearly the ideological fears that obviously
governed the legal aid issue but were left unsaid by other protagonists.
Law, he said, was necessary to avoid revolution, and, v/ithout justice
for all, the seeds of communism and anarchy would be sown; or, at
least, denial of justice to the lower classes would cause them mental
26worry which would lead to a "loss of production" (Gurney Champion, 
1926, pp. 3 &ncL 4)* Backed by a 'pressure group* consisting largely 
of established members of religious organisations, Gurney Champion 
also attempted to persuade the Lord Chancellor's Office of the need 
for more drastic action. However, even if the reasons for his fears 
were well-founded, the tenor of his solutions did not prove acceptable, 
especially, for example, his suggestion that the government introduce 
a "Poor Persons (Honesty) Bill, 1925" admitting that it was not 
implementing the Magna Carta and was therefore openly denying justice 
to a section of the populace.
Generally, however, the legal media were more than willing to
25Who were not qualified to administer law and were therefore making a mess of it.
26Loss of production would be almost as damaging to those in.power as revolution itself.
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provide ideological support for the legal aid scheme. In 1932, after
the T.U.C. had suggested that the 'Poor Persons' Procedure* was used
as a cover to allow inexperienced laY/yers to practise on the poor,
the Solicitor's Journal (1932, P*2fj) strongly denied.this pointing
out how much money in damages had heen recovered for the poor in
poor persons* cases, and reminding readers that "everyone knew" hov/
27often eminent la7jyers appeared for the poor • Also both the Law 
Journal and the Solicitor's Journal carried laudatory, if brief reports 
of the Law Society's annual conferences on the 'Poor Persons* Procedure'.
Some other charities and non-legal pressure groups were also
concerned about the contradictions within the legal aid scheme and
attempted to sv/ay political opinion to a more liberal position, either
through direct action, such as the running of 'Poor Man's Lav/yer*
centres, or by publishing opinions and giving evidence to committees.
Thus, for example, Gertrude Tuckwell, a prominent magistrate; Margery
Pry; and the Hov/ard League for Penal Reform protested in the 1920's
about imprisonment without proper trial and suggested that aid should
be available in all courts. It appears that these pressures were
instrumental in persuading Schuster to initially set up the Pinlay
28Committee to investigate possible extensions of criminal aid •
Other organisations had less pov/er, however, and their voice 
was heard only when giving evidence to the committees. Their recom­
mendations usually tended to be rather similar: for instance, calling
27Even if everyone did know this, they were certainly reluctant to 
put it doY/n on paper for others to read, no other references to it could be found.
28Although, as mentioned, Schuster v;as convinced that nothing could be done about this.
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for more state money and intervention to extend the scheme, or even
29a state-run scheme with ’public defenders’ ; and could be seen to
30be informed by a fairly homogeneous ideological framework of Fabianism
and welfare statism. The Salvation Army and the Federation of
Residential Settlements both felt there was a need for a v/ide ranging
enquiry into the availability of legal aid, although the settlements
themselves, however, did not really have a coherent policy (the
secretary of the Federation resigning in 1924 because of the failure
to achieve this). However at least one of the major settlements,
Toynbee Hall, was prepared to go as far as to recommend a state
insurance scheme to provide aid for the lower classes. The London
Council of Social Services was much less radical suggesting only
central control of ’Poor Man's Lawyer' centres and more state money
to help in the administration of these; and the National Council of
Social Services further endorsed this, arguing that social workers
should be used in conjunction with other voluntary efforts, to improve
31the provisions for legal advice •
However, when actually giving their evidence, the lesser importance 
attached to the interests of these groups could be seen: Schuster
more or less told those recommending state schemes, that legal aid
29State-paid lawyers as in the United States to represent those who could not afford to pay private lawyers.
^ A  political ideology dominated primarily by support for a gradualist transition towards some sort of social or socialist democracy.
31 Increasing involvement of voluntary social 7/orkers in state organised social service schemes was a feature of the expanding 'social services' 
of the 1920's and 1930's, a development which was politically and ideologically similar to the history of the legal aid scheme and paved 
the way for some of the changes of the later 1940's see Woodroofe 
(1962, P.144 et seq.).
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must remain voluntary and that no state money would be forthcoming.
The Charity Organisation Society and the British Legion were asked
to give evidence to the Finlay Committee, but did not bother, perhaps
aware of the little influence they would have; Gertrude Tuckwell
did not give evidence on the assumption that she knew Schuster would
follow her suggestions; she was obviously unaware of the amount of 
32influence she had •
During the second war military concerns obviously became important
in determining the nature of legal aid, at least in as far as aid
concerned the services. A memorandum from the Army to the Lord
Chancellor's Office in 1940 pointed out the need for legal help,
especially for financial and marital problems, to prevent a weakening
33of morale and the loss of "good soldiers" • The Army were also 
concerned that in applying for legal aid their soldiers should not 
be labelled as "Poor Persons" and requested that for the services 
eligibility for free legal help should be by rank and not by income"^. 
The Army could draw upon voluntary advice from qualified officers 
and they organised this into a fairly well structured scheme; but 
their need for morale led them to demand a "comprehensive” advice 
and divorce scheme, which v/as eventually set up in 1942*
The Army were the major protagonists for organised service legal
32Schuster made no reference to her requests and they are not reflected in the final report.
^The Army seemed quite convinced that marital and legal worry were sure to produce worse soldiers. ,
^S'he ranks which they suggested should be eligible received pay higher than the previous income limits, thus indirectly, and perhaps unintentionally, they were recommending a substantial extension of 
the provisions for legal aid.
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aid schemes and were in fairly close contact with the Lord Chancellor's 
Office, The Navy and the Air Force were less outspoken about the 
need for help and more reluctant to contribute towards any general 
service scheme originating from the Army, they claimed that the needs 
of their servicemen were very different, and they were initially quite 
obstructive to War Office attempts at amalgamation. Finally, however, 
the Service Divorce Scheme did cover all three services; it was a 
direct product of the demands made by the War Office for more compre­
hensive provision of aid, and it was set up with the support of the
Lord Chancellor's Office, Schuster being greatly involved in the
35planning and structuring of the scheme •
This reinforcement of the continued importance of the Lord 
Chancellor's Office as a mediator and innovator in determining the 
structure of legal aid throughout this period, serves as a suitable 
reminder that, although many groups were concerned economically, 
politically and ideologically with the operation of legal aid, not 
all of these concerns were idential nor 7/ere they all equally widely 
accepted and implemented. Particularly relevant to this point was 
the close correspondence which could be seen between the legal pro­
fession and the Lord Chancellor's Office which often effectively resulted 
in the rejection of any propositions which did not have their joint 
approval. Inequality of power and influence, however, did not change 
the fact that a number of different groups were involved in different 
ways in the creation of legal aid during the 1920's, 1930's and early 
1940*s and it will be seen how the foundations for the legal aid 
schemes were directly and indirectly a product of these disparate
35The War Office congratulated Schuster for all the work he had done in setting up the scheme and suggested that he was really responsible 
for its inception and birth.
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interests and practices.
Obviously the consideration of activities given here is very
much one-sided in that it only looks at the interests and practices
of powerful groups. Certainly, as mentioned in the previous chapter,
it is only for these groups that the failures of the universalistic
ideology of the legal'system are a problem and legal aid therefore a
necessity. However, to assume from this that the concerns of these
groups over this problem are determined in a vacuum would be a funde­
rsmentally serious error. Naturally, and in mary cases explicitly , the 
need to preserve the universalistic ideology of the legal system resulted 
from a fear that the lower classes would readily see a partial legal 
system to be a tool of oppression and exploitation, although this was 
an ideological problem which extended beyond the operation of the legal 
aid scheme or the legal system.
The attitudes and activities of the lower classes were the major 
dynamic in producing changes in the economic, political and ideological 
structure of legal aid, just as much as of any.national scheme. The 
unarticulated demands of disunited classes did not appear in published 
material or official documents; but the continual and rising demand 
for divorce from these classes was the major cause of concern for the 
profession and the Lord Chancellor's Office and even the limited 
demand for accident compensation was sufficient to produce a split 
in the legal profession between those who could and those who could 
not afford to ignore such cases.
In spite of the importance of .the lower classes, however, it is 
not possible to deal here in detail with their position in relation
For example, Gurney Champion (1926) and 'Solicitor' (1932).
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to legal aid; partly because of the disunity and lack of articulation 
amongst the working class especially as regards the effects of the 
operation of the legal system; partly because the powerful groups 
concerned with legal aid did not perceive the actions of the lower 
classes as anything more than a latent threat; and partly because 
of the limited nature of this project, already referred to. In the 
next chapter the relationships between the groups involved in the 
creation of legal aid and the demands of the lower classes will be 
discussed somewhat more fully in relation to the changes in the legal 
aid scheme. But it is perhaps interesting to note at this point 
that there was only one reference to the users of the ’Poor Persons’ 
Procedure' in all of the Lord Chancellor’s Office’s files: the
reference was made by Lawrence in 1928, after he had retired as 
committee chairman and after control of the scheme had. been passed 
to the Law Society. He was urging the Lord Chancellor’s Office to 
keep quiet about the £14,000 left over from the deposits paid by 
applicants for Poor Persons* Certificates, which, largely through 
ignorance, they had not claimed back; he feared that the release of 
such news might reduce the faith of the poor in the operation of the 
scheme; but in other respects he thought that the "truth" was that the 
poor persons themselves seemed quite contented with the rules as they 
stood. This "truth" shows how little those concerned with the creation 
of legal aid 7/ere aware of the situation of the lower classes and of 
their response to the ideological claims made by the administrators of 
the legal system.
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CHAPTER POUR
"THE CREATION OF LEGAL AID 1920 TO 1942 - THE STRUGGLE”
Writing about the growth of welfare services at the end of the 
nineteenth century Woodard (19&2, P.316) noted that their intro­
duction at this time was not just an arbitrary ideological decision 
suddenly to attempt to alleviate hardship, but rather was linked to 
the development of capitalist industry and the social organisations 
that accompanied it; he said,
"Poverty did not become a problem until industry’s 
maximum output could not be maintained without more consumers.”
He was referring primarily to the period of the 1870's and 1880's, 
the time when the Poor Law was seen to be partly inadequate, and 
philanthropic groups began to administer other forms of assistance 
to the poor. It Y/as also the time of the first 'Poor Man's Lawyer* 
centres in the newly-formed settlements in London, and of the first 
extension of the 'in forma pauperis' procedure for centuries. To 
suggest such a straight forward economic determinism as Woodard's 
statement implies, that welfare services were a direct product of 
industrial demands, is obviously to over-simplify a much more com­
plicated social process; for example, the changes in London during 
this period are much more fully dealt with by Stedman Jones (1971)• 
However, this statement does indicate the need to see the interests 
of different groups, including those involved in the production of
legal aid, within the context of the social and economic organisation
*
of society and the practices of different classes within that organ­
isation.
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As pointed out at the end of the previous chapter, it is the 
responses of social classes and fractions to economic, political 
and ideological problems and contradictions which provide the force 
for change and creation in society* This is the case for legal aid 
in the 1920's and 1930's just as much as for any other social phenomenon. 
To deal in detail with major economic, political and ideological 
contradictions within which the changes in legal aid are situated
would, as pointed out in Chapter Two, involve a systematic analysis
(of the society itself, a worthwhile but far too weighty task to be 
attempted here; but, it is pertinent and useful to discuss the 
dominant contradictions of this period, at least in so far as they 
can be seen to be fairly relevant to the creation of legal aid. 
Particularly it is useful to demonstrate from this how these are 
linked to the interests of the different groups involved in legal 
aid and become utilized and adapted by these groups, perhaps creating 
problems for them, perhaps being employed in response to problems 
posed by others. Thus it seems wise to include a discussion, albeit 
much abbrieviated, of the economic, political and ideological problems 
which dominated the inter-war period, particularly those aspects 
which are relevant to the creation of legal aid.
It is generally well known that the 1920's and 1930's were a 
period during which most capitalist economies experienced a sharp 
and prolonged recession. Furthermore in Britain this crisis was more 
serious for the population as a whole than that of the 1870's and 
1880's referred to above by Woodard (19&2), this was partly due to 
the greater involvement of the lower classes in consumption and thus 
in the wider repercussions of overproduction. In order to stimulate 
growth it was necessary to create more demand, and one of the effects
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of this for the working class was the increased extension of credit 
to them* It was as a result of this that the collection of debts 
through the County Courts became so important and had to be made 
efficient, a factor which was well known to those in control of the 
courts: thus Schuster pointed out in his memorandum on legal aid
in 1926 that the smooth functioning of the credit system was very 
necessary and that the use of legal aid in the County Courts would 
disrupt this smoothness and ruin the credit system* It was as debtors
fthat many working class families first came into contact with the 
law, and this was increasingly the case throughout this period; 
thus the effects of the operation of this aspect of the legal system 
were spread widely throughout society* Another effect of debt, of 
course, was to put family structure very much under strain; coupled 
with unemployment and consequent shortages of essentials it may have 
had a disastrous effect on many homes, thus perhaps increasing the 
demand for divorces*
Unemployment was very much a product of economic crisis, and at 
times in the 1920’s and 1930's it reached massive proportions in this 
country: over two million out of work, up to twenty per cent of the
work force* This naturally forced crucial changes to be made in the 
social services and welfare provisions* The Poor Law was still in 
existence after the first World War,, but it had not effectively 
survived the pressures put on it both economically and ideologically 
at the turn of the century and was of little importance at this stage* 
The pre-war Liberal Government had introduced unemployment benefit, 
although this originally only covered a few workers in selected jobs. 
The Lloyd George Government extended this to more workers; but as 
unemployment continued to be the most pressing political problem of
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recession, benefits had continually to be expanded and adapted, 
usually at a desperately late stage and with insufficient knowledge 
and funds, simply in order to placate the Labour movement (see Gilbert, 
1970, P*70 et seq.). The Labour Governments, although at first more 
keen to extend welfare schemes, soon found that they were hampered 
just as much as the other parties by the refusal of the Treasury and 
other major financial interests to endorse the provision of adequate 
funds; and by the 1930’s the unemployment benefit scheme, politically 
the most important limb of the 7/elfare services, was not able to cope 
effectively with the demands placed on it.
This eventual collapse of the unemployment benefit scheme was 
echoed in other welfare services, including legal aid: and it forced
political changes to be made, these being reflected initially in the 
appointment of the Beveridge Committee to review the ?/hole of the 
welfare services. In a period of crisis the demands placed on the 
welfare services were massive, much more than the ill-thought out 
and partial schemes could cope with; and yet in such a crisis it 
was very necessary for the schemes to work, or at least appear to 
work, because of the fear of the working class taking things into 
their own hands if their problems became too acute. As early as 
1920 the Cabinet admitted that,
’’the Communists are gaining converts: the facts
relating to unemployment are indisputable and they form a powerful weapon for attacking the capitalist 
system.”
(in Gilbert, 1970, P.77)
Paced with the economic contradictions of overproduction, the welfare 
schemes seemed doomed to failure, yet this failure was denied or 
displaced for most of the period since it would have been politically 
disastrous for those in power to admit its reality.
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Thus it can be seen that political practice was very much 
tied to the economic situation* Not surprisingly, the fears of 
working class unrest and revolution subsided somewhat in the later 
1930*s - the crisis had continued for some time and there had been 
no revolution, the failure of the general strike had been a severe 
setback for the Labour movement, and two Labour Governments had 
given the movement the impression of power without actually changing 
anything substantial* In spite of the influx of Labour M.P.’s, 
Parliament in the 1920’s was still composed largely of lawyers and 
businessmen, whose concerns were still largely those of property- and 
industry* The post war Lloyd George Government was very aware that 
malnutrition, bad housing and low wages were important issues for a 
much increased electorate with war on its mind; but it could hardly 
afford both to 'solve* these problems and to appease its members’ 
concern with their propoerty interests* Thus by the time of the 
early 1920’s, the Directorate of Intelligence was employed full-time 
in keeping some control over revolutionary organisations, and the 
Government retained its political power and the support of the 
majority in the Commons by pledging itself to seek retribution against 
Germany and to carry through limited social reforms* Of course the 
social reforms gradually became more and more limited as public money 
became shorter and economic problems loomed larger*
Apart from being economically problematic, however, social 
reforms were not taken seriously by politicians throughout the inter­
war period* Gilbert (1970, P.3O7) suggests that social reform was 
not an issue in Parliamentary circles, where it was felt to be
At the time of Lloyd George's Government 102 M.P.'s were legally qualified*
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"squalid and boring” to discuss poverty and housing shortages; 
decisions on such issues 'were much more likely to be taken at a 
lower level, i.e., by full-time civil servants in G-overnment Departments, 
and merely confirmed in the Ministerial corridors. This can be seen 
to be the case with the unemployment benefit scheme which throughout 
the period was never really given a full political reconsideration, 
but merely propped up and adapted by a series of stop-gap measures 
introduced to solve particular crises. The political development 
of legal aid can be seen to fall very much into this pattern also.
This political situation was reflected in the position of the 
Labour Party Governments which were caught in the centre of the 
contradictions surrounding social reform. By their attainment of 
power the Labour Governments may have done much to placate the Labour 
movement; but they could never be given any support in government 
by the other parties unless they abandoned their reformist platform. 
Furthermore, they could not carry through reforms on their own; 
they needed public money and the support of established financial
2interests and these were not available for far-reaching social reform • 
Any Government expenditure was continually limited, and thus, for 
example, when in 1931 the Labour Government 7/as forced to cut unemploy­
ment benefit payments by ten per cent, this measure immediately 
resulted in the withdrawal of the support of the Trade Unions and led, 
within months, to the collapse of the Government.
The political see-saw between enforced social reforms, stemming 
mainly either from a fear of revolution and unrest or from a Fabian
2Gilbert (1970, P.169 et seq.) notes the control exercised by the Bank of England, in conjunction with the Opposition, over the Labour 
Government in 1 931•
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or Labour reformist social conscience; and, on the other hand, a 
power structure, which in a period of economic decline wanted to 
conserve resources through traditional outlets, was characteristic 
of the dilemmas faced during this inter-war period. It is evidenced 
also in the decisions made about housing policy, with Rent Act control 
leading to shortages and lack of public money restricting building; 
and, of course, in the case of legal aid. And the contradictions 
here were particularly exemplified by the position of the Labour 
Party, which was able to command enough support to become the Government 
and yet was unable to do anything once in power. These contradictions 
dominated the political situation throughout this period.
Ejy the mid-1930's welfare benefit schemes in their semi-charity,
semi-entitlement form had more or less all broken down and within
3the Departmental Offices plans for reconstruction had already been 
established. The political vehicle for the decisions to reconstruct 
was the appointment of the Beveridge Committee to reconsider the 
structure of the welfare services, which officially confirmed commitment 
to the need for reforms. When reforms were introduced after the 
second war, they were not intended, of course, to remove the contra­
diction between social change and the need to limit public expenditure, 
but merely to reorganise the basis on which public expenditure was 
made and to allow for its increase when this would be possible.
During the period of the I920fs and 1930*s, however, the necessary 
reorganisation did not take place; and thus the frequent crises and 
collapses in the welfare services had to be continually justified and 
legitimated. In order to do this, it was necessary to attempt to
^Yfoere, as mentioned, the major decisions were taken.
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placate revolutionary and reformist feelings by stressing the avail­
ability and success of existing welfare services. This was the 
ideological approach with which the administrators attempted to 
conceal evidence that it was not feasible to make these schemes 
workable•
Writing about the growth of social work in G-reat Britain and 
the United States, Woodroofe (1962) is forced to discuss the ideo­
logical tenets of the welfare services. She argues that the "rags 
to riches" myths of United States democratic ideology were much less 
powerful in this country, and thus social responsibilities were more 
readily admitted. This can be seen particularly in the influence 
of Fabianism, which, although only achieving any direct political 
recognition on the left of the Labour Party, did to some extent 
force general ideological acceptance of the need to sponsor some 
positive form of assistance for the lower classes, at the expense 
of those in more privileged positions. Woodroofe suggests that, 
during this period, this had the effect of forcing an ideological 
transition from private philanthropy to organised assistance: a
transition which was seen by some as the "quiet revolution" which 
Lloyd George had suggested could take place in a "constitutional 
country".
In spite of the Majority Report of the Poor Law Commission 
1905-9 coming out in favour of private charity, the Poor Law had 
effectively been on the decline since the late nineteenth century.
Also the impact of Freudian psycho-analysis on social work ideology 
was on the increase after the turn of the century, perhaps more so 
in the United States, but was not without significance here, requiring 
that the dominant assumptions about individual responsibility be
re-assessed* However, the economic crisis produced a need for schemes 
which minimised the time spent analysing the individual needs of 
clients and could deal with massive demands for help on the hasis of 
simple entitlement to benefit; and this need forced changes in a 
social work ideology concentrating solely on the individual either 
as in need of encouragement or treatment*
This factor contributed towards the ideological shift from 
paternalistic, and necessarily limited*1' private philanthropy towards 
a position more amenable to the notions of automatic entitlement and 
services run on a state basis - notions which, however, only achieved 
political acceptability after the Beveridge Report and the Second 
World War, and after the total collapse of the limited, privately- 
run, schemes of the inter-war period*
Social workers in many different kinds of agencies were as ready
as some of those involved in legal aid to admit the ideological links
between their concerns and existing social practices, and their fear
5of radical change* In 1927 the Charity Organisation Society suggested 
that,
"•••• the only real antidote to Bolshevism is good 
casev/ork”
which can be compared to the statement made by a Solicitor (1932,
P.80) in a book about legal aid five years later,
"I am a Conservative in politics. Those who wish to retain our institutions must reform them. It is the revolutionary party that profits by abuses•”
Necessarily limited, because it *was generally assumed by social 
service agencies that, if those in need were given too much help, they would become lazy and learn to rely entirely on handouts.
^Quoted in Woodroofe (19&2, P«55)*
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Even the more extreme and Eabianist Y/elfare radicals, who demanded 
equal rights and redistribution of v/ealth fitted quite well into the 
ideological requirements of Governments, being able to placate the 
Labour movement by administering relief and benefits■primarily to 
the most powerful and demanding groups amongst the lower classes •
Writing of the history of social services, Woodroofe (1962,
P.205) has suggested that their task was,
"Accepting the existing framework of society - it is mobilising the community's resources to promote the well-being of all individuals."
It can be seen that, throughout the 1920's and 1930*5, this was an
ideological tenet which was very influential in determining dominant
attitudes towards practices within all welfare services, including
the administration of legal aid. Of course the available economic
resources and the existing political framework did, as mentioned
above, impose severe limitations upon the realisation of this ideological
goal, and upon the ability of this ideology to conceal and control
the contradictions between the existing framework and the well-being
of all individuals within it. The effects of these limitations can
be seen especially clearly in the changing nature of legal aid.
The concerns of the groups involved in the production of aid 
during this period, as expressed in the interests and practices 
discussed in the previous chapter, can be seen to demonstrate the 
influence of these dominating perspectives. The effects of this can 
be understood by looking at the major themes produced by these 
interests and practices, their i$ter-relationships and their results 
in producing, upholding and changing the phenomenon of legal aid.
^In the case of welfare these were the unemployed; in the case of 
legal aid, those demanding divorces.
126
These themes will not be dealt with in ary chronological order; 
the purpose of the first chapter was to give an overview of the 
chronology of changes in the availability of legal aid, and to treat 
this part of the analysis in a strictly temporal sequence would 
give a spurious picture of continuous, coherent development and 
interplay, which would be of no explanatory value* Historically 
it can be seen that forces do not follow a gradual, even development^, 
but rather proceed in an uneven fashion, different forces being 
dominant and determinate at different times and some effecting little 
change over long periods. Thus in the production of legal aid it 
can be seen that some factors remained more or less stable and 
dominant throughout the period, some changed much in the light of
other factors and other changes, and some had only brief prominence;
\but that altogether their inter-connectedness and their relationship 
to the structural form of legal aid at any given moment were the 
conditions which made for the development of aid up to the Second 
World War*
Not surprisingly, the economic power wielded by the Treasury 
was of great significance in determining the form and extent of 
legal aid. Every official committee appointed to investigate aid 
during this period had a representative from the Treasury on it; 
and Gurney Champion (1926, P.144) was so bold as to suggest that 
this indicated a desire directly to limit the commitment of any 
public money to the legal aid scheme.
It was the failure of the fund, which it was intended to establish
7As argued earlier, to suggest this would be to project ideologically the current structure as the conscious goal of past changes.
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after 1915 with the support of money from the Treasury, to provide 
for the out-of-pocket expenses of solicitors conduction cases for 
poor persons under the rules introduced in 1914? which effectively 
ensured that these rules in their initial form would collapse; and 
that as a result of this collapse the rules would he rewritten in
g1920 placing the scheme, officially at least , upon a basis of private 
charity throughout* Direct control exercised by the Treasury can be 
seen on several occasions: under the rules introduced in 1920 it
was they who decided how the money paid as deposits by applicants 
should be dealt with; and in 1938 v/hen large amounts of money, 
collected as deposits and abandoned by applicants after their cases 
had been dealt with, were in the possession of provincial law societies, 
it v/as the Treasury who decided that these funds were not taxable 
and could be invested. The influence of the economic control of the 
Treasury could also be seen at the time when control of the ‘Poor 
Persons* Procedure1 was handed over to the Law Society: the Law
Society required a grant of money from the Treasury to cover admini­
strative expenses and £4*500 was given for the first year; but, 
when this was not fully used, the Treasury reduced the next years* 
payment to £3,000 despite strong protests from the Law Society and 
the consequent need for economies to be made.
As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, the Treasury, the 
Bank of England and the powerful financial interests in the country 
during this period would never agree to a welfare scheme involving
0Unofficially solicitors conducting poor persons* cases continued to collect some money for their out-of-pocket expenses from the deposits paid by the applicants before being issued with certificates. 
This activity was eventually admitted by the Law Society in 1940* and became the basis for the financing of the official Service 
Divorce and Civilian Divorce Schemes during the second war.
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uncontrollable state payments, and this limitation can be seen to be 
very important for legal aid also* When such a scheme was suggested 
in some of the evidence given to the Finlay Committee, the Government 
Actuaries Department was quick to exercise control, pointing out in 
a direct communication to Schuster that ary form of national legal 
insurance scheme was not on; that the employers, protesting already 
about health insurance, would take no more; and that some other 
solution would have to be reached* This kind of financial proscription 
was obviously crucial in forcing legal aid to take the form of a 
private charity throughout this period; and, when it was politically 
and ideologically impossible to carry on in this form towards the end 
of the 1930 s , it was the Treasury who were the first to be told, 
by Schuster after the start of the Second World War, of the need to 
reconstruct the ’Poor Persons’ Procedure’ on a new basis after the 
war*
The limitations imposed by this national economic policy dominated 
the form of all welfare services and legal aid, and, although it does 
not appear so in the literature or in the communications on the subject, 
were a major stumbling block in the way of any attempt to put legal 
aid on a different footing, or any ideological move tov/ards automatic 
entitlement to assistance in enforcing legal rights* Elsewhere the 
dominating influence of economic proscriptions over the form of legal 
aid can be seen in the important effects of the economic position of 
the major personnel involved in the operation of the legal aid scheme, 
the legal profession.
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the major concern of 
the bulk of the legal profession at this time was the consolidation 
and development of newly-won monopolies over litigation and conveyancing.
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Thus for the aspiring member of the profession it was not economically 
prudent to be concerned about extending legal services into much 
more dubious areas; in fact, this might very well be positively 
detrimental, because by lowering the status of his clientele the 
solicitor also effectively lowered the status of his practice*.
There are reports in letters to the Lord Chancellor’s Office of 
solicitors turning down divorce cases because there was "not time 
to touch it" or it was "not our kind of work".
The need to deal primarily with prestigious, elitist cases, 
however, was more acutely felt by the top London solicitors; as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, some of the weaker provincial 
firms could not afford to adopt such high aims* For these firms 
legal services for the lower classes were worthwhile, even necessary 
work - one solicitor based in Doncaster wrote to Hassard Short, 
Secretary of the Poor Persons’ Committee, in 1922, pointing out 
that this type of work wa3 not distasteful and could be done quite 
cheaply. Obviously the suggestion that a legal ’practice’ could be 
based on lower class work was a threat to those firms concerned to 
show that the important task was to consolidate property work, and 
so some of the solicitors doing work for the lower classes Tie re 
labelled as ’speculative solicitors'. There is certainly some evidence 
of solicitors, sometimes calling themselves legal aid societies and 
collecting subscriptions on a weekly basis, doing work for the lower 
classes for small fees. However, the major criticism made of these 
lawyers by the Law Journal (1912, P.49) was that they were net 
philanthropic; and Gurney Champion (1926, P.33) was forced to admit 
that whilst ’speculative solicitors’ definitely exploited the poor 
nothing positive could be proved against them whilst Jackson (1940*
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P.256) admitted in 1940 that they did get valuable results.
Eventually the Service Divorce Department showed that poor 
persons' cases could be dealt with efficiently and cheaply by lawyers 
working on a full-time basis, once the need was admitted. But full­
time paid work for the lower classes in the inter-war period would 
have meant sacrificing other developments for the legal profession, 
and so this form of legal aid was not acceptable to them, nor was 
the possibility, explored by the 'speculative solicitors', of conducting 
the cases at a fee and for a profit.
For both branches of the profession a scheme based on private 
charity was financially much simpler and considerably less threatening. 
For the Bar it had obvious advantages in the form of free, unsupervised 
training for young barristers, an interest which was secured in the 
rules introduced in 1914 by the stipulation that on no account should 
fees or out-of-pocket expenses be paid to barristers conducting poor 
persons' cases. For the solicitors private charity allieviated the 
necessity for adapting 'practices' to cope with different cases and 
clients, and allowed the successful firms to ignore poor persons' 
cases, so that the burden of the 'Poor Persons' Procedure* fell on a 
few firms, who often did much other lov/er class work and were perhaps 
close to being 'speculative solicitors'.
Thus, even in 1938> when the 'Poor Persons' Procedure' had 
admittedly collapsed, and Schuster suggested possible reforms of 
legal aid to the Law Society, the idea of extending divorce jurisdiction 
was willingly accepted, but the ’suggestion of paying small fees to 
solicitors conducting poor persons' cases rejected as strongly as 
ever. The inter-relationship between the economic position of the
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legal profession and their ideological stance concerning legal aid 
was of considerable importance during this period. Elliott (1972,
P.132) has suggested that professional ideologies are belief systems 
"through which the practitioners make sense of their work experiences”. 
Without going into a detailed discussion of the relationship between 
ideology and practice, it can be seen that the ideological approach 
adopted by the legal profession during this period was very much 
based upon the requirements of their financial position.
The representatives of the Lav/ Society, the major ideological 
spokesmen for the legal profession, had always insisted that legal 
aid should be based on private philanthropy. As referred to above, 
they were prepared to insist on this even after such a scheme had 
collapsed and led to protest action by solicitors in South 7/ales, 
and the Lord Chancellorfs Office had officially recommended the 
payment of fees to lawyers as a possible solution to the problem.
Even when criticising the scheme as fulfilling only a part of the 
need for legal aid and attacking the Lav/ Society for its unquestioning 
self-confidence, Harrington Edv/ards (1928, P.236) clearly stated 
that the procedure should be kept on a philanthropic basis.
Quite often, however, the professions' ideological opposition 
to fees took the form of opposition to suggestions that it could 
not carry the burden of the legal aid scheme, which it v/as sometimes 
admitted was part of the payment which had to be made for the advantages 
gained from administering the legal system. Thus in evidence to the 
Finlay Committee the Sussex Law Society pointed out that ”it v/as in 
the profession’s own interests to show that the scheme could work"; 
and, in response to Harrington Edward’s suggestion (1928, P.234) 
that the current scheme was only meeting two and a quarter per cent
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of the need for legal aid, Gregory, a Law Society spokesman, said 
that the work was done,
Mfor the honour of the profession and to show the 
world at large that-solicitors had some regard for people other than themselves”,
and added that the scheme had been a great success (Harrington Edwards,
1928, P.236). In 1932 when the T.U.C. alleged that the ’Poor Persons'
Procedure' was used to allow inexperienced lawyers to practise on
the lower classes, the Lav/ Society again replied that,
"everyone with experience of the courts knows how 
frequently eminent and experienced barristers appear gratuitously in poor persons' cases”
(Solicitors’ Journal, 1932, P.25)
To its own members, who refused to carry the burden in honour of the 
profession and its privileges, for instance, the South Wales Law 
societies in the 1930's, the Law Society, in stressing the professional 
duty, coupled with it the threat of take-over by a Government 
Department if the charitable scheme were to fail.
The Lav/ Society's ideological opposition to a State Department 
is quite important here: obviously, if the 'Poor Persons' Procedure*
was a professional duty, then to have it controlled by a Government 
Department would weaken the profession immensely, since control 
over a part of private practice would seriously undermine the 
profession's independence and financial security. Thus Poole, at 
one time chairman of the Law Society, reminded the annual provincial 
meeting (Allen Jones, 1938, P.300) that Government control of the 
'Poor Persons' Procedure' at the beginning of the century had nearly 
wrecked the scheme, thus enlisting the profession's ideological 
support for continued philanthropy at a time when the scheme was 
again collapsing and the Lord Chancellor's Office was considering
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paying lawyers to do poor persons’ work*
It is in-the light of this ideology, which dominated the profession's 
attitude towards legal aid throughout this period, that later 
suggestions that legal aid v/as a ’social service* and that as such 
it was unprecedented for it to be controlled by a private profession 
should be judged* Such suggestions would be the antithesis of the 
way in which aid was viewed by the Law Society and the Lord Chancellor’s 
Office, the dominant ideological spokesmen on the subject, for whom 
it was logical, desirable and necessary for the scheme to be controlled 
by the profession in order for it to survive in the only acceptable 
form* Not surprisingly acceptance of professional control continued 
even after both the Lord Chancellor's Office and the Law Society had 
accepted the need for a state financed legal aid scheme*
However, the burden of private charity v/as not carried willingly 
by all members of the profession* Towards the end of the sittings 
of the Finlay Committee, the Secretary of the Law Society put it to 
Schuster that the profession needed more encouragement, and that the 
Lord Chancellor’s Office and the courts really ought to Mpat us on 
the back a little more" to ensure their continued support for a scheme 
which gave them little thanks for the v/ork they did* This suggestion 
that there was not full agreement within the profession to support 
the existing scheme is to some extent masked by the general ideological 
statements of the Law Society. Obviously the necessary ideological 
cohesion of the profession did not reflect the different ideological 
standpoints of all of its members, and these, particularly in relation 
to the general ideology, were important in shaping the form of legal 
aid*
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For many solicitors poor persons1 cases were an embarrassment,
’’not their kind of work", and were thus ignored* Therefore the real
burden of operating the 'Poor Persons' Procedure' fell on a few
solicitors, who were often aware that they were doing the charity
9work for the whole profession without getting any credit for it •
Mar^ y of these solicitors did a great deal of other legal work for 
the lower classes, largely one-off cases with a rapid turnover which 
did not assist the financial security of their business, and as a 
result of this their ideological position, where it achieved any 
widespread recognition, was linked to their different economic back­
ground and their practical involvement with the legal aid scheme• 
Indirectly this ideology represented the pressures and contradictions 
of the operation of the scheme and thus constituted an important 
force for changes, especially of a small-scale, administrative nature*
On many occasions these solicitors complained that since they 
were having to do a great deal of divorce work it would help if this 
could be made easier, preferably by allowing it in the County Courts, 
or if not at least extending it to all Assizes. In 1929 one solicitor 
wrote to the Law Society praising them on their running of the scheme, 
but pointing out that since they were doing this work for the Lord 
Chancellor could he not be persuaded to make it easier* In the 1930's 
the solicitors in Cardiff and Swansea felt so strongly that they were 
being swamped by poor persons' cases and that the scheme needed 
reforming that they rebelled against the Law Society's official 
complacency and finally went 'on strike', refusing to take any poor
9In written evidence to the Finlay Committee a Wrexham solicitor 
argued that it was unfair that the poorest branch of the profession 
should do all the charity work, whilst conveyancing and property lawyers never bothered*
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persons1 cases* Although this constituted a severe threat to the 
Law Society's ideological front, it was obviously politically in­
expedient for them simply to give way to such a blatant threat*
They, in turn, threatened the South Wales Law Societies with the 
possibility of state control if the scheme could not be made to work, 
and attempted to minimise the political importance of their revolt* 
However, in that year, 1938, divorce jurisdiction was extended to 
more Assize towns, as requested by South Wales; and the following 
year the 'Poor Persons' Procedure' was admitted to have collapsed 
and the possibility of paying lawyers to conduct poor persons' cases 
was being broached, also as requested by the South Wales societies*
It is no surprise to discover that the professional ideology of 
lawyers was not homogenous, and yet it can be seen that open conflict 
between differing ideological viewpoints was very much the exception. 
The interaction between the strictly independent, private philanthropy 
platform of the top solicitors and the Law Society in London, and the 
hard-pressed, more practical demands of the small local firms, however, 
constituted an important source of pressure for the adaptation of 
legal aid and the manipulation of it to justify existing practices*
The economic and ideological positions of the Law Society were
so decisive in determining the nature of legal aid during the 1920's
and 1930fs, and indeed since then, partly because of the political
power afforded by the position of the Law Society* In Parliament
lawyers have traditionally been over-represented as a professional
group, and, for instance, in the Parliament of 1920 there were 102*
lawyers, who were not afraid to use their political position in their 
own interests* More importantly, however, since the Law Society was 
the only official body representing trained lawyers in the country
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any scheme for the administration of law involving lawyers had to 
enlist their support, and thus largely conform to their demands*
Thus the legal aid scheme was based upon the existing ’private 
practices’ of the legal profession and did not threaten their ordinary 
business^.
Apart from its general structure, however, the Law Society was 
often very much involved politically in bringing about particular 
changes in legal aid, related closely to the profession's position 
of power and knowledge as impleraenters of the scheme* The rules 
drawn up from the recommendations of both the Lawrence Committees 
only came into operation when agreed to by the Law Society, and the 
rules drawn up after the Finlay Committee were amended by the Law 
Society. Divorce jurisdiction was extended to many Assize towns 
throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s to please the Law Society* In 1935 
the Law Society requested a change in the rules to allow them wider 
discretion to refuse applications for poor persons’ certificates, 
and this was immediately done*
/
Further involvement in the creation of the rules governing 
legal aid was ensured by the powerful political position of individual 
members of the Law Society, who were often close friends of Schuster 
and other members of the Lord Chancellor’s Office staff* Just before 
the setting up of the Second Lawrence Committee which recommended 
passing the control of the ’Poor Persons’ Procedure1 to the Law 
Society, the society’s president had asked Schuster to regard favourably 
the position of the Law Society. In 1938 the then president, Reginald
10Where it did they were quick to drop the embarrassing poor persons * cases, as noted above.
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Poole, felt confident enough to ask for a meeting with the President 
of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division to discuss the future 
of the legal aid scheme; and later on in the same year when Schuster 
was considering reconstructing the scheme his "good friend Reggie 
Poole" was quickly told of the proposals.
Generally, Law Society approval v/as sought for all rules likely 
to affect the operation of the 'Poor Persons' Procedure1, and quite 
often the society themselves were asked to draw up the rules. On 
the collapse of the 'Poor Persons' Procedure' and the commencement of
the second war, it was to the Law Society that Schuster turned, and
it was they who were the instigators and organisers of the Service 
Divorce Scheme, demanding changes in the rules so that the scheme 
could be made to work; and later on of the Civilian Divorce Scheme 
also, providing the first official full-time legal service by salaried 
lawyers for the lower classes in this country.
The position of power provided by the cohesive practices of a 
professional organisation gave the Law Society the political weight
to be able to limit the legal aid scheme to their demands and where
*
necessary to force changes to be made in it. But the Law Society 
was never in a position to be able simply to dictate the format of 
legal aid; for instance, they had always claimed that it would be
desirable to have divorce jurisdiction in the County Courts or, at
least, in all District Registries of the High Court and resolved 
several times to push for this to be implemented, yet it was made 
clear that Schuster would not allow County Court divorce. Only very 
slowly was divorce jurisdiction extended to a few Assize towns and 
then only in undefended poor persons' cases.
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The political power of the Law Society, like any political 
power, was only useful if it could be wielded at the correct time 
and at the decision-making level. As discussed at the beginning of 
the chapter, welfare and social policy questions were not really a 
Parliamentary issue at this time, and this was even more so the case 
for legal aid. None of the political parties had any distinctive 
policy concerning legal aid, and consequently changes in Government 
were of no real importance. Very occasionally there was a question 
in the House of Commons concerning legal aid, which was usually the 
product of a particularly articulate poor person persuading his local 
M.P. to take up his case in the House and which tended to take the 
form of "why is something not being done?" and was answered by the 
Attorney General with a statement prepared by the Lord Chancellor’s 
Office, which always pointed out that the matter was in hand and 
something was being done. The result of this was that the effective 
decisions about the nature of legal aid were taken at civil service 
level, and thus, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Lord 
Chancellor*s Office was of crucial importance. It was this office 
which had official responsibility for the administration of the 
legal system, and so the legal profession had to act through the 
Office, as did the courts. They were responsible to the Government, 
through the Lord Chancellor himself, but the Office was actually 
controlled by permanent civil servants with much experience of the 
procedures of political debate.
The Importance of the political practices of the Lord Chancellor*s 
Office are thus obvious. It was’they who set up and ran the Committees, 
which investigated the *Poor Persons* Procedure* during this period, 
and through which the official decisions of the Office were made;
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and, although many different political opinions were aired on these
committees, it is clear that overall control was exercised by the
representatives of the Office in leading the questioning of witnesses
and drawing up the draft for the report. But, not only did the Office
control through its mediation between other interests, it was also
politically strong enough to initiate and carry through changes,
which were opposed by other interests. When the Hodgson Committee
was set up in 1938 on the collapse of the *Poor Persons* Procedure1,
it was given a clear indication from Schuster, who had always been
aware of the possibility of paying state money to solicitors if the
voluntary scheme failed, to consider a change of this nature; and,
by the time the Rushcliffe Committee had been set up to replace the
Hodgson Committee after the second war, a scheme of this nature had
already been accepted by the Office as the only solution and other
11groups were forced politically to accept it •
Although it v/as partly because of the lack of political importance 
attached to legal aid in Parliament, that the Lord Chancellor*s 
Office v/as able politically to control the structure of legal aid; 
any permanent body entrusted with the responsibility for administering 
something like the legal system was certain to become the political 
centre of the production of legal aid. The political centre, hov/ever, 
had to take account of the interests of other parties if it v/as to 
ensure the continuation of the structure which guaranteed it its 
political position. In a letter to the Mayor of Aldershot in 1940, 
rejecting his suggestions of possible improvements in the legal aid
11Por instance, the Treasury, who had already strongly opposed any 
scheme which would commit the expenditure of state money on a permanent basis, were told of the need to reconstruct the scheme along these lines after the v/ar.
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scheme, Schuster pointed out that the Lord Chancellor was continuing 
to consult those who were most likely to give him helpful advice* 
Obviously the Lord Chancellor's Office had to refer to other groups 
and sometimes follow their demands; hut this letter underlines the 
fact that the Office could always choose from whom it was to receive 
advice and whether or not it would follow it#
Largely because of its politically powerful position, the Lord
Chancellor's Office also became an important centre for ideological
debates about the status and future of legal aid. The political
decisions made in the Office naturally prescribed limitations upon
ideological statements about what the nature of legal aid ought to
be; for instance, as early as 1920 Schuster had made it clear,
unofficially, that the Office would not allow divorce jurisdiction in 
12the County Courts , and after this it v/as generally agreed by those 
involved in debates over the extension of legal aid that representation 
for poor defendants was not necessary in the County Courts and v/ould 
even disrupt the simple, efficient procedure in those courts.
Through this kind of predetermined agreement the Lord Chancellor's 
Office v/as in a position, more or less, to set out the dominant 
ideological approach tov/ards legal aid, although always in the 
knowledge that this would be an approach which v/ould be largely 
accepted by the legal profession. Examples of this can be seen in 
the memorandum on civil legal aid prepared by Schuster before the 
commencement of the Finlay Committee, stating, for instance, that the 
poor should be dissuaded from litigating by limiting availability of 
legal aid in order to prevent them from using litigation as an
12The 'Poor Persons’ Procedure' v/as used almost entirely to obtain 
divorces.
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instrument or oppression; and. that, although free legal advice 
was desirable, it too ought to be limited and very carefully controlled 
to prevent the poor adopting aggravated false grievances. In fact, 
the status of the memorandum itself gives an indication of the 
ability of the Office to dictate ideological prescriptions. It 
was drawn up by Schuster to set the position on civil legal aid 
right and to ensure that ’’scrappy and ill-informed” evidence could 
be properly assessed; and, although it v/as officially only intended 
for circulation to members of the Finlay Committee, it contained 
many statements which appeared elsewhere throughout the period, and 
did, of course, form the basis of the committee's final report.
The importance of ideological statements about legal aid from 
the Lord Chancellor's Office went beyond merely the limitations 
laid down by the Office itself; by its acceptance and approval of 
the demands and arguments of other parties the Office could also 
give the appearance of official truth to these ideological positions. 
Thus the Office could both confirm the validity of ideological state­
ments about legal aid and determine the nature of future statements 
by requiring that they fit into this; examples of this can be seen 
in the official and unofficial practices of the Office, In the 
report of the Second Lav/rence Committee the independent, controlling 
position of the Lav/ Society v/as affirmed; it was agreed that there 
was a moral obligation on the legal profession to ensure the success­
ful operation of the 'Poor Persons' Procedure' in return for their 
monopoly over the administration of legal services; and it was 
pointed out that there was evidence that the profession would be 
able adequately to discharge this duty. At the same time, however, 
the Lord Chancellor’s Office staff were unofficially preparing a way
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for the involvement of Government money or control if the private
scheme were to fail: at first the possibility of control by a
government department was used as a threat to the Law Society to
coerce further voluntary efforts out of it, a threat which was
readily accepted and used by the Law Society to coerce its members
into volunteering; but as voluntary effort failed to keep the scheme
going this threat became to be regarded as more of a real possibility,
and by 1938 the idea of paying state money to solicitors conducting
poor persons* cases had been more or less agreed upon within the
Office and was being put to other parties in the form of proposals 
13for reconstruction •
Although perhaps dominated by the official position represented 
in the statements emanating from the Lord Chancellor*s Office, wider 
ideological debates about the nature of legal aid and the possibility 
of changes in it did take place during this period, albeit mainly 
amongst lawyers and other associated groups. Sometimes contradictions 
within the ideology surrounding legal aid would be exposed in these 
debates, perhaps forcing changes to be made in the scheme, perhaps 
merely pushing the ideological commitments towards legal aid a-little 
further in one direction or another.
As early as 1914> Parry, a County Court judge, published a book 
on the subject of law and the poor (Parry, 1914) casting severe doubts 
upon the feasibility of the legal aid scheme. However it seems that
13The continuing political and ideological pov/er of the legal pro­fession can be seen here, however, in effectively securing the abandonment of the other possibility of the state control of the legal aid scheme; and when direct payment was introduced after the. 
second war, control of the scheme remained in the hands of the Law 
Society with no other body in anything more than an advisory capacity.
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his critical cynicism was a little too radical to a chieve general
ideological acceptance. The same is largely true of two important
books published anonymously in the 1930*s. The second, published by
the Left Book Club (’Barrister1, 1938) opened with the sentence,
"There can be no true justice in a capitalist society"
but then went on to lay most of the blame for the lack of justice 
upon the limitations of the ’Poor Persons* Procedure’, the activities 
of ’speculative solicitors’, and the inexperience of magistrates. 
Although the other author (’Solicitor1, 1932) claimed to be "a 
conservative in politics", he made similar criticisms of the legal 
aid scheme, and seems to have been similarly ignored by the other 
major protagonists involved in the production of legal aid.
Some published material did, however, come much nearer to
expressing important trends and contradictions, and consequently
providing for change in the perceived nature of legal aid. Harrington
Edwards (1928), praised the work done by the profession and supported
the voluntary effort; but argued that, by dealing only with divorce
petitions and other High Court actions, the ’Poor Persons’ Procedure’
was, in fact, only meeting two and a quarter per cent of the needs
1 11.of the lov^ er classes for legal services • Representatives from the 
Law Society replied that this was a gross misrepresentation of the 
operation of the scheme and that the author ought to pay more attention 
to the creditable recommendations of the Pinlay Committee (Harrington 
Edwards, 1928, P.23&), thus suggesting that although praise and minor
^^This, he argued, was because the procedure was only available in 
the High Court; and the vast majority of cases concerning poor 
persons occurred in lower courts, for instance, over sixty-two per cent in the County Courts.
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criticisms were in order, it would be wrong to suggest that the legal 
aid scheme was useless, and that it could be seen from an official 
source that this was not so.
Wentworth Pritchard (1935)* in an address to the Law Society
Annual Provincial Meeting, praised the work done by the fPoor Man's
Lawyer* centres, thus officially bringing them the ideological
recognition which the Finlay Committee had recommended would be
politically useful in 1928. Three years later, on the same occasion,
Allen-dones (1938) extended the discussion of 'Poor Man's Lawyer’
centres and suggested that their work could be expanded by the setting
up of advice-giving legal bureaux, perhaps even state financed, as in 
13Sweden • Further ideological support came in 1941 from an article 
written by the administrative officer in charge of running the legal 
aid scheme throughout the 1920's and 1930*s who, although he was 
particularly well aware of short-comings in the operation of the 'Poor 
Persons' Procedure', which by this time was in a state of collapse, 
said that the facilities were greater than was ordinarily realised 
and that the scheme ensured that everyone without means could obtain 
justice (Kassard Short, 1941* P.27)*
Some non-lawyers were involved in challenging and changing 
ideological attitudes towards legal aid. Of particular interest here 
is the work of G-urney Champion (1926), who emphasised the need to 
avoid "anarchy and revolution" or "loss of production" which a failure to 
provide legal aid could lead to, and suggested that mere advice was
15It is interesting to note that by 1938 the possibility of state money being provided for the legal aid scheme was no longer out of 
the question, as it had been earlier; in fact the Lord Chancellor's Office was seriously considering it as a solution to the problems 
experienced by the existing scheme.
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sufficient to solve the problems of most people - the poor, he said,
would be "relieved and happy at advice alone” (G-urney Champion, 1926,
P.20)* He also stressed the need to secure the involvement of social
workers in legal aid schemes, an ideological position which acquired
much support from elsewhere as the ambit of social work expanded and
began to influence the ideology of welfare services* The links between
ideological statements about the nature of legal aid, and the changing
ideology of welfare services generally have already been mentioned;
they were not just co-incidental, but rather were attempts by writers
like Gurney Champion to raise questions about legal services and push
further the barriers of ideological debate. Thus the Charity
Organisation Society and the National Council for Social Services were
occasionally in communication with the Lord Chancellor’s Office, and,
although aware of the weakness of their political position in a legal
department, did try to demand a greater involvement in the legal aid
scheme, particularly involvement in any facilities established for the
16giving of legal advice •
The National Council for Social Services, the London Council
17for Social Services, the Salvation Army, the Settlements and the 
'Poor Man's Lawyer' centres all gave evidence to the Finlay Committee, 
although they had not given evidence to either of the two Lawrence 
Committees or been involved in previous discussions of legal aid*
They pointed out how much the lower classes were affected by increasing 
social legislation and how much legal advice was needed by those 
likely to be covered by these rules, and even recommended that state-
16This was one area, however, which Schuster ensured remained as an unofficial, voluntary activity of minor importance*
17Particularly Toynbee Hall.
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run advice schemes involving social workers he set up. These suggestions 
were, of course, rejected more or less immediateHy by Schuster, but 
they did widen the scope of the debate about possible alternatives and 
sowed the seeds for issues which could be raised again at a later date*. 
Consequently many more social vrork agencies were asked to give evidence 
to the Rushcliffe Committee on legal aid after the second war and were 
even able to secure the establishment of the Lord Chancellor*s Advisory 
Committee on legal aid as part of the new legal aid scheme introduced 
in 1949* a permanent body upon which their voice could be heard in 
debates about legal aid •
Thus it can be seen that the trends in social service ideology 
towards legal rights; automatic entitlement; full-time and trained 
workers instead of philanthropy; and advice as well as assistance 
were issues which were raised within the ideological discussions of 
legal aid also; and, although they were not immediately acceptable to 
the dominant parties involved in the production of legal aid, they 
did provide for the possibility of future changes, at a political and 
economic leyel as well as within the ideology.
It was noted in the previous chapter that, apart from the High 
Court judges and registrars in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty 
Division, the courts were not very much concerned with legal aid 
during this period. They did, however, have some political importance, 
since it was they over whom the Lord Chancellor’s Office had official 
jurisdiction and from whom it gained much of its power; and there was
•18As has been seen in the last few years, the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee can be a very important spokesman in discussions 
on legal aid ideology and can be a powerful force for changes in the 
scheme. In 1974 it suggested that legal aid should be available for representation in tribunal hearings.
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a fairly close relationship between the major judges and registrars 
and the staff of the Lord Chancellor’s Office. Thus, for instance, 
Schuster would sometimes seek the approval of the President of the 
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division before acting, as when they 
agreed in 1938 to put up a concerted, reasoned front in opposition 
to the Law Society’s demands for wider divorce jurisdiction.
It was largely because of the ideological fears of the courts 
that divorce jurisdiction was initially so limited anyway: because
the granting of a divorce was of such social significance, they 
argued that the procedure providing for it needed to be strictly 
controlled, which was possible only if divorces were carried out 
solely in London. Once this position had been abandoned, they 
argued that where the registrars had undergone a detailed training, 
and pointed out on several occasions that lax procedural practices 
were allowing collusive divorces to go through and thus creating a 
public scandal, undermining 'public confidence' in the law and in 
the institution of marriage. Thus they were continually demanding 
a tightening up of procedural safeguards and a ban on the further 
extension of jurisdiction, demands which the Lord Chancellor’s Office, 
as officially responsible for the operation of the court system, was 
virtually forced to accept, although, as has been discussed, fears 
of the imminent collapse of the 'Poor Persons’ Procedure* required 
the Office to put pressures on the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty 
Division to relax its proscriptions a little, from time to time.
It was clear that the Magistrates and County Court judges did 
not want the procedure in their courts slowed down and disrupted by 
the legal representation of poor litigants. They indicated to the 
Lord Chancellor's Office on several occasions and in evidence to the
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Finlay Committee, that they did not think that legal aid was necessary 
in their courts, an ideological position which Schuster accepted 
immediately, and incorporated into his important memorandum on civil 
legal aid, thus clearly establishing it as the official ideological 
attitude. The Magistrates Association did suggest in their evidence 
to the Finlay Committee that there were a few exceptional cases where 
legal representation would be useful in helping to clarify the defence 
being relied upon by a defendent unable to afford a lawyer himself, 
and in the Poor Prisoners Defence Act of 1930 this request v^ as put into 
operation by a change in the rules governing criminal legal aid, 
allowing it to be granted by magistrates for summary cases in "exception­
al circumstances" where they felt it "desirable in the interests of 
justice", without the previously existing requirement that the defendent 
be asked to disclose his defence before a certificate could be granted.
Therefore, although not of a continuing, major importance, the 
courts were involved in determining the nature of legal aid, particularly 
through the political power they exercised by dictating overall 
limitations upon acceptable changes to the Lord Chancellor’s Office; 
and also, as a result of this, through their ideological role in 
creating and restricting the ’need* or lack of 'need* for legal services.
Another theme which influenced the production of legal aid not 
by continually structuring it, as was the case, for example, with 
the economic and ideological power wielded by the legal profession, 
but by directly dictating demands upon it at a particular time, was 
the political power of the military during the second war. Shortly 
after war broke out, the War Office established a fear for the morale 
of the troops if divorce was not readily available; an- acceptance
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of the need for legal advice to keep the ranks happy ; and an 
agreement to change, and in fact considerably extend, the eligibility 
requirements for the ’Poor Persons* Procedure* in order to avoid the 
stigma of labelling the ranks as *poor persons’. Furthermore the 
political power which they wielded, as the leaders of the fighting 
forces during war-time, and exercised through the Lord Chancellor’s 
Office, was sufficient to procure new legal aid schemes to meet 
these ideological requirements within a matter of tv/o years, bringing 
about changes in the availability of legal aid much more far-reaching 
than anything which had been achieved in that direction in the previous 
twenty-five years.
Although it was the Law Society who were officially responsible 
for the setting up and running of the Service Divorce Scheme, it was 
quite clear that it was a legal aid scheme restricted to servicemen 
and women, a fact which demonstrated the political, and ideological 
strength of the War Office, in being able to command the first full­
time state legal aid scheme with automatic entitlement, a scheme which 
although it had been mentioned, threatened and perhaps even seriously 
considered had never actually been officially countenanced in the 
period up to the second war. Also it was the War Office, primarily 
through the Army, who put into operation the first official legal 
advice scheme to work inconjunction with the legal aid scheme.
Schuster had been instrumental in deciding the format for this scheme 
and in drawing up official proposals for it, but it could hardly 
be seen merely as a product of the poliijcal initiative of the Lord 
Chancellor’s Office; for instance, the Navy and the Air Force
19A ’need’ which G-urney Champion had had little success in getting accepted fifteen years earlier.
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initially operated entirely different schemes which they had drawn 
up, and were reluctant to accept uniformity throughout the Services, 
when requested to by the Office,
Therefore, although it might not appear to be a factor which 
would be much involved in the creation of legal aid, it can be seen 
that the political power of the military establishment was for a short, 
but important, period a major force in vastly restructuring legal aid 
and reconstructing its ideological boundaries.
So far discussion in this chapter has concentrated upon the 
major economic, political and ideological themes which have been shown 
to determine the nature of legal aid in this country during the 1920*3, 
1930's and early 1940's, Operating within the context of the social 
situation outlined at the beginning of the chapter it has been demon­
strated how legal aid was a product of the interaction of these 
different factors emanating from within the position of power of 
different fractions, categories and strata of the ruling class, What 
has not been explored is the relationship of these demands and these 
powers to the position of the intended recipients of these charitable 
welfare services, the lower classes, particularly the poorer sections 
of the working class. Nor has it been questioned why, having estab­
lished an acceptable format.for legal aid largely determined by the 
more powerful of the dominant groups, it should have been necessary 
for these groups continually to accept changes, adaptations and even 
expansions of the scheme throughout this period.
One way to approach a discussion of this is to consider one other 
theme from within the interaction of the ruling groups concerned with 
legal aid, a theme which will lead to the addressing of these problems,
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at least at a limited level of analysis. This theme is the political
position of the administrators of the legal aid scheme, who up until
1926 were a small Government Department, the Poor Persons' Committee,
20and after that time were a group of employees in the Law Society • 
Although apparently having little political or economic importance, 
Hassard Short and the other administrators were a constant source of 
pressure and embarrassment to those involved in the operation of the 
legal aid scheme and often provoked the necessity for reaction to 
the problems of the availability of legal aid.
Throughout the inter-war period there are notes in the Lord
Chancellor's Office files from Hassard Short referring to the shortage
of solicitors prepared to take poor persons* cases, to the backlog
of applications awaiting certificates or conducting solicitors or to
the possibility of the scheme finally collapsing. In mid 1922 he
warned that the scheme might be paralysed by December; in 1923 he
said that he feared its imminent collapse if something was not done;
in 1929 he said that the cases awaiting solicitors in London were 
21becoming congested ; in 1935 he said that there was a backlog in 
London again; in 1940 he reported that there were 1600 cases awaiting 
solicitors to conduct them and in 1942 noted that this number had 
increased to somewhere near 10,000. Other groups tended to brush over 
these predictions of doom and at times even flatly denied them, as 
the Law Society did in 1923; but eventually the predictions al?/ays
20In fact virtually the same people, who under the control of the 
Secretary of the Poor Persons’ Committee, Hassard Short, moved over to the Law Society when control of the scheme was passed to them.
21At this time most of the divorce cases, i.e., most of the total 
number of cases, were still heard in London.
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provoked a reaction and a change in the scheme to try and deal with 
them*
This was not simply because Hassard Short’s reports were made from 
a position of power which commanded a response on the part of the 
other groups involved; but because these reports were effectively 
the form in which the unarticulated and unorganised reactions of the 
mass of recipients of the legal aid schemes was made known to, or 
rather ideologically presented to the ruling groups concerned with 
legal aid* As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the only 
direct reference to the interests of these lower classes in the 
official and unofficial correspondence dealing with legal aid 7/as 
Lawrence’s remark to Schuster in 1928 that the poor persons themselves 
’’seemed quite contented with the rules as they stood”, a remark made 
from a position of manifest ignorance*
Not surprisingly the lower classes were in no way directly 
involved in assessing the value of legal aid to them; determining 
a response based on this assessment; and communicating this to the 
relevant portion of the ruling class so that the legal aid scheme 
could be adapted to fit it. As vras discussed in chapter tw'o, the 
availability of legal aid was not a problem for them, and so they 
were not consciously concerned with seeking a solution to it; and at 
the same time those involved in creating legal aid were not concerned 
to seek the advice or opinions of the lower classes - partly because 
of a realisation that they would have nothing to say, partly perhaps 
because of a fear that anything they might say ?/ould expose the 
basis of the scheme and partly, of course, because the channels for 
communications did not exist*
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However, any scheme which was designed to provide justice for the 
lower classes, even if this was only a promise on paper made within 
legal ideology, was destined to invoke some sort of reaction from them, 
albeit merely in the form of a tacit rejection of the limited and 
useless justice offered; and, not surprisingly, this is largely what 
did happen. Thus, for instance, in 1926 there were just over 3000 
applications for legal justice through the ’Poor Persons* Procedure* 
from the millions of people eligible, an average of much below one 
case per qualified solicitor a year. Virtually all of the applications 
were for divorces, since having got legally married one could only 
reverse the procedure by court action with legal representation.
Other forms of legal services purportedly provided by the profession 
were much less Imperative: applications for Poor Persons* Certificates
for actions to claim compensation, where trade unions or insurance 
companies may have been able to help, numbered only in tens, and apart 
from these there was virtually nothing.
There appeared throughout this period to be an almost total and 
explicit lack of interest on the part of the lower classes in the 
problems encountered by a legal system, v/hich claimed to contain 
universally available services and yet effectively wanted to continue 
serving the poY/erful property interests which had given it its income 
and its security. And yet, in spite of this, their much restricted, 
heavily selected and severely means-tested demand for divorce was 
sufficient to provide a continuous series of crises in the solutions 
adopted to these problems by the administrators of the legal system. 
These crises forced a repeated rethinking of the political, ideological 
and economic bases of legal aid by those concerned with it, resulting 
in the move from a scheme based on an extremely paternalistic, private
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philanthropy^ to the official admission of the need for a scheme 
of direct state financing for all lawyers doing work for those who 
could not afford to pay, a scheme which eventually began to be 
realised in 1951* is still the basis of legal aid today and promises 
to be so for the foreseeable future* c
^Sfriich was ignored by the more successful solicitors who did not even want to dirty their hands this much*
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CONCLUSION
As was stated in the Preface it was not the purpose of this 
study to contribute policy recommendations to an ongoing debate about 
how to solve social problems* Had this been the case then this 
conclusion would probably contain a concretisation of the problem, 
as defined, and a prescribed course of action designed to resolve it - 
with a reminder that the value of the suggestions could be proved in 
their implementation and operation. It has been shown, however, 
that suggestions such as this can only solve their problems in a 
very limited way, and can be seen to be inadequate not just in action, 
but by the redefining of the problem so as to permit another solution*
It was demonstrated in Chapter Two that this kind of functionalism is 
theoretically incorrect and that the inconclusiveness of the studies 
carried out within it stem from its false assumptions that the societies 
in which it is applied are harmonious and have clearly defined problems 
which are capable of solution*
This study did not start from such assumptions and did not 
attempt to provide a solution to a problem. Rather it treated the 
formation of problems themselves as problematic and tried to identify 
for whom the problems existed and why they took the form they did, 
by looking at the practices and concerns of those in positions of 
power as definers. Certainly different formulations of the legal 
aid problem can all be seen to occur within the justifying role of 
legal ideology, a practice which concerns lawyers in particular; 
and lawyers are the main protagonists in debates about the extent 
of the availability of legal aid* Thus this study has explicitly 
concentrated upon the activities of lawyers in producing and changing
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legal aid.
Disclaiming any concern with problem solving does not, however, 
remove political importance from this, or indeed any work. Nor is 
any spurious neutrality intended or achieved. By adopting a position 
outside of legal ideology and using a clear theoretical approach, 
which sought to identify and explain the production of social phenomena, 
it v/as argued that policy solutions to problems in legal aid are 
inappropriate to a situation in which the legal system is predominantly 
designed and used by only one part of society; and that, as lawyers 
benefit from this existing role, it would be misguided idealism to 
expect them to re-organise their concerns and make basic changes in 
this, if indeed they would be able to do this were they to try.
This argument is not to be proved in practice - it is in itself a 
part of practice. As an intervention in an ideological debate, an 
attempt to try to direct that debate towards a fuller appreciation of 
the social situation with which it is concerned, its success can be 
assessed from the value of the analysis in clarifying its object.
As stressed at the end of Chapter Two, although it is only a partial 
explanation situated within an explanatory framework which has not 
previously been used to examine legal ideology, the utility of this 
study lies in its ability to explain.
In the light of this it may be worth reviewing the major themes
discussed and their importance in a reappraisal and understanding of
legal aid. After an outline of the chronology of changes in aid;
a ’common knowledge' such as employed by other writers on the topic,
*
the study focussed on the production of legal aid in a particular 
period. This period was the 1920's, 1930's and early 194-0*3, and it 
is especially important because the basis of legal aid as it operates
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today was formulated at this time, whilst other important social 
changes in analagous fields were taking place. By the early 1940*s 
it had been accepted by all the major protagonists that a state- 
financed legal aid scheme, run by the Law Society, should be introduced 
after the war.
There has been no suggestion made that there is any single 
cause of the changes in legal aid, or indeed that causality operates 
in such a unilinear way. Certainly there has been no suggestion of 
the economic determinism from which some would-be Marxist studies 
suffer. Rather it has been contended that different practices, which 
can be categorised as economic, ideological and political, can be seen 
to have been relatively autonomous and through their interconnections 
to have produced social phenomena not entirely dependant on any one 
of them; ultimately the structure of these interconnections is one 
dominated by economic needs, and, where these needs produce antagonistic 
classes, by the antagonisms between these. Legal aid is produced by 
the interaction of the different practices of different groups, which 
themselves are dependent on basic conflicts; this production is 
explored in detail in the third and fourth chapters*
The different groups involved in the production of legal aid were, 
to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on the continued operation 
of the legal system, and thus were concerned to avoid any contradictions 
which might bring about its destruction. Legal aid is one of the 
vehicles used to^overcome these contradictions. The dependence of 
the legal profession on the current operation of the legal system 
was obvious and the particular example of the large London solicitors 
was only one demonstration of the attitudes resulting from this.
These firms ’would not even take poor persons1 cases since these would
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reflect badly on their other work and would use up time y/hich could 
wisely be spent in other pursuits. The major official duty of the 
Lord Chancellor^ Office was to ensure the continued successful operation 
of the legal system, and so their position was clear. The courts, 
being part of the legal system, could hardly but support their own 
existence, for example the Principal Registry of the Probate, Divorce 
and Admiralty Division of the High Court was very concerned about the 
proper form of divorce pleadings, and opposed to certain changes 
because of this. Although some vnriters in the inter-war period were 
critical of legal aid the majority were concerned about its success 
and stressed its good points. Perhaps less dependent upon the 
particular form of the legal system, these writers nevertheless 
derive their *raison dfetref from the operation of laws, about which 
they are the purveyors of knowledge.
Two other important protagonists were less directly dependant 
upon the continued existence of the legal system; the Treasury and 
the War Office. Both represented other aspects of government, which, 
in order to maintain their own position, had, at times, to rely upon 
the operation of the legal system. Having defined divorce as a problem 
of morale for the troops, the War Office needed the legal system to 
provide this, without at the same time classifying its lower ranks as 
paupers or shaking their faith in the law. At a time of economic 
crisis and when increasing demands were being made on state expenditure, 
the Treasury was very concerned to see the legal system operate as 
cheaply as possible and certainly without ary major changes-which 
would involve committing large amounts of money on a permanent basis - 
as the Government Actuary said in 1926, the employers were already 
protesting about payments for unemployment insurance, they would not
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tolerate more state benefits.
The problems shared by these groups were very much those of the 
official operation of the legal system rather than the effects of 
this operation on the lower classes. In all the material encountered 
there was a noticeable paucity of references to the recipients of 
the legal aid scheme, in fact the only one which appeared in the 
Lord Chancellor’s Office files, a reference by Lav/rence in 1925, 
demonstrated a complacent ignorance of the disadvantages experienced 
by the lower classes in obtaining legal justice. In spite of this, 
however, it was the Conflict between a legal system primarily beneficial 
to the ruling class and the unarticulated demands of the lower classes 
for some form of legal restitution (mainly divorce) which provided 
the structuring determinant for changes in legal aid. It was within 
this structuring determination that the practices of the various 
groups of the ruling class produced and changed legal aid, and the 
particular form it took at any one time can be seen to be the result 
of the interaction of the important aspects of these practices.
One clearly important factor was the political power of the 
Treasury; although the suggestion of a state financed legal aid scheme 
was unwelcome to other protagonists, it was the Treasury’s emphatic’ 
refusal to commit any state funds to legal aid on a permanent basis 
which ensured that such a scheme was never seriously considered during 
the period of the 1920*s, 1930’s and early 1940’s. Furthermore this 
political power 7/as not wielded in any secretive way, the report of 
the Government Actuary clearly spelt out the prohibitions and the 
reasons for them. This is perhaps less true in the case of other 
factors Y/hich were in many ways more important in governing the context 
in which decisions about the changes in legal aid were made. Legal aid
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was the product, in a large part, of the economic position of the 
legal profession; a position based firmly on the tenets of 'private 
practice* and opposed, therefore, to any suggestions of state aid, 
salaried lawyers or any kind of control by users* Not surprisingly 
the ideological practice of the profession was very much concerned 
to explain and justify this economic position stressing, for example, 
the need to have independent lawyers and a voluntary scheme* Partic­
ularly at the national level professional ideology openly supported a 
scheme based on private philanthropy in spite of the enormous difficul­
ties faced throughout the period in maintaining this; and even secured 
the passing of control of the scheme to a professional body, the Law 
Society. The profession’s self-justifying ideological practice was 
further supported by the po7/erful political position it enjoyed, 
especially as regards the legal system and legal aid* As mentioned 
in Chapter Three, the Lav; Society, the official representative body 
of the majority of the legal profession, was in constant communication 
with other influential bodies and its chief personnel occupied positions 
of personal esteem and favour* Both officially and unofficially the 
representatives of the legal profession always knew what was going 
on and were consulted about all issues*
The political power of the legal profession v/as closely linked 
to the important political role of the Lord Chancellor's Office, 
which like the economic position of the profession was an important 
factor not merely in the making of decisions, but also in governing 
the situation in which decisions were made. The activities of this 
office clearly demonstrate the power accorded to particular individuals 
within the structure of government, the permanent civil servants who 
were not politically answerable as were Government Ministers* The
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The power exercised by Sir Claud Schuster over the production of 
legal aid during the 1920’s, 1930’s and I9^0fs was certainly greater 
than that exercised by any other individual, and, although it would 
be naive to suggest that the nature of legal aid was simply a function 
of his personal whim, his organising role was certainly strong enough 
to prevent any other interest being able to dictate changes. The 
political position of the Lord Chancellor’s Office also made it the 
central agency for prescribing the ideological framework within which 
debates concerning legal aid were to be conducted, for example 
Schuster’s memorandum about civil legal aid was the statement against 
which other false accounts were to be assessed. However, in spite of 
this piece of individual initiative the activities of Schuster and 
the Lord Chancellor’s Office as a whole were not generally creative; 
and the role of the office largely exemplifies the way in which 
different interests and practices were brought together, changing 
each other and themselves, and emerging eventually as the official 
form of legal aid. Charged with the administration of the legal 
system the office’s official role was one of mediation, and the way 
in which this mediation produced legal add was a central feature of 
the operation of the legal system.
If legal aid were simply a product of the co-operation of 
different groups of the ruling class, however, then, once having 
decided upon the form which this was to take, there should be no 
reason for these groups to continually change and adapt it, as they 
did throughout this period. Of course aid was not simply a product 
of the coalescing of such interests - it was produced to justify 
ideologically the operation of the legal system, which was primarily 
concerned with property and ruling class interests, by giving the
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appearance of making equal access to the legal system available to 
the lower classes* Since this could not really be done without 
fundamentally changing the legal system, and by implication also the 
society in which it operates, the supporters of legal aid were 
continually faced with an internal contradiction, which would be 
heightened if the lower classes actually tried to use the limited 
remedies available to them on anything approaching a regular basis. 
During this period the only use made of the available remedies was 
to obtain a very limited number of divorces; but this was sufficient 
to provoke a series of crises in the scheme, which forced those 
involved with its production to change and adapt it in order to continue 
the appearance that it was meeting the ideological goals of availability 
which they set for it. One could hardly say that this fluctuating and 
highly selected demand for divorces was a conscious part of class 
struggle; but it did reflect indirectly the demands of the lov/er 
classes, particularly the most numerous poorer working class, which 
were in conflict with the operation of the legal system, and so 
forced the production of justifications and legitimations of this 
operation in the form of legal aid*
This legitimating role of legal aid is still apparent today, 
and an awareness of it permits an understanding of the social nature 
of legal aid which cannot be provided by the social surveys of 
functionalist lawyers, which merely extend the ideological importance 
of this role and further its contradictions. The question to be 
faced is not whether or not legal aid should be made more widely 
available; but who is it who is'asking that question and in whose 
interests are its answers formulated*
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